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Abstract
From Social Media to Social Movement:
Developing a Secondary Stakeholder Model for the Information Age

- The Case of Deepwater Horizon

Michele A Jurgens
Chair of the Supervisory Committee:
Pierre Berthon

Secondary stakeholders are thought to differ from primary stakeholders in that they
interact with the firm mainly for the purpose of changing its ethical, societal, and
environmental policies and practices. Research on secondary stakeholders has shown that
they are successful in influencing their corporate targets despite the relative lack of
power, legitimacy, and urgency of their requests. One explanation for the success of
secondary stakeholders can be found in the ‘political process model’ from the social
movement literature. The political process model describes and predicts how social
movements are formed and the conditions that are necessary for them being sustained and
successful. Originally developed to explain state-level social action, such as the civil
rights movement or the French revolution, the political process model sees successful

viii
stakeholder action as a function of political opportunities, framing, and mobilizing
structures. King (2008) suggests that this model can be used to shed light how secondary
stakeholders influence their corporate targets. However, the political process model was
developed in the pre-internet era and social media and the internet connectivity have had
a significant impact on the way that social movements communicate, coordinate and act.
This research seeks to update the political process model to the internet age by posing the
question: How does social media and internet connectivity change the political process
model for secondary stakeholders?
To answer this question this research looks at the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill,
the rise of stakeholder outrage against BP, and the way in which social media was used
by stakeholders to influence the company. The study contributes to existing stakeholder
theory by developing the political process model into a ‘stakeholder process model for
the internet age.’ Specifically, the enhanced framework redefines and introduces new
elements into the traditional political process model: ‘Political opportunities’ are
differentiated and redefined as ‘pre-existing conditions’ and ‘disruptive events’; ‘framing
processes’ and ‘mobilizing structures’ are reinterpreted; and ‘stakeholder action’
differentiated into ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ influence strategies. The implications of the new
model for theory and practice are explored.
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1
DISSERTATION

Chapter 1: Introduction
This study addresses a gap in the stakeholder literature by integrating new knowledge
about the use of social media and internet connectivity to explain how secondary
stakeholders are able to influence their targets. Using a social movement lens and
building upon the conceptual framework of the ‘political process model’ for stakeholder
movements, this research increases our understanding of how the elements of the political
process model have changed in the 21st century and as a result of the use of social media
and internet connectivity (King, 2008a). The Deepwater Horizon spill was studied
because it was one of the first major incidents in which social media and internet
connectivity was used extensively against a firm in the context of a stakeholder protest.
Secondary stakeholders were able to play an important role and were, in fact, driving the
movement against BP. This situation contrasts with traditional explanations about the
ways in which firms are influenced by their stakeholders. Extend research posits that
firms listen to primary stakeholders who by the resource dependent nature of their
relationship with the firm have greater power, legitimacy and urgency in their request
(Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997). This study’s
conclusions suggest that secondary stakeholders used social media and internet
connectivity in a manner that enhanced their ability to impact the firm and other
stakeholders. As such, they may have partially overcome their relative disadvantage visà-vis primary stakeholders through the use of internet connectivity and social media.
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From extend literature, we know that secondary stakeholders can be distinguished from,
and are at a comparative disadvantage to, primary stakeholders with regards to their
ability to influence a target firm; the firm is not dependent upon its secondary
stakeholders for key resources nor do secondary stakeholders generally benefit from the
attributes of power and legitimacy as do primary stakeholders such as employee groups
or important suppliers and partners (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Frooman, 1999; Mitchell et
al., 1997). As such, secondary stakeholders must develop public interest in their cause
and thereby raise concerns among primary stakeholders in order to have an impact on the
firm (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Perrault, 2012).

Recent work on secondary stakeholders’ strategies has drawn on social movement theory
with the aim of finding a theoretical foundation to explain when and why these groups
take action (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008; Lounsbury, 2001; Lounsbury & Ventresca,
2003; Scully & Segal, 2002). It has contributed to a move away from a firm-centric view
of firm-stakeholders relations and towards a more holistic perspective on secondary
stakeholders as individuals and organizations in their own right. While this set of authors
has been inspired by, and borrowed from, the social movement literature, few have
attempted to develop or adapt a social movement model for secondary stakeholders. An
exception to this is King (2008a). He posits that the social movement literature’s
‘political process model’ can be used to better understand firm-stakeholder relations and
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posits that stakeholder influence is greatest when those groups’ take advantage of
political opportunities (such as a change or event that weakens the target corporation),
develop mobilizing structures for organization and discussion, and use framing to draw
media attention and turn public opinion against the target firm (Goodwin & Jasper, 2012;
King, 2008; McAdam; McCarthy; Zald, 1996; Tilly & Wood, 2009). In explaining the
political process model’s applicability to stakeholder theory, he says, “Although it was
designed primarily to assess the actions of state-oriented social movements, many of the
key insights from social movement theory may help us understand corporate
stakeholders. The firm and the state are both social institutions with varying levels of
openness that have many constituents. Both are relatively closed to outside interest
groups, but both also try to actively manage their constituents …many organizational
theories, especially those of the macro-level, emphasize the institutional and resource
constraints that shape organizational behavior, social movement theory provides an
interest-based explanation for change” (King, 2008a, p. 3). King also makes it clear that
this approach is particularly well-adapted to understanding secondary stakeholders, “The
contribution … is to focus our attention on the process whereby managers come to
recognize the consequentiality of secondary stakeholders and their associated claims. I
use social movement theory as a framework for understanding this process” (p. 2).

King’s (2008 a)model, however, does not take into account the role that social media and
internet connectivity are now playing. Social media represent a new ‘tool’ in the
influence strategy arsenal and research in related domains suggests that social media and
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internet connectivity are having an important effect on social movements and consumer
activism. For example, several authors posit that social media have altered the
interactions between corporations and their consumers by increasing transparency and the
outlets for consumers to post complaints (Pitt, Berthon, Watson, & Zinkhan, 2002;
Watson, Pitt, Berthon, & Zinkhan, 2002). Social media and internet connectivity have
also been shown to be change the manner in which activists pursue their causes to
governments, corporations and the public at large, for example, by making it easier,
faster, and less expensive to interact with fellow activists across geographies
(Baringhorst, 2008; Bennett, 2003; Shirky, 2011).

The study makes a contribution by analyzing the case of the Deepwater Horizon rig
explosion and subsequent spill in 2010 off the coast of Louisiana. The rig was owned by
Transocean Ltd., but leased to BP. BP rapidly came under pressure from secondary
stakeholder groups for its ineffective response and repeated underestimation of the
damage produced by the spill. The course of events suggests that secondary stakeholders
acted rapidly and effectively to uncover information pertinent to the public’
understanding of BP’ role in the oil spill. Secondary stakeholders also appear to have
been vigilant concerning BP’s and its partners’ response to the spill and took action to
influence these groups’ behavior. This study explored how these stakeholder groups were
successful in their efforts, how they used framing, political opportunities and mobilizing
structures in their influence strategies, and how they used social media and the internet to
enhance their efforts. The study’s findings led to a refining of the political process model
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with the integration of social media and internet connectivity, and represent a theoretical
contribution to stakeholder theory in the area of secondary stakeholder influence
strategies.

6
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Three literature streams have provided valuable input to this study. First, the stakeholder
literature and, in particular, that part of the stakeholder literature dealing with secondary
stakeholders and their strategies for influencing their target firms. Second, in order to
gain a thorough understanding of the political process model, I have examined the use of
the political process model in the study of social movement and King’ explanation of his
version thereof for use in exploring stakeholder-firm relations (2008a). Finally, recent
literature on social media and the internet are relevant and, in particular, we are
concerned with the research on social media and the internet’s impact on social
movements.

The literature review below is thus split into three sections: 1. Stakeholder Theory &
Secondary Stakeholders; 2. The Political Process Model; and 3. The Impact of Social
Media and the Internet.

2.1 Stakeholder Theory & Secondary Stakeholders

In the stakeholder literature, there have been several efforts to categorize stakeholder
groups and a common distinction is that between primary and secondary stakeholders
(Carroll, 1991; Mitchell et al., 1997; Post, Preston, & Sachs, 2002). By definition,
primary stakeholders (e.g. employees, shareholders, suppliers/partners, etc.) provide vital
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resources to ensure the continuation of that organization whereas secondary stakeholders
(e.g. activists, special interests groups, local community organizations, etc.) generally do
not, or only provide resources that can be substituted or easily replaced. Secondary
stakeholders are those who influence, or are influenced by, the corporation, but who are
not essential to the corporation for survival (Clarkson, 1995). Secondary stakeholders
may champion social and political issues to the firm that are traditionally dealt with by
interacting with governments, and these stakeholders may be concerned with bringing
about institutional or ‘field-level’ change, as well as changes in the practices or behavior
of a single corporation (Baron, 2001; Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007). Primary
stakeholders may also be concerned with broader societal issues; however, their primary
purpose for interacting with the firm is thought to be the maintenance of the mutually
beneficial financial relationship that has been established. Those relationships may
involve, for example, the exchange of goods and services or the provision of capital for
the firm’s growth and development. While the demands of primary stakeholders may
raise important strategic issues for the firm, secondary stakeholder demands are thought
to raise ethical and societal issues which potentially could damage the corporation’s
reputation if not addressed (Goodpaster, 1991; Laan, Ees, & Witteloostuijn, 2007). For
the purposes of this study, I distinguish between primary and secondary stakeholders
along the lines described here. Primary stakeholders will be thought of those groups that
interact with the firm with a view to their financial interests whereas secondary
stakeholders will be thought of as those groups that interact with the firm for the purpose
of changing its ethical, societal, and environmental policies and practices.
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In their efforts to influence the firm, secondary stakeholders are at a disadvantage as
compared with primary stakeholders (Frooman, 1999; Rowley & Moldoveanu, 2003).
Theory suggests that corporations accord saliency to stakeholders based on the
stakeholder’s power, the urgency of the request and the legitimacy of the stakeholder and
the issue (Mitchell et al., 1997; Perrault, 2012). Power is accorded on the basis of
resource dependence – the degree to which one party is dependent upon the other for the
resources it provides – and on the ability of one party to impose its will in the
relationship. Legitimacy in this context is the “ generalized perception or assumption that
the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchmann, 1995).
Secondary stakeholders, who are removed from the day-to-day workings of the firm and
are sometimes individuals or small groups, comparatively lack many of the attributes of
power and organizational legitimacy vis-à-vis the corporation. They raise ethical and
societal issues relative to the firm operations and must rely on the urgency of the request
and the legitimacy of the issue – together defined as “issue prominence” - in order to
provoke a response from their target firm(s) (Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Frooman, 1999;
Perrault, 2012). Issues for which there already exists a consensus of public opinion, for
which the negative consequences are important, or for which there is close proximity of
the consequences to the stakeholder group, are, for example, more likely to be issues on
which stakeholders mobilize and influence the firm (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; T. Rowley
& Berman, 2000). Secondary stakeholders will therefore go to considerable efforts in
order to draw media and public attention to their cause and increase the issue’s perceived
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legitimacy and importance (Greenwood, 2007). Take, for example, shareholder
resolutions that call for immediate action on climate change (Clark & Crawford, 2011).
Their primary purpose, consistent with what is known as ‘private politics’, is to draw
attention to the issue being championed and to contribute to the mobilization of other
stakeholders (Baron, 2001; Derville, 2005). Media and public attention alone will raise
awareness of the potential for a moral or ethical issue, and the right kind of media
coverage can alter perceptions and opinions in the direction desired by these secondary
stakeholders (Hart & Sharma, 2004; B. Neville, Bell, & Menguc, 2005; Sharma &
Henriques, 2005). Secondary stakeholders can also have an impact on the strategic
interests of primary stakeholders. For example, firm partners who in the past had no
reason to be concerned with the firm’s practices may, as a result of secondary
stakeholders’ efforts, perceive that their own strategic interests or reputation may be
threatened by the questionable actions of the firm. If serious enough, partners may choose
to break off their relations with the firm (Greenwood & Van Buren III, 2010; Hoffman,
1999). A table summarizing the differences between primary and secondary stakeholders
with regards to influences on the firm can be found in Appendix 1.

With regard to the question of how secondary stakeholders influence their target firm,
Frooman (1999) draws on Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) theory of resource dependence
and suggests that secondary stakeholders use primarily indirect and coercive influence
strategies such as boycotts, letter and email-writing campaigns, protests, etc. as well as
more subtle methods such as lobbying or attempting to influence key decision-making.
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Indirect influence strategies are those whereby a group attempts to convince stakeholders
with direct influence on the corporation to speak (act) out on behalf of the cause. An
ecology group might, for example, try to influence consumer groups or the government to
put pressure on corporations selling prepared foods to stop using high fructose corn syrup
(Frooman & Murrell, 2005; Frooman, 1999). Coercive strategies are those that try to
force change upon the firm and are in contrast to cooperative strategies that try to
diplomatically cajole and/or reward the firm for altering its behavior. Frooman’s table of
stakeholder influence strategies is presented below. According to Frooman’s approach,
secondary stakeholders would fall into the box in the top left corner, where they are no
dependencies, either on the part of the firm or the secondary stakeholder.
Diagram #1

Source: (Frooman, 1999, p. 200)

Subsequent empirical studies have shown support for Frooman’s (1999) proposition that
stakeholders strategy choices are influenced by their level of dependence on those firms
(Darnall, Henriques, & Sadorsky, 2009; Frooman & Murrell, 2005; Sharma & Henriques,
2005; Tsai, Yeh, Wu, & Huang, 2005). For example, Sharma and Henriques’s (2005)
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study found that the strategies chosen by stakeholders in the Canadian forest products
industry were consistent with Frooman’s model and that they obtained a response from
their focal firm.

Yet, influence strategies – both direct and indirect, coercive and cooperative - have been
found to vary according to the phase in the protest campaign and according to whether
the group is radical or more moderate (Den Hond & De Bakker, 2007; Winn, 2001;
Zietsma & Winn, 2008). Zietsma and Winn’s (2008) model suggests a change-process
perspective whereby stakeholder influence strategies are chosen according to the stage in
the process of change, from the initial state in which the firm’s practices are first
challenged through to the end state when new practices have replaced the other ones. In
their research, stakeholders (as well as firms) used a wide range of strategies, coercive
and cooperative, to try to gain influence over their target. The authors suggest that
stakeholders are primarily motivated to gain influence by creating ‘influence chains’
which connects several stakeholders (secondary and primary) together in a coalition, and
by managing ‘influence flows’ which involve managing the framing of the issue and its
perception by the public, the media, and the parties involved.

Another pair of authors - Den Hond and De Bakker (2007) – have suggested that the
choice of secondary stakeholder influence strategies is based on, 1) stakeholders’ motives
for either de-institutionalization or re-institutionalization of firm practices, and, 2) the
degree to which the group is radical or less so (reformist). They point out that while
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groups might begin at a starting point that is more moderate, escalation will ensue if the
demands are not met and thereby lead to a change to more radical strategies. It appears
that both radical and reformist groups will seek to increase the legitimacy of their
demands by seeking support from other powerful and legitimate actors and stakeholders.
Radical groups, however, are more willing to use illegal or dramatic means to achieve
legitimacy (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992). In an examination of the tactics used by employees
who attempt to influence their firm’s policies on diversity, researchers’ observations
suggest that re-institutionalization of diversity friendly practices, symbolic impact (rather
than material), and gains (rather than damage) were the focus of the employees efforts
(Scully & Segal, 2002). Empirical research has also shown that in certain instances
indirect strategies are favored by all groups over direct strategies (Frooman & Murrell,
2005).

For additional reference and clarification, Appendix 2 provides a list of coercive and
compromise strategies that stakeholders might use, and Appendix 3 provides an
overview of four predictive models of stakeholder influence strategies.

Several researchers have suggested that stakeholders’ strategies are influenced by the
characteristics of the firm(s) they target (Gardberg & Newburry, 2010; Hendry, 2006;
Lenox & Eesley, 2009). Lenox and Eesley (2009) showed that, with regard to ecological
activism, the more a firm polluted, the less likely it was to respond to stakeholder
pressure, yet the more attractive it would be to the activist organization if it were to gain
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firm compliance with their demands. The study also showed that the greater the firm’s
financial reserves, the greater the ability of the firm to resist activists’ pressure tactics and
the higher the marginal cost to the activist organization of a campaign against such a
firm. Rehbein, Waddock and Graves (2004) found that firm size was a factor in
identifying which firms were targeted. Larger, more visible firms were preferred over
smaller firms. A study by Hendry (2006) also found that large firms were a target, but in
addition found that firms with a large environmental impact would be more likely to be
chosen, as well as those that have been targeted in the past for similar offenses.

Social movement theory has inspired much of the recent research on secondary
stakeholders (King & Soule, 2007; King, 2008; Lounsbury, 2001; Lounsbury &
Ventresca, 2003; Scully & Segal, 2002). Researchers have looked more closely at the
characteristics of secondary stakeholders, their motivations, and their interactions with
one another. In this vein, we can identify the works of Rowley and Moldoveau (2003),
Wolfe and Putler (2002), and Gardberg and Newburry (2010), as providing valuable
insight into the characteristics and demographics of protest groups and their members.

Rowley and Moldoveanu (2004) propose that an individual whose identity is strongly
connected with a particular activist group is more likely to take action than an individual
whose connections with such groups is more broad-based. They also argue that a group
or activist that has successfully mobilized in the past is more likely to mobilize in the
future. In support of this notion, empirical work has shown that demographic
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characteristics of individuals, thought to be indicative of social identity, are associated
with certain patterns of protest (Gardberg & Newburry, 2010).

A study by Wolfe and Putler (2002) challenges the assumption that stakeholders within a
particular role-defined group have similar goals and aims, for example, that all
employees, or all shareholders, or all ‘green’ activists have the same perspective. They
argue that in certain instances stakeholders viewpoints will differ within groups and a
consensus among stakeholders within the group on what policy to pursue should not be
assumed. Moreover, the authors found that in certain instances, stakeholders will be
willing to override their self-interest in the pursuit of a large symbolic goal they find to be
important. Issue then is of importance as well.

The issue of stakeholder heterogeneity was also the subject of research that tested
whether stakeholders from the same group – customer/users – but that were from
communities with different wealth profiles were treated differently by their utility
supplier (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006). The authors showed that rich (powerful)
communities were able to extract a better level of ecological performance from the firm
than those stakeholders and communities that were poor ( and less powerful).

Social movement theory also allows us to consider stakeholders’ actions in the broader
context of institutional and social change. A single stakeholder request may be part of a
much larger strategy managed by the stakeholder group, and a single stakeholder may
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engage in actions together with other stakeholders with each group’s role and behavior
altering in whatever fashion best suits the needs of the cause. Van Huijstee and
Glasbergen (Van Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2010a; Van Huijstee & Glasbergen, 2010b)
looked at the relations between two NGOs and a firm over time and showed that
stakeholder groups can play different roles (good guy – bad guy) vis-à-vis the firm, that
they are aware of each other’s role, and that at times they will use their different positions
in a way that allows them to be more effective at influencing the target firm.

Another interesting perspective on intra-stakeholder networks has been provided by
Neville and Menguc (2006) who developed the notion of ‘stakeholder multiplicity’. They
suggest that the extent to which there is congruence between the perspectives of different
stakeholders is important to the success of stakeholders’ strategies via-avis the firm. They
posit that the more that claims are complementary and the less that they are competing,
the more likely it is that the firm will find the demands of the stakeholder groups to be
salient and will act on them.

Friedman and Miles (2002) developed a framework that combines “institutional theory
with a realist theory of social change and differentiation”. They suggest that implicit or
explicit contracts between stakeholders and the firm can provide insight into the behavior
of the parties towards one another. In addition they suggest that the degree to which the
two parties have compatible or incompatible interests also has an important impact on the
choices of stakeholders and firms alike. Both of these factors are subject to change over
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time. For example, the relationship between an organization such as Greenpeace and a
large corporation might be described as, ‘contingent’ (i.e. no recognized contract
operating) and ‘incompatible’ at one point in time and ‘necessary’ (i.e. an implicit or
explicit contract is needed) and ‘incompatible’ once both parties recognize the
advantages that a minimum level of cooperation might provide.

To summarize, secondary stakeholder strategies and the success of those strategies appear
to be influenced by several factors: stakeholder characteristics, target firm characteristics,
firm-stakeholder network relationships, and resource dependence between the
stakeholder group and the firm. Below is a graphic showing the various factors and their
relationship to stakeholder choices based on extant literature. As shown below, firm
reaction to stakeholder strategies feedback to influence firm-stakeholder relations and
inter-firm relations, which in turn influences stakeholders’ choices of subsequent
influence strategies. Firm reaction also impact stakeholder strategies directly – if the firm
cedes to stakeholder demands, for example, stakeholders are likely to stop protesting.
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Diagram #2

While insightful to our general understanding of stakeholder actions, for the purposes of
this study not all of these approaches adequately address the topic of secondary
stakeholders influence strategies. Network theory, for example, on which Neville and
Menguc (2006) and Pajunen (2006) based their works, assumes that stakeholders are
connected in some way. This does not account for the independent protester, the
geographically distant protester, or other secondary stakeholder groups or entities that do
not have existing working or personal relationships with the target firm. With regard to
Frooman’s (1999) proposal that stakeholder strategies are driven by resource dependence,
the results of Frooman and Murrell’s (2005) own test of the model suggests that of the
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two types of resource dependence, only the stakeholders’ degree of dependence on the
firm influenced the choice of strategy (coercive or cooperative). More concerning,
Frooman’s predictions do not entirely align with those of De Bakker and Den Hond
(2007), and Zietsma and Winn (2008) who all suggest that phase in the protest process is
a strong predictor of the choice of influence strategies. In short, there is a great deal that
has yet to be explained with regards to secondary stakeholders’ ability to influence their
target firms and, therefore, room for additional development of the literature in order to
better explain secondary stakeholders’ influence strategy choices.

2.2 The Political Process Model
The model that provides the framework for this study’s examination of BP’s stakeholders
with regards to the Deepwater Horizon spill was proposed by King (2008). King’s
framework represents the application of the political process model, from the social
movement literature, to the specific context of stakeholder-firm relations. The social
movement research community grew up in the vanguard of the social and political
upheavals of the 1960’s and 70’s. It is said to have begun when, “…the late Charles Tilly
revolutionized the study of collective action in the 1960’s by redirecting attention from
the motivations and choices of protestors to their demographic, economic, and political
contests” (Goodwin & Jasper, 2012, p. 3). His initial ideas, later developed and expanded
by Doug McAdam and Charles Tarrow, contributed significantly to our understanding of
how agency and structure interact to bring about change in a political or social system.
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Known as the ‘political process theory’ of social movement, it embraces Tarrow’s (1996)
observation that our environment both enables and constrains us. This theory has
dominated the social movement literature for over 30 years (Bevington & Dixon, 2005;
Goodwin & Jasper, 2012). In one modern observation on social movements, Frances Fox
Piven (2006) has argued that if ordinary people are going to alter the institutions in which
they are enmeshed they must get angry, rise up and ‘disrupt’ things. New issues are
brought to the fore and disruption represents a kind of veto power on the workings of
existing institutions and networks of power.
The political process theory on social movement has informed and inspired work on
stakeholders in several ways. First, authors have observed a convergence between
activists’ tactics directed at governments and those tactics directed at firms; several
authors have labeled this as a trend towards ‘private politics’, the transfer of political
protest activity from the public arena in which activists target their efforts against
political or governmental institutions, to the private arena in which activists target their
efforts towards large private companies or organizations (Baron, 2001; Clark &
Crawford, 2011; Gebhardt, 2010; Lenox & Eesley, 2009; E. M. Reid & Toffel, 2009).
This is thought to be due in part to the increasing power of corporations, notably
multinational corporations that now rival governments in their resources and scope of
influence, and in part to improved chances for the success of activists’ strategies when
they target a firm vulnerable to public opinion (Hendry, 2006). Regarding the latter,
activists efforts are said to be more effective when their interests can be concentrated (vs.
diffuse) on a specific, preferably narrow issue that involves a specific corporation rather
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than when they encompass broad ideas such as ‘climate change’, ‘pollution’, etc. (Stone,
2012; Wilson, 1980).

Secondly, a social movement perspective on stakeholder theory has contributed to a
move away from viewing firm-stakeholder relations in the ‘spoke and wheel’ formation
originally proposed by E. R. Freeman (1984) and towards a more holistic view of
stakeholders as individuals and organizations in their own right - not as simply dangling
attachments to the firm. In this vein, we can identify the works of Rowley and
Moldoveau (2003), Wolfe and Putler (2002), Gardberg and Newburry (2010), and Den
Hond and De Bakker (2007), described above. Drawing on the social identity theory
branch of the social movement literature, these authors have provided valuable insight
into the characteristics and demographics of protest groups and their members – radical
or moderate, homogenous or diverse, minority or white, etc..

Thirdly, social movement theory allows us to consider stakeholders’ actions in the broad
context of institutional and social change. A single stakeholder request may be part of a
much larger strategy managed by the stakeholder group, and a single stakeholder may
engage in actions together with other stakeholders with each group’s role and behavior
altering in whatever fashion best suits the needs of the cause (Huijstee & Glasbergen,
2010; Zietsma & Winn, 2008). There are both long term ‘wars’ fought between the
parties and punctual ‘battles’ that are either planned or arise unexpected and that can
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determine the course of the ‘war’ for change in the targeted institutions and governments
(Tilly & Wood, 2009). Social movement theory thus brings a much more dynamic vision
of stakeholder-firm relations to the discussion of stakeholder theory. This dynamic ‘social
change’ perspective can be seen in the work of Hoffman (1999) on how institutional
fields can be created around an issue and contested over a 20-30 year time frame, in the
work of Reid and Toffel (2009) on how initiatives by activists taken at the institutional
level over time bring a firm to alter its policies, in the work of van Huijstee and
Glasbergen (2010) on how NGOs work to play different roles in a semi-coordinated
manner over time to influence the target firm, and in the work of Zietsma and Winn
(2008) on how stakeholders use ‘influence chains’ and ‘influence flows’ in their
strategies to protest the Canadian forest industry practices. It can also been seen in the
work of Lounsbury (2001) and Lounsbury and Ventresca (2003) who studied recycling
practices in the educational community and found that the presence of an activist group at
the field-level altered the adoption of practices in different institutions.

King (2008) suggested that the political process model could be used to gain a deeper
understanding of firm-stakeholder relations. He posits that stakeholder influence is
greatest when those groups’ take advantage of political opportunities (such as a misstep
by the target corporation), develop mobilizing structures for organization and discussion,
and use framing to draw media attention and turn public opinion against the target firm.
The ‘political process model’ has gained widespread recognition for its application to
social movements, but has also more recently come under some critique (Bevington &
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Dixon, 2005; Gamson & Meyer, 1997; Goodwin, Jasper, & Khattra, 1999; Goodwin &
Jasper, 2012). Chief among the critiques is the broadly defined nature of ‘political
opportunities’ – opportunities open the way for political action, but they can also be
created by political activists (Gamson & Meyer, 1997; Goodwin et al., 1999). Another is
the lack of specificity or relevance of the theory – Bevington and Dixon (2005) point out
that social activists seek not only to know that ‘political opportunities’, ‘mobilizing
structures’ and ‘framing mechanisms’ are important, but also to know ‘how’ they can
create those mechanism more effectively.

King (2008a) partially addressed the issues with the political process model by
attempting to provide precise definitions for each element. What has yet to be determined
is whether or not King’s definitions adequately reflect these elements in the stakeholderfirm context; King’s own empirical research found a correlation between activist actions
and firm responses, but did not explore the definitions or the application of the political
process model in a specific case or instance (King, 2008b).

A visual interpretation of King’s model is presented below. Political opportunities,
framing mechanisms and mobilizing structures are ‘input’ variables that lead to
successful stakeholder action – the ‘outcome’ of a social movement against the firm.
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Diagram #3: A Visual Presentation of King’s Political Process Model

Let’ examine for a moment King’s definition of ‘political opportunities’ based on
McAdam, McCarthy and Zald’s work from their book, Comparative Perspectives on
Social Movements (McAdam; McCarthy; Zald, 1996). King (2008 a) defines political
opportunities as:
a) Major firm-level changes in corporate structure and leadership, including
mergers and acquisitions, corporate restructuring, and promotion of a new CEO.
b) Expressions of internal ally support (among top executives or board directors).
c) Increased industry competitiveness and increased failure rates of dominant
incumbents.
d) Government action taken against an industry or corporation.

One issue that can be raised with this definition is whether or not King has overlooked
important aspects of ‘political opportunities’ from the original research on that topic. For
example, his definition above does not also include action or events including company
decisions, strategy changes, unintended events or accidents, court cases, random events,
etc. The decision of a firm to use or not to use a specific supplier, to build or not to build
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a factory in a given location, to compensate or not to compensate employees for a
possible wrong, or to react or not to react to an environmental event or to new
environmental research are all possible examples. Punctual occurrences of this type are
identified as ‘political opportunities’ in the literature on the political process model, but
are absent from King’s 4-part definition above (Gamson & Meyer, 1997; Kingdon, 1984;
Stone, 2012). Research in the stakeholder area would also suggest that such events are
important and serve as catalysts to stakeholder mobilization indicating that the definition
of ‘political opportunities’ in the stakeholder context should perhaps encompass them (T.
Rowley & Berman, 2000).

A related concern is whether King (2008 a) has overlooked elements specific to the firmstakeholder relationship, but not recognized in the broader ‘political process model’. The
political process model includes the three elements mentioned above – ‘political
opportunities’, ‘mobilizing structures’ and ‘framing mechanisms’ – and King has
included the same three in his framework for firm-stakeholder relations. But, for
example, it is widely recognized that firm-stakeholder relations are strongly impacted by
social and cultural trends with regards to ethical and moral standards. What is considered
to be acceptable practice at one time may not be in another. Changes in social norms or
other institutional factors may be important ‘political opportunities’ and firms that do not
alter their behavior in accordance with social norms may gradually become increasingly
vulnerable (Friedman & Miles, 2002; Goodpaster, 1991; Hillman & Keim, 2001). These
factors are not included in King’s three-part framework which raises questions about how
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such elements and others should be represented in this framework or if they should be at
all.

To conclude, the political process perspective on social movements is proving to be a
useful lens in which to examine the actions of secondary stakeholders vis-à-vis their
target firms. King’s suggestion that the political process model could be applied to
secondary stakeholder-firm relations and his initial framework provide a very useful
starting point in the development of a social movement-based model for secondary
stakeholders. Yet, there is a good deal yet to be done to develop the framework into a
workable tool. This dissertation work has provided the opportunity to carry King’s
framework to the next level of articulation and development.

2.3 The Impact of Social Media & the Internet
The fore-mentioned research has significantly advanced our understanding of secondary
stakeholders and their actions yet many of these ideas and research projects date from
before the advent of social media and no major study has looked at the changes that
social media have brought to secondary stakeholder influence strategies. This may be an
important oversight. Research on social media in the marketing and political science
domains affirms that these tools are changing the way that activists and consumer groups
gain support for their causes. Studies indicate that social media are making it easier for
protest groups to organize across geographical boundaries, or to conduct outreach to
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potential new members (Shirky, 2011; Walgrave, Bennett, Van Laer, & Breunig, 2010;
Weinberg & Williams, 2006). Other studies suggest that social media are facilitating
protest dialogue, a process thought to be a precursor to mobilization (Bennett, 2003), and
fostering the creation of new techniques for protest such as the creation of spoof Twitter
sites, or the sharing of You-Tube videos like the one against Joseph Kone’s ‘children’s
army’ in Uganda (Invisible Children, 2012; Pitt et al., 2002).

For the purposes of this study in which the use of both social media and other internetbased tools is important, I define ‘social media’ as, the set of behavior and practices,
enabled by the internet, web 2.0 and related technologies, that allows for the creation,
development, and sharing of information, ideas, and services directly between
individuals, groups and organizations across the planet. This definition draws upon
perspectives provided by Li and Bernoff (2008), the authors of Groundswell, who
describe the internet and social media based phenomenon as having its roots in
technological developments, but its future driven by social interaction. Li and Bernoff
(2008) define it as “a social trend in which people use technologies to get the things they
need from each other, rather than from traditional institutions like corporations” (p. 9).
Kaplan and Haenlein (2010) define it as follows: “Social Media is a group of internetbased applications that builds on the ideological and technological foundations of Web
2.0 and that allow the creation and exchange of User Generated Content” ( p. 61).
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A social media site or tool is simply a platform or better, a backdrop, to the core activity
which is the sharing of information and ideas directly between parties without the
interface of a supra-organizing entity that edits, compiles, summarizes, restricts, or
otherwise controls the communication between one party and another. In a very concrete
fashion, this purpose-driven behavior turns the traditional notion of information creation
and diffusion on its head. In the traditional mode, trusted, presumably reliable
organizations such as the government, corporations, information entities such as libraries
or research organizations provided (pushed) information to the public – consumers – who
then relied on that information in order to make decisions. Those decisions could be
about consumption, investment, politics, life-style, career-choice, or any other topic of
interest. In this new world, information creation and diffusion can be, and is being,
managed by individuals themselves. Corporations, organizations, governments are no
longer the sole or preferred source for information. Herne, Foth and Grey (2009) describe
it as follows, “…participatory culture, enabled by recent technological innovations, (that)
shifts the communication flows away from a central business-to-consumer model. The
trend is towards consumer-to-consumer or even ‘prosumer-to-prosumer’ flows of
communication as consumers start to produce content on their own using new media
applications and services” (p. 2). Hart-Cohen (2012) has a more general description,
“Within the current usages of ‘social media’, … the ‘social’ collapses into a term of
mediation and stands for the range of connecting instances in which media performs
linkages across platforms and virtual places. These linkages frequently take the form of
conversations between persons…” (p. 1).
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The internet is a tool which is well adapted to meet the needs of the social activist. With a
push of a button, the activist can connect with every individual he/she ever got, or tried to
get, join their cause. Better yet, he/she can transmit facts, arguments, and visual evidence
throughout the world in a matter of seconds. Protests and events can be organized in a
matter of minutes with the use of social media (Juris, 2012; Tapscott & Ticoll, 2003).
Why stand around outside in the cold protesting when one can create a powerful
worldwide internet event similar to the one mounted against the Ugandan guerilla leader
Joseph Kony from a desktop. In an essay in Foreign Affairs magazine Clay Shirky
(2011) points out that, “social media has become the coordinating tool for nearly all of
the world’s political movements” (p. 2). And in a recent survey of 53 activist
organizations in the US, 100% of the 169 respondents indicated that the social media
helps them accomplish their advocacy goals (Obar, Zube, & Lampe, 2011).

Bennett (2003) has found that social media is revising the traditional manner in which
protestors associate with one another. In particular, he maintains that, “…an important
sub-text of this movement is media democracy, centered on the conversion of media
consumers into producers, …all channeled through personal digital networks” (p.145).
He goes on to point out that, “… effects at the network level include the formation of
large and flexible coalitions exhibiting the ‘strength of weak ties’ that make those
networks more adaptive and resistant to attack than coalitions forged through leaderbased partnerships among bureaucratic organizations” (p.146). The polycentric,
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distributed networks of protesters connected via the net and social media may be better
equipped to tackle protest directed at global corporations and transnational targets. He
explains, “Many activists believe that labor, environment, rights and other policies of
their governments have been weakened by pressures from global corporations and
transnational economic regimes such as the World Trade Organization. The resulting
capacity of corporations to escape regulation and win concessions from government has
created a political sphere beyond normal legislative, electoral, and regulatory
processes…”(p.148). He goes on, “…newly emerging forms of political action are being
aimed beyond government nearly everywhere in the post-industrial North…. These
nimble campaigns aimed at corporations and transnational trade and development targets
lend themselves to the repertoires of digital communication…”(p.148).

In recognition of the importance that on-line networks play in a social movement, several
authors are looking specifically at the configuration of social media and network ties
within communities (Asur, Huberman, Szabo, & Wang, 2011; Choudhary, Hendrix, Lee,
Palsetia, & Liao, 2012; Grabowicz, Moro, Pujol, & Eguiluz, 2012; Romero, Huberman,
Galuba, & Asur, 2010). Choudhary et al (2012) studied the Egyptian uprising and found
that the most influential tweets were provided by major news organizations: Al Jazeera,
CNN, etc. Asur et al (2011) looked at how trending topics remain popular and found that
for a topic to trend for a long time, it requires many people to contribute actively to it.
Romero et al (2010) showed that the majority of Twitter users act as passive information
consumers and do not forward the content they receive. Grabowicz et al (2012) showed
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that there were strong parallels between on-line and off-line networks in Twitter and that
although personal interactions were more likely to occur between those of the same
network, new information was more likely to be passed through links connecting
different groups.

Juris (2012) approached the question of social network configuration from another
perspective. He drew on his research and personal experience with the ‘Occupy’
movement to suggest that there may be differences within the family of digital
networking tools between those that favor the ‘logic of networks’ and allow activists to
develop sustained and somewhat complex discussions and exchanges regarding tactics
and strategy, and those that favor the ‘logic of aggregation’ and allow one to “blast out
vast amounts of information, links, and updates via person-to-person, ego-centered
networks, that take advantage of powerful ‘small-world’ effects to generate massive viral
communication flows.” He points to Twitter and smart phones as particularly effective
with regard to the ‘logic of aggregation’.

Social media also appears to be altering the method of execution of traditional strategies
while simultaneously creating unexpected added benefits. Based on her study of a
German anti-corporate campaign, Baringhorst (2008) points out that the social media and
the internet allowed that movement to extend beyond the traditional spatial limits (i.e.
geographic limits). It also permitted a rapid consensus of opinion and reaction around a
single visual image or story that then served as a visual code for the community and was

31
sufficient for the creation of a sense of community and social capital despite the
geographic separation. In studying the 2004 Howard Dean campaign for democratic
presidential nominee, Weinberg and Williams (2006) found that on-line use of ‘MeetUp’, a community building website, increased off-line campaign contributions,
volunteering activity, and advocacy on behalf of Dean. Cogburn and Espinoza-Vasquez
(2011) have suggested that social media also had an important impact on the Obama
presidential campaign of 2008 that went beyond educating the public and raising money
to include ‘getting out the vote’ and virtually organizing the grassroots mobilization and
activity, particularly by or for young people.

Corporations and marketing specialists have also acknowledged the impact of social
media. Aula (2010) writes, “…what is important is that social media content cannot be
controlled in advance and that content cannot be managed in the same way as, for
example, conventional media such as TV or newspapers. In practice, that means that it is
almost impossible for organizations to control conversations about themselves” (p.44).
Concretely, Aula’s point is that social media allows for customer generated information
or content and consumer to consumer communication and sharing that is not subject to
corporate oversight. User-generated-content can be created through reviews, shoppers’
surveys, on-line discussions, video-sharing, even through conversations in virtual worlds,
all of which impacts the behavior and views of consumers with regard to the firm (Liu &
Karahanna, E; Watson, 2011). With such tools at their disposal, individuals who want to
say something about a firm, its products, or its practices have ample opportunity to do so.
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As summarized by Fournier and Avery (2011), “Branding had become an open-source
activity, via which anyone and everyone had a say in matters of the brand” (p.194).

A good example of open-source branding is the popularity of anti-brand sites and
spoofing. Consumers can often go to great lengths to target a corporation. In some case,
webpages or websites are set up to make fun of or to ‘spoof’ actual websites. For
example, a BP Twitter feed was set up to satirize BP and BP’s CEO Tony Hayward with
what sounds like the voice of Hayward saying, “Black Sandy Beaches are very trendy in
some places” (Fournier & Avery, 2011). Pitt, Berthon, Watson and Zinkhan (2002) point
out that some sites have been set up so effectively that anyone looking for the real firm
on a search engine can’t fail to find the spoof site as well. In other cases, sites are set up
to allow disgruntled customers to vent. One of the more successful anti-brand sites was
set up for dissatisfied United customers, ‘www.untied.com’. The site’s founder claimed
that in 2000 over 200,000 people visited the site. Compounding the challenge faced by
firms, Berthon, Pitt, Plangger and Shapiro (2012) point out that local events seldom
remain local and general issues seldom remain general with global trends being
reinterpreted locally.

As a result, some authors are suggesting that social media is facilitating an alteration in
the power relationship between consumers/activists and firms. In looking at the impact of
social media on consumer ‘price making’ (vs. price taking), Pitt et al (2001, 2002) have
suggested that social media and the internet have given consumers’ more power vis-à-vis
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the corporation due to reduced search costs and the ability to engage in bidding or
consumer-to-consumer transactions. The notion that consumers’ willingness to pay might
be changing is a topic that was looked at by Parent, Plangger and Bal (2011). The authors
felt that this rather central concept in marketing needed to be reconsidered in light of
social media and re-baptized, ‘willingness to participate’. “The ‘old’ WTP, or
willingness-to-pay, is a concept derived from and used in business strategy; it refers to a
consumer’s motivation to pay a price … a result of their perception of that good or
service’s higher value. We suggest that in an internet connected, social media-enabled
world, this willingness is better reflected as consumer engagement, or active involvement
with a brand, product, service, or company through acts like creating content…” (p. 220).
They go on to explain how firms are able to leverage the power of their on-line
communities to either lower costs, increase loyalty or both. Drawing on French and
Raven’s power theory, Rezabakhsh, Bornemann, Hansen, and Schrader (2006) have
developed the argument that consumer power has increased due to higher market
transparency, consumers’ increased ability to inflict punitive sanctions on companies via
exit and voice, and consumers’ increased opportunity to play a more active role in the
product value chain, thereby influencing both prices and features.

In the preceding pages, two major branches of the literature on social media have been
reviewed – the branch dealing with activism and social media, and a second branch
dealing with corporate marketing and communications and social media. These two were
identified as being the most pertinent for a discussion of stakeholder influence strategies

34
by activist groups. Researchers in both branches of the literature indicate that social
media is bringing about a shift in the power balance between activists and/or consumers
on the one hand and firms on the other. With regard to activists, this is explained by
social media’s ability to allow activists to ‘do more with less’ (i.e. to accomplish more
with fewer resources in terms of manpower and money), and by the assistance social
media tools provide in allowing activists groups to create and coordinate networks on a
world-wide basis and, notably re-dress an imbalance of power that had built up between
local or regionally based activists group and large multinationals. With regard to the
consumer, the power transfer is explained by consumers’ greater access to information
which allows them to be more rational buyers, and by consumers’ increased ability to
‘sanction’ firms with more avenues for expression and the possibility for collective
action. Consumers are becoming more price-makers than price-takers.

The second theme found in the literature relates to Skirky’s (2011) notion of the
importance of the access to conversation. Both research branches point to importance that
on-line dialogue is beginning to have in the formation of ideas, political opinions, likeminded communities, etc. Such dialogues have been shown to be vitally important in
bringing about individual action and, in the past, these dialogues have occurred only in
the physical arena. The movement of these dialogues into on-line communities that
stretch across the world can potentially change the manner in which people create
political or social identities, frame their observations and ideas, and then translate those
into action. Aula (2010) has his notion of ‘ambient publicity’, while Bennett (2003) talks
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about ‘media democracy’. Both point to the new role that socially networked individuals
are playing in the construction of the public perception of events and institutions.

For the reasons outlined above, the impact of social media on stakeholder influence
strategies merits further investigation. Both the greater ease with which activists can
organize and mobilize, and the increased ability of all consumer and activists to frame
their issues and create a conversation around a topic, may have implications for the
functioning of the political process model and the impact of stakeholder influence
strategies. This study proposed to fill that gap by taking into account social media’s
impact on secondary stakeholders’ influence strategies and the operationalization of the
political process model.

In the following sections, the research questions which guided this study of secondary
stakeholder influence strategies in the Deep Water Horizon incident are presented.
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Chapter 3: Methodology
This research is exploratory and aimed at contributing to theory-building. Gioia and Pitre
(1990) define theory broadly as, “any coherent description or explanation of observed or
experienced phenomenon” and theory-building as, “the process or cycle by which such
representations are generated, tested, and refined” (p. 587). This study contributes to the
process of theory-building by exploring the use of a recognized broad-level theory in the
social movement literature for use in a specific context in another domain – that of firmstakeholder relations. This research’s contribution is more specifically the refinement of
the political process model for use in explaining stakeholder-firm relations in the internet
era. It also sets the stage for the development of a mid-level theory that can explain and
predict successful secondary stakeholder action against a firm.

This study adopts an inductive approach to process of theory-refining in this context.
Inductive research is based on inductive reasoning in which the researcher moves from
observation to pattern identification to tentative hypothesis and finally to theory (Trochim
& Donnelly, 2008). Deductive research moves in a reverse order, from theory to
confirmation thereof. As explained in the literature review section of this dissertation,
theory is as yet poorly developed in the area of secondary stakeholder-firm relations.
Constructs such as King’s (2008 a) political process model for stakeholder-firm relations
are tentative and cause and effect relations between secondary stakeholders’ actions and
firm responses are as yet inconclusive or incomplete. It is not clear as yet whether how
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the political process model might be applied to firm-stakeholder relations. Moreover, the
model was developed before social media and internet connectivity were introduced and
it has been suggested that these tools have significantly impacted social movement
related processes (Aula, 2010; Bennett, 2003; Shirky, 2011). An inductive approach is
therefore suited to the purposes of this work.

This study also reflects an interpretive tradition. It is aimed at explaining secondary
stakeholders’ perceptions and behavior vis-à-vis firms with whom they engage. It thus
entails the study of relationships and interactions and these are essentially social and
perceived by nature. For such a study, Gioia and Pitre (1990) suggest that
positivist/functional approaches may be less well adapted than those based on
subjectivist/interpretive traditions (see also Burrell and Morgan 1979). When, “what is
‘out there’ becomes very much related to interpretations made ‘in here’ (internal to both
the organization members under study and the researchers conducting the study),
subjectivist/interpretive approaches are better adapted” (p. 587). An understanding of the
position of the parties impacted by the Deepwater Horizon spill was gained through
interpretation of these parties’ comments and actions, and these were used to understand
subsequent events and relations between stakeholders and the firm. Karl Weick (1989)
describes this process as ‘sensemaking’ and quotes Dublin (1976) who describes this
approach to research as, “making sense of the observable world by ordering relationships
among elements that constitute the researcher’s focus of attention in the real world.”
(Dubin, p. 26; Weick, p. 519) Consistent with the interpretive perspective, it should be
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recognized that this study’s results reflect both my own interpretive bias and that of the
subjects studied.

In terms of the type of theory this research ultimately will contribute to developing, it is
helpful to recall the taxonomy describes by Gregor (Gregor, 2006). The author defines
five separate types of research: 1) Analysis; 2) Explanation; 3) Prediction; 4)
Explanation/Prediction; and 5) Design and Action. In its original conception, the political
process model is a theory of social political movement, a Type 4 theory
(explanation/prediction) that applies to broad movements for social change in a political
and social system. In applying it to the different and more limited context of firm
stakeholder relations, neither the explanatory nor the predictive elements of the model
can be assumed to hold. The model must therefore be re-conceived starting from the
definitions and clarification of elements in the model and their relationships. Ultimately,
this research should contribute to the development of a separate mid-level theory –
tentatively named the ‘stakeholder process model’ – that is likewise a Type 4 theory,
explanation/prediction, but that displays its own characteristics, definitions, and predicted
outcomes. This study represents a step in the process of developing such a theory. From
the perspective of theory-building, this study’s primary aims are to validate the
applicability of the political process model to the firm-stakeholder relationship context
and to develop the explanatory capabilities of the model for this context. This study
therefore does not attempt to test the predictive capabilities of the model, although
conceptually, they are understood to be present. The study method used here, a case
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study, is adequate for the purposes of developing appropriate definitions, clarifying the
relationships between the elements of the model, and explaining firm-stakeholder
relationships within the context of a secondary stakeholder protest. Indeed, this is the
purpose of this study. Moreover, these elements will be necessary for building a strong
mid-level explanative/predictive theory (Gregor, 2006).

3.1 Research Questions: In keeping with theory-building objectives, this study
addressed ‘how’ questions that allow the researcher to adopt an exploratory approach and
to tease out differences that might otherwise be missed if another approach had been used
(Yin, 2009). The following questions guided this study’s investigations:

1. How does social movement theory, as explained by King’s (2008 a) model, explain the
interplay between BP and its stakeholders following the Deep Water Horizon incident?
2. How has social media changed the role that framing, opportunities and structures play
in the life of a protest and, over time, in the social movement.

3.2 Case Method: To address the research questions above, a single case study was
chosen. This study falls under the category of an ‘exploratory case study’ whose purposes
are to contribute to the theory-building described above. Both Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin
(2009) suggests that such cases are appropriate when the level of research concerning a
phenomenon is limited and there are little or no hypotheses that can be applied to the
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given subject of study. Indeed, as suggested by the literature review above, our
understanding of secondary stakeholders’ influence strategies is limited and the advent of
social media has further complicated our ability to use existing theoretical models to
explain secondary stakeholders’ behavior vis-à-vis firms. Yin (2009) also suggests that
the case method is appropriate when the subject of the study is contemporary, which is
the case here with regards to the study of the impact of social media.

Yet even for an exploratory case, Yin (2009) advises that some structure should be given
to the study. Eisenhardt (1989) echoes Yin in writing that the use of a priori constructs
will help to shape the research design. King’s (2008) article suggesting that the political
process model can be applied to the study of stakeholder-from relations provides the
initial construct on which to base the exploration of secondary stakeholder influence
strategies. King’s model however should not be understood as well-developed. He
provides tentative definitions and several possible angles of interpretation of the political
process model for the purposes of stakeholder-firm analysis, yet the model is at a very
early stage of development (see the literature review above for details). Moreover, the
political process model from the social movement literature, on which King based his
work, has not been revised to account for the advent of the internet and social media.
With so many factors potentially influencing the reliability of existing constructs around
firm-secondary stakeholder relations, the decision to adopt an exploratory case study
method is largely justified.
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3.3 Research Setting – Deepwater Horizon spill: As a context for the study, the BP
Deepwater Horizon has been chosen as an illustrative case in order to further our
understanding of the ‘political process model’ as it is applied to firm-secondary
stakeholder relations. The study explores secondary stakeholders’ influence strategies in
reaction to the Deep Water Horizon spill of 2010. Such behavior can be considered to be
typical of those found in other protest actions in the 21st century, including the BP
stakeholders’ use of social media.

It could be argued that the Deepwater Horizon spill was an event too widely publicized or
too unusual in the scope of the damage inflicted to be used as an illustrative case. The
magnitude of the incidence could be thought to impact the external validity of the study
for use as an illustrative case. Yet many dramatic incidents of the past, such as the study
of the Cuban missile crisis, the Columbia flight disaster, or the events at Mann Gulch
have proved to be excellent opportunities to study human and social interactions in
organizational settings (Allison, 1971; Starbuck & Farjoun, 2005; Weick, 1993). The
dramatic nature of events does not necessarily alter human reactions, though it may
amplify them. There is, for example, in this case no reason to suppose that the actors in
the Deepwater Horizon incident would behave differently if the spill were a little more or
less important in size. In the category of important ecological events, the Deepwater
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Horizon can be considered illustrative in terms of the reactions and behavior of the
parties concerns.

Because the Deepwater Horizon spill represents a major ecological incident in the 21st
century, it was well documented and thereby provides a very rich and easily accessible
source of information for study. For example, by May 1, merely eight days after the
initial explosion, there were already over 300 articles per day appearing in the English
print media referencing the topic. By June 15 there were over 850 articles appearing per
day (based on a Proquest data search). This does not include the communication that
could be found on social media sites such as Twitter, Facebook and on the various blogs.
The Deepwater Horizon spill therefore is an excellent case for the study of illustrative
secondary stakeholder and firm behavior due to the easy access to data on that behavior.
The day-by-day course of events can be followed easily and suggests that stakeholders
acted rapidly and effectively to help uncover information pertinent to the public’
understanding of BP’ role in the oil spill. Stakeholders’ positions on various aspects were
widely documented, thanks to the press, but also to such events as the US Congressional
hearing that began within the first 90 of the explosion. The reactions of BP and its CEO,
Tony Hayward, are also well documented by the press and by citizen groups who
attended the many meetings and events organized by BP on the Gulf. Comments and
claims by certain groups can be easily cross-referenced for veracity with observations and
documentation from other sources. In many situations where corporate stakeholders are
involved, researchers do not have the luxury of having such excellent access to
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stakeholder-firm dialogue; much of the discussion occurs behind closed doors, but, for
the Deepwater Horizon spill, a great deal occurred under the glaring scrutiny of the
public eye. These circumstances make the Deepwater Horizon spill a very good case
study for our purposes.

3.4 Unit of Analysis: This study set out to analyze the interplay between BP and its
stakeholders following the Deep Water Horizon oil spill as it progressed towards a fullfledged social movement against BP. This approach includes looking at BP’s secondary
stakeholders’ reactions to the spill and BP’s actions and interactions with both secondary
and primary stakeholders, government agencies, and the public following the spill. This
approach fits well with the use of the political process model as a lens for examining
these relationships and interactions. The political process model is structured around
explaining a ‘movement’, in this case, the development of a social movement against BP
subsequent to the Deepwater Horizon spill.

Given the original framing for this study, it was anticipated that there would be a single
unit of analysis with regards to the BP spill, i.e. a single social movement by stakeholders
against BP. As the research unfolded, what had appeared to be a single phenomenon –
‘the movement’ - was later discovered to be an event occurring at two levels: 1) the level
of the ‘movement’ in which one observes the development of negative stakeholder
sentiment against BP, and 2) the level of an issue in which one observes punctual
discussions or events that arise around a topic that subsequently impacts the larger
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movement against BP. This observation in itself represents a finding of the research (see
‘analysis’ and ‘findings’ for more information). These issues are topics around which
groups rally and enter into discussion or debate. Issues develop as the result of a
divergence of interest and perception about the benefits and costs of a particular event or
decision (Stone, 2012). Each issue identified in connection with the Deepwater Horizon
spill gave rise to discussion and debate and sometimes protests by stakeholders. Each
movement around an issue had a separate set of stakeholders, a different start point and
end point, and progressed largely independently of the other issues and the larger
movement against BP - although there were observable interconnections. Most
importantly for this study, each of these issues ultimately fed into the development of the
movement as a whole against BP.

Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that case studies can involve multiple levels of analysis within
a single study. She gives the example of Mintzberg & Waters’ (1982) study of a grocery
empire in which multiple strategic changes were examined within the context of broad
corporate-wide change (Eisenhardt, 1989). The study of the Deepwater Horizon appears
to have a similar structure. While in what Bonoma (1985) describes as the “drift stage” of
the case study process in which the researcher is “ready to learn from the naturalistic
phenomenon as they present themselves”, a pattern of multiple issues coming to the fore,
being debated, and then feeding into the movement against BP as a whole, or dying away
was observed (p. 205). The evolution of each of the 15-18 issues identified exhibited this
pattern. In some cases, these issues were social movements in their own right, for
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example, the movement against off-shore drilling is a particularly contentious one that
has been going on since the oil spill in 1969 off the coast of Santa Barbara. The revived
discussion around the off-shore drilling topic and the manner in which discussions were
evolving at the time of the Deepwater Horizon spill had major implications for the
evolution of BP-stakeholder relations. I therefore decided to use the political process
model as an approach for analyzing each of these issues.

Because of this new understanding gained early on in the course of the research, the
study’s unit of analysis was altered to add a set of embedded cases (the issues) within the
study of the broader phenomenon (‘the movement’) (Yin, 2009). The units of analysis for
this study are therefore: 1) the stakeholder ‘movement’ of protest against BP, and 2) the
‘issue’, an embedded unit, defined as a topic or concern around which stakeholders
rallied and whose evolution had an important impact on BP and subsequent events
connected with the Deepwater Horizon spill.

The following diagram explains further the relationship between the issues, stakeholders,
and the target of a stakeholder protest, over the stages of a stakeholder movement. The
stages are described below as: emergent, coalescing, and (fully emerged) stakeholder
movement. In the emergent stage, an issue of importance or concern to a group of
stakeholders emerges. Several different stakeholder groups and several different issues
may exist or emerge. Initially, the issues and their stakeholders exist independently of
one another; there is little connection between stakeholder groups; little attempt is made
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at this stage to engage with other groups supporting other issues. The organizational
targets at this stage may be several. A stakeholder groups may hold the government, a
corporation, as well as several other parties potentially responsible for the issue that has
been raised.

Diagram #4 Conceptual Relationship between Issues, Stakeholders, and Protest Targets

In the coalescing stage, stakeholder groups begin to be aware of each other and their
respective issues. There may be an attempt by some to develop ties with other groups and
to make connections between their respective issues (Zietsma and Winn call these
influence chains) (Zietsma & Winn, 2008). Framing alters in this phase as groups attempt
to identify messages which appeal to the stakeholders of multiple groups. Targeting

47
efforts narrow to focus in on fewer organizations. In the final phase, stakeholder groups
ban together and coordinate their efforts closely. They may organize joint protest efforts,
or issue simultaneous press releases. The issues they champion become closer related and
the framing and messaging of the separate issues build upon one another to project a
common impression. These efforts are now cumulative rather than isolated or simply
parallel. In this final stage, a target has been determined and stakeholders’ efforts are
concentrated on influencing a single target rather than multiple targets.

This diagram and the relationships described therein considered in the context of this
study suggest that the exploration of the role of issues, as well as stakeholders and their
targets is merited. The choice of using the political process model to explore issues as
embedded cases is justified by the important role that issues play in the development of a
stakeholder movement and close relationship that exists between stakeholders, issues and
their target.

3.5 Nature of data collected and sources: This study relied upon data in four forms.
First, there was information provided by the traditional media and press in the form of
newspaper articles, magazines, and news website articles. Second, there was information
coming from individuals posting comments and links to blogs, targeted media sites such
as ‘Mother Jones’, and other social media expression sites (Facebook, for example).
Third, there were YouTube videos and other visual commentary uploaded by individuals
and groups directly to YouTube. Finally, there was information coming from special
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interest group websites such as the Gulf Restoration Network, Louisiana Bucket Brigade,
etc..

While the journal articles and other traditional sources should be considered as secondary
sources, the social media site posting, the blog postings, the YouTube videos and other
such user content based data are closer to being ‘primary sources’ due to their candid and
unmediated nature. Hookway (2008), for example, suggests that blogs can be thought of
as the on-line version of a diary in which the person expresses his/her feelings and
opinions in an open letter or ‘op-ed’ without the stigma of being identified as the author
due to the autonomous nature of many blog postings. Cowton (1998) even suggests that
secondary sources may be sometimes preferable to primary sources for research on
socially or politically sensitive topics because of the difficulty with social desirability
response bias with the interviewer present. The range of sources used in this study is
sufficiently reliable and varied to provide a thorough understanding of the events
surrounding the Deepwater Horizon spill.

With regards to the choice of sources, the following approach was used. For more general
information concerning events connected with the Deepwater Horizon spill, the
mainstream journals such as the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Associated
Press based articles, and the wire services such as the Environmental New Service wire
were the most useful. These sources provided thorough coverage of the spill and assisted
in the construction of a reliable timeline of events. In particular, the New York Times
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began daily coverage of the spill entitled: “Day -: The Latest on the Oil Spill” which was
most helpful for following along with developments (“Day 45: The Latest on the Oil
Spill,” 2010).

For regional reactions, journals based on the Gulf including the Times-Picayune, the La
Houma Courier, and the Orlando Sentinel, for example, were useful. The UK journals
including the Times, the Financial Times, and the Guardian reported extensively on the
BP spill and they often provided a more BP-centric view on events, for example
commenting on the implications of an event for BP and/or its management team. More
investigative journals such as the Christian Science Monitor or the Wall Street Journal
provided in-depth reporting on particular issues. This study also relied on some CNN,
MSNBC and Fox TV coverage to complement the journals. This was obtained in a more
haphazard fashion as certain issues were researched on the internet. But by triangulating
the information provided from these varied sources, it was possible to gain a broad
understanding of the course of events and of the major issues that came into play over the
three month period of the Deepwater Horizon spill.

To absorb more subjective perspectives on events, a different set of sources was used
including the blogs, the specialized and political news websites (such as Mother Jones),
and the industry specific websites (such as Rigzone). To be sure that a roughly equal
selection of views from both ends of the American political spectrum was included, a list
of Technocrati’s list of top blogs was crossed with that of Blogs.com list of top ten to
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arrive at a draft list of political blogs (“Technocrati Top 100,” 2014, “Top 10,” 2014).
The blogs in questions were also checked to be sure that they were active and popular in
2010. Based on the ease of accessing information from 2010, several political blogs were
chosen for use. They included DailyKos, Hotair.com and Reason.com. Several news
sites/special interest sites were also chosen: Mother Jones, Oildrum, and Rigzone. Other
sources came up as suggested links to articles in sites such as HuffingtonPost Green;
Grist, Reuters, CNNMoney, etc.

A YouTube search was carried out on the BP explosion and BP spill and over 400 videos
were found. All of those with over 40 views were retained. Many were songs,
photographic chronicles of events, and personal commentaries, but others were
recordings of press interviews, links to websites with scientific and/or technical
information, recordings of conspiracy theory commentators, or recording of meeting with
BP officials and local residents or groups. CNN Cooper Anderson TV reporting was a
very popular topic for uploading. These sources are very rich in what Geertz calls ‘thick
description’ as they provide clues to how people are feeling about the events, how they
relate events to other concerns in their life, how they interpret the events and their
potential impact (Geertz, 1994). There were also a large number of recordings of the
underwater oil leakage, footage that was made publicly available following the
Congressional hearing and that was uploaded to YouTube by private citizens.
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Finally, the websites of specific groups involved in the protests against BP were looked
at. Several of these sites had only limited information about events from 2010 and were a
bit disappointing as sources. The groups had changed over the material on their sites and
the archives search function of their websites was either absent or not very effective. The
groups included, for example, the Audubon Society, the Sierra Club, the Louisiana
Bucket Brigade, the Gulf Restoration Network, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Natural
Resources Defense Council.

Below is a table indicating the sources and the number of articles from each source.
Table #1 Sources

The overall goal of my data collection activities was not to achieve ‘representativeness’
or comprehensiveness, but rather to gather enough information for me to correctly
interpret the import of the events surrounding the BP spill and the variety of responses of
stakeholder groups involved in those events. A snowball or convenience sampling
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approach was used to identifying sources whereby a link or information referenced on
one site was followed to its source and then added to my data base. The advantage of this
technique for this study is that it replicates internet user behavior and the networked way
in which they find information (Choudhury & Hari, 2006). For the purposes of this study,
it was also important to ensure that information coming from the different sources was
not unduly influenced by the views of one group or another, but that it took into account
the variety of perspectives that existed. Networked links from multiple blogs and
websites representing different perspectives on the spill were also pursued. In all, a data
base of 581 entries was collected and over 300 YouTube videos.

All of the data was summarized and entered into a data set and coded according to issue,
stakeholder, publication source, authors, dates, etc. For each of the articles or web posts,
exact quotes from the article and by the various stakeholders was lifted from the article
and entered into the data entry file. This permitted me to examine all of the recorded
comments by a particular stakeholder group over the 30-day periods by simply scrolling
down the data file. Duplicates in the data file were avoided/eliminated.

3.6 Scope of data collection: As indicated in the previous section, the data search
conducted for this study was not intended to be comprehensive. Choices that were made
to limit the amount of data collected was done in a heuristic and iterative fashion and
continued throughout the data collection process, as suggested by Miles, Huberman and
Saldana (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2014, p. 70). A choice was made from the outset
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to limit this research to a timeframe covering roughly the first three months of the
Deepwater Horizon spill – from the time of the explosion on April 21, 2010 to the time
that the well was successfully capped on July 16th, 2010. The choice of this timeframe
relates to the theoretical purposes of this study. This study explores the rise of a social
movement against BP in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon spill. While subsequent
events are certainly interesting and newsworthy, the study thereof would not contribute
significantly to our understanding of how a social movement against BP came about. The
social movement against BP reached its peak in mid-to-late June 2010 and although
certain groups continue to express their dissatisfaction with BP even today, much of the
initial anger directed at BP had subsided by the end of the summer of 2010.

Another important choice made was to limit the study of the Deepwater Horizon events
to those aspects that impacted firm-stakeholder relations. Initially, it wasn’t evident what
the best approach would be for doing that, but after having read through a collection of
all published journal articles available on Proquest over the first two weeks of the
Deepwater Horizon event – from April 21 to May 1, 2010, I chose to concentrate on
researching a ‘short list’ of stakeholders and BP. From May 1st onward only those articles
that concerned one or more of the roughly 48 stakeholder groups were included in the
data set. This group was made up of both primary and secondary stakeholders. Primary
stakeholders includes employees and their families, the investor community and
shareholders, BP customers and partners - particularly those in the gulf region - and
government bureaus responsible for regulating oil drilling in the Gulf. Secondary
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stakeholders including ecology groups from across the country and the world, local Gulf
communities, water-based businesses impacted by the spill such as fishing or shrimp
farming, tourist-based business in the gulf region, researchers and data gathering
organizations, and US government and semi-governmental units studying oil,
environmental or biological issues - this list not being exhaustive.

When it became apparent that various issues around the events of Deepwater Horizon
spill were going to be important, research then further concentrated data collection to
focus on those 16-18 issues. In the latter phases of the study and in the analysis phase the
issues were re-classified and/or reduced to arrive at a final list of roughly seven to eight.

Finally, stakeholders groups for analysis were reduced to those stakeholder groups which
appeared to have an impact on subsequent events, in some cases, carrying out additional
searches to find out more about their activities and perspectives. A good example here is
the Louisiana Bucket Brigade which is a local ecology group that was active very early
on in the spill and continued to be mobilized throughout the period studied. Study was
also limited to Gulf stakeholders in the Louisiana region. This region was impacted
earlier on and more significantly than others. In addition, their politicians were more
vocal and the legacy of Katrina was a factor particular to this region which also appeared
to play a role in their actions following the BP spill.
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Below is a table with the list of stakeholder groups identified, broken down by
primary/secondary stakeholder category.

Table #2 Deepwater Horizon Spill Stakeholders: Primary and Secondary Stakeholders
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A number of otherwise important areas of possible exploration have, therefore, been
deliberately left out of the scope of this study. First, this study did not concentrate of
gathering data on whether or not BP was actually guilty of wrong-doing with regards to
the Deepwater Horizon spill. Relatively little data was available in the first three months
on this topic and the interest of this research is not on BP’s actual ‘guilt’, but rather on
gathering data on the perceptions of BP held by stakeholders and the public. Second, this
study does not gather extensive technical information on the efforts done at the bottom of
the ocean to stem the leak(s). The results, or lack thereof, and the perception of the efforts
by the parties concerned – NOAA, Coast Guard, BP, Transocean, etc. – seemed to be
more important than the actual technical details, although many individuals in the public
domain appeared to revel in discussions around those technical issues on social media
(see for example, ‘Oil Drum’ for May-July 2010). Third, this study does not chronicle titfor-tat exchanges between stakeholders and BP, but rather focuses on the broader scope
of events leading to growing frustration among stakeholders with BP.

In the following sections, the iterative process of data collection and exploration is
described in greater detail.
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3.7 Data Collection and Analysis Process: As an inductive and interpretive study, the
process used to arrive at the conclusions is of importance. Consistent with common
practice in such a study, the process was iterative. While Eisenhardt (1989) and Yin
(2009) both propose orderly approaches to case study research, my own more closely
resembles that described by Bonoma (1985). Bonoma suggested four phases in theorybuilding case study research:
1) ‘Drift’ phase – in which the researcher attempts to immerse him/herself in the
data, ‘soaking in’ the information and rejecting a priori notions about the subject
and environment.
2) Design phase – in which the researcher attempts to develop tentative explanations
about the topic and to structure these into a model which is then refined
throughout the rest of the process.
3) Prediction phase – in which the researcher explores the predictive capabilities of
the model and adjusts the model as the result of these considerations
4) Disconfirmation phase – in which the researcher attempts to further explore the
limits of the generalizations of the model based on the evidence at hand. He/she
looks for disconfirming examples which do not fit, or poorly fit, the model
developed.
The purposes of this study are to develop the political process model for use in
analyzing firm-stakeholder relations. The most relevant of the above phases for the
purpose of this study is therefore the ‘design’ phase in which the model is developed
and refined. That being said, the research process touched upon all of Bonoma’s four
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phases and was iterative in that I went back and forth between phases several times.
In particular, I found myself in the ‘drift’ phase several times in the process. In this
phase, I was attempting to push the boundaries of what was known of existing theory
searching for alternative explanations. It is also worth noting that, as suggested by
Bogden & KnoppBiklen (2002), the iterative process of moving between data and
conclusions continued throughout all of the phases.

The table below provides a step-by-step description of the process followed during
the data collection and analysis phase of this study. Items italicized represent
important breakthroughs in the theory building process. As indicated, the final step in
this study was the final refinement of the political process model.

Table#3 Data Collection & Analysis Process
My Research
Choices

My Actions

Outcomes
-

‘Drift’
Phase

-

Start -Inductive
approach;
looking at
stakeholderfirm relations in
Deepwater
Horizon Spill
Read everything
published in first
two weeks of the
spill
Identified initial list
of 48 stakeholders
Saw that ‘issues’
were also
important in

Design
Phase

-

Prediction
Phase

-

Disconfirmati
on
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stakeholder-BP
interactions
Research angle Focus on issues
Social
movement
represented
not one, but
many issues.
Identified 1618 issues
Worked on
developing a
timeline of events
Would use
timeline to
structure data
Developed a
Timeline over
three months
Broaden data
search triangulating
data from
different sources
Looked at social
media, YouTube,
special interest
sites
Study Scope
reduction
Went back to
issues list
Re-classified
& reduced list
of issues to 10
Went back to
stakeholder list
and looked for
dominant
groups/parties
Shorter list of
key
stakeholders –
reduced
emphasis on
ecology
groups and oil
industry
groups
Began studying
the issues one by
one
Looked at the first
issue that came up
– safety – using
political process
model
Model seems to fit
pretty well
Tried other issues
Model mostly worked
with other issues as
well, but model is
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very rough & missing
stuff
Continued to
analyze by issue
Went back to first
issue – safety –
and looked at how
to improve it
‘Political
opportunities were
both ‘events’ and
‘pre-existing
conditions’
Modified the model
Looked to see if
new design fit the
other issues – it
did!
Backtracked to
‘drift’ mode
Went back to look
at all the issues to
see how they
developed
Noticed that
stakeholder
efforts were
directed at
multiple
targets, not
just BP.
Backtracked to
stakeholder
theory –
construct
validity check: is
multi-firm,
multistakeholder
model possible
for analyzing
firm- secondary
stakeholder
relations?
Tried out multistakeholder; multitarget; multiple
issue angle on
PPM
Multi-stakeholder,
multi-target, multiissue model works
with PPM as a
frame; issues nested
within larger
movement;
represents an
alternative to firmcentric approaches to
analyzing
stakeholder-firm
relations
Altered PPM model
to include multi-
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target framing
Began looking at
how social
media is used
Looked at use of
social media
within each of the
steps of the PPM
Social media used for
framing and as a
mobilization
structure; replaces
physical protests for
many, but not all
issues. Altered PPM
model accordingly
Another check
on issues &
stakeholders
Looked again at
issues and
stakeholders: too
many overlapping
issues & inactive
stakeholders
Consolidated issues
list; consolidated
relevant stakeholders
list.
Turned to the
study of PPM
outcomes –
looking for
conclusion
validity
For each issue,
looked at the
outcomes for BP
and other major
stakeholders
Saw two types of
outcomes – direct
outcomes on BP,
indirect outcomes
that would later
impact BP
Modified PPM to
include direct and
indirect outcomes
Checked for the
reliability of the
model across
issues
Re-mapped each
issue based on
modified PPM;
checked for
consistency within
& across issue
maps
Found that all fit except
one issue - it was an
awkward fit
Why an
awkward fit?

62
Found why –
added to research
implications
Final version of
PPM

3.8 Working Definitions: Framing for theoretical exploration is the political process
model. (King, 2008 a) Based on the political process model, some working definitions of
key terms were developed for use in this study based on King’s work and extant research.
Social movement (hereafter ’movement’): adopted here is the definition provided by Fox
Piven (2006) who explains social movements as ordinary people altering the institutions
in which they are enmeshed by getting angry, rising up and ‘disrupting’ things.
Issues: adopted here is Stone’s (2012) perspective on issues and define them as topics
around which groups rally and enter into discussion or debate. Issues develop as the
result of a divergence of interest and perception about the benefits and costs of a
particular event or decision. For the purposes of this study, issues are important because
they are shown to contribute to the development of a social movement against BP.
Political opportunities: King (2008 a) adopts the broad definition of political
opportunities as being “stakeholders’ response to exogenous opportunities” . He
identifies both corporate and industrial opportunities in this category including a change
in leadership or the financial standing of the firm, a change in political relationships
within the firm, and industry factors and industry competition. This definition is used
here.
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Framing mechanisms: King draws on Benford & Snow’s definition of framing processes
as involving, “the strategic use of shared meanings and definitions to invoke claims on
individual’s identity and cultural sense of responsibility to a cause” (King, 2008 a, p. 11).
This definition is used here.
Mobilizing structures: King (2008) adopts the definition of mobilizing structures as
being, “collective vehicles, formal as well as informal, through which people mobilize
and engage in collective action” based on the work of McAdam (p. 3). This definition is
used here.
Secondary stakeholders: Groups or individuals that interact with the firm for the purpose
of changing its ethical, societal, and environmental policies and practices (from p. 6
above).

Although these are the initial definitions adopted at the outset of this study, the reader
should note that for some of these – political opportunities, framing mechanisms, and
mobilizing structure - new definitions have been developed as the result of the study’s
findings. They are presented in the Findings section of this dissertation.

3.9 Research Rigor and Reliability: Several approaches were used to ensure that the
findings of this study are reliable and rigorous. They are explained below. That being
true, several additional research techniques will be needed to confirm certain findings of
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this study. Time and resource constraints did not allow for their completion at this stage
of the research.
The approaches that were used to ensure reliability and internal validity include those
used at the data collection phase, those used in data analysis, and those used in the scope
and design of the study.
Table #4 : Approaches Used to Ensure Reliability and Rigor of the Research in Data
Collection, Data Analysis and Study Scope and Design

65
Miles, Huberman and Saldana (2014) suggest that a qualitative study can be assessed on
various facets (Miles et al., 2014). First is the objectivity and confirmability of the study
– the degree to which the researcher’s biases have been reduced to a minimum. Included
in this category is the degree to which the study and its steps have been carefully laid out
and the degree to which the sequence of data collection and analysis can be followed. The
process for this study has been carefully laid out in section 3.7 and the study’s methods
and approach were determined and presented before data collection ever began. The
authors also suggest that rival explanations need to be considered and inconsistencies
examined. In the analysis section of this dissertation, approaches for validating
explanations has set forth and in particular, in section 5.4, Final Analysis at the holistic
case level, inconsistencies are discussed.

Secondly, Huberman et al (2014) suggest that a study should be reliable/dependable and
auditable. This principally refers to the research design and execution. In the table above,
the approaches used to ensure reliability and dependability of the data and of the analysis
are set forth. In particular, the triangulation of data from various sources assisted in the
reliability of the data collected and contributed to the dependability of the findings. One
area where this study can be improved is in the analysis of data. Reliable analysis is
dependent upon the coding of the information and in particular, the coding of the issues,
is a sensitive area. This study had only one coder and additional coders would have
improved the reliability of the findings.
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Thirdly, Huberman et al (2014) suggest that a study should have internal
validity/credibility/authenticity. This includes both the degree to which the study’s results
are meaningful and rich and present a picture which is coherent and convincing. The
interpretive nature of this research has ensured that the presentation of the results is
‘thick’, rich and meaningful. The findings are also well-linked to existing theory in
stakeholder-firm relations and social media, and provide a reasonable explanation filling
a gap in the existing research on how secondary stakeholders influence the firm.
Moreover, as described above in the table, careful efforts were made to limit the scope of
the study in order that the research explores specifically those elements relative to the
research questions.

Fourth, Huberman et al (2014) write of the external validity/transferability/fittingness of a
study. Single case studies in particular face challenges in terms of the transferability of
their findings. I address specifically the question of generalizability and transferability of
the findings of this study in section 7.1. With regards to data collection, an effort was
made to ensure that the variety and breadth of data used in this study was as broad as
possible in order to represent many groups and populations that might be concerned by
the study’s findings. Additional research will be needed in order to confirm the validity
of the approach used here.

67
Finally, Huberman et al (2014) indicate that the findings should have
utilization/applicability/an action orientation. By this they mean that the research should
heighten awareness, make a difference in individuals’ perceptions of an issue, or lead to
concrete action that alter the course of events. This research contributes primarily to
heightening the awareness of business practitioners concerning the role of secondary
stakeholders and the potential increase in their ability to influence their corporate targets.
More on this subject can be found in section 7.2-7.4. Should the research agenda initiated
here be carried to its conclusion, then it will have the potential to alter perceptions and
bring about changes in the way in which business leaders manage their relations with
stakeholders. More on this topic can be found in section 8 – Further Research
Opportunities.

In conclusion, measures have been taken to ensure the reliability and rigor of this study
with the exception of one crucial area – that of the coding of the data collected. Due to
limited resources, the classification of information into the various categories for analysis
was carried out by a single coder. In a second phase, this study’s finding should be
confirmed through the use of additional coder or eventually a program-based coding tool
(an example is envivo).
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Chapter 4: Study Setting – The Deepwater Horizon Spill
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill began on April 20, 2010 following an explosion in the
Gulf of Mexico on a rig owned by the Transnational Corporation which was under
contract to BP. In the immediate days that followed, the oil rig went up in flames and
sank and eleven of the 126 rig workers were declared decreased, but the well was thought
to be under control with no major leaking (A.P, 2010). Yet on April 24th, NOAA, BP, and
the Coast Guard announced that a leak had been found thereby beginning a dramatic saga
extending over three months as BP and its partners attempt to stem what was eventually
found to be a massive oil gusher at the bottom of the ocean (A.P., 2010).

The parties implicated in the events leading up to the spill and in the clean-up operations
include BP and several of its partners - notably Transocean, Halliburton, Cameron,
Anadarko and Mitsui - along with the US government including the Department of the
Interior, the Mining & Minerals department, NOAA, the EPA, various Congressional
bodies including both the Senate and the House and the relevant committees, and the
President Obama and his cabinet team (“Document: BP didn’t plan for major oil spill,”
2010, “Oil Execs’ Celebration Ends; Now Comes the Grilling,” 2010, “Oil Spill
Threatens Gulf Coas,” 2010; Trumbull, 2010; Wald, 2010). Also implicated are state and
local level officials including, for example, Louisiana’s Governor Bobby Jindal and the
Plaquemines Parish President Billy Nungesser (“Here is the latest from Gov. Bobby
Jindal,” 2010). Local businesses, fishermen, boat and chartering operations, tourist-based
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services, and local citizens were all impacted by the rig explosion and participated to
greater or lesser degrees in the spill clean-up (Harmon, 2010; Robertson, 2010a). Finally,
ecology groups and scientists from around the country were involved in assessing the
spill damage and in organizing and participating in the clean-up efforts (M. Reid, 2010;
Wheaton, 2010).

Concerns over BP’s handling of the spill incident began just a week after the explosion
on April 28th when NOAA indicated that the leak was 5 times BP’s original estimate
(“Five Times the Oil Gushes From Broken Gulf Wellhead,” 2010, “Oil spill could eclipse
Exxon disaster,” 2010). BP rapidly came under pressure from scientists, environmental
groups and other stakeholders for its lack of transparency and then later for its slow
response to cleaning up the damage produced by the spill (Lewison, n.d.; “Public
relations disaster,” 2010; Wang, 2010). Although Transocean, Halliburton and other BP
partners did not escape the eventual legal fallout from the spill, they were largely absent
from a bright spotlight put on BP during the first months of the spill (Lewis, 2012;
Robertson & Fountain, 2010). Leadership at BP was also less than delicate in handling
the affair. In one of several inelegantly phrased remarks that were picked up by bloggers
and the press, Tony Hayward, BP’s CEO of its US operations, called the spill ‘tiny’ as
compared with the size of the ocean (Webb, 2010). Widespread sourcing and subsequent
re-transmission of spill facts and events by individuals, researchers and other third parties
prevented BP from calming concerns about its own actions and from minimizing fears
about the potential impact of the spill on the Gulf Coast (“BP’s Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill
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at the Oil Drum Overview - Especially for New Readers - Discussion,” 2010; Sheppard,
2010a). By early May, the spill was beginning to be labeled the ‘BP spill’; critiques of BP
could be found in spoof videos and a spoof Twitter account; they reached a fever pitch in
late June with widespread condemnation of BP on social media including the sale of antiBP gear to help fund the clean-up (“Gulf Oil Crisis Inspires Americans to Help Through
the Design of Expressive T-Shirts and Bumper Stickers at CafePress,” 2010; Lacombe,
2010; Stelter, 2010)

While much attention was directed towards BP, government officials and the Obama
administration were not spared criticism and as the background information on decisions
leading up to the spill became available, questions were raised as to whether greater
blame should not be placed on lax government oversight at the Mining and Minerals
Department (Wang, 2010; Woodard, 2010). Interior Secretary Ken Salazar was obliged to
move quickly. On May 12, he fired the new department head who had been put in to
bring about reform and re-organized the department into three separate functions so that
they would subsequently report to separate parts of the administration in order to avoid
potential conflicts of interests between development and oversight activities (“Oil Is
Fouling Wetlands, Official Says,” 2010). During the slow-moving clean-up operations,
the government faced new criticism on the lack of an effective effort and several
wondered whether this was to be “Obama’s Katrina”, making reference to President
George W. Bush’s administration’s poor response to the 2005 Katrina hurricane
(Hannity, 2010). This prompted new efforts on the part of the administration to re-direct
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responsibility for the spill clean-up towards BP by insisting upon BP’s responsibility for
managing (and paying for) those efforts (Robertson & Fountain, 2010). In late May,
Obama established a bipartisan commission to investigate the spill and, on May 27, the
US Interior Department extended a moratorium on new offshore drilling in Gulf &
Virginia & halts oil exploration drilling in the Arctic (“Obama clamps down on offshore
drilling,” 2010). The latter move was broadly criticized by Gulf residents who depend
upon the oil industry, as well as the fishing, tourism and boat industries for their
livelihood, leaving the administration in a ‘no-win’ situation between the ecologists on
one side and the local Gulf residents on the other (Zeller, 2010).

While certainly the local and national ecology groups were mobilized to help with the
spill efforts and remind the public at large of the dangers of off-shore drilling, local
residents were even more vocal and more visible. Verbose politicians such as Billy
Nungesser broadly condemned BP and, drawing support from his constituents and fellow
parish presidents, initiated local plans for coping with the spill effects (“Fishermen May
Be Cleaning the Spill That Put Them Out of Work,” 2010, “Go Billy Nugesser: the
president is fully engaged update 2,” 2010, “Here is the latest from Gov. Bobby Jindal,”
2010). Boat owners and fishermen were also widely quoted as not having understood
why BP didn’t make better use of their skills and availability (Fishgrease, 2010;
Robertson, 2010b). Governor Bobby Jindal didn’t hesitate to call a state of emergency
and reached out for additional aid from the Coast Guard and the government expressing
concerns that, “BP’s resources are not adequate” (Chazen, 2010). Numerous meetings
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and gatherings occurred in the Gulf, recordings of which were posted on YouTube, on
CNN, and blogged about throughout the social media world. These events, and the media
and social media coverage they received, brought to the attention of the public outraged
citizens such as Kindra Arnesan whose comments against BP’s handling of the clean-up
are both direct and poignant (Gulf Emergency Summit, 2010).

The spill continued for 87 days. Over that period roughly 4.9 million barrels of oil were
released into the ocean from a mile deep well; it is the largest recorded spill in US history
(Astaiza, 2012). BP and its partners Halliburton and Transocean were ultimately
attributed the majority of the blame for the course of events and the US Justice
Department has charged the three with gross negligence and willing misconduct. BP and
Transocean have since pleaded guilty in their respective criminal cases (“Deep Water
Horizon Oil Spill,” 2013, “Judge approves BP’s guilty plea to manslaughter, other
charges, in Deepwater Horizon spill; company to pay $4 billion in penalties,” 2013). A
civil case against BP for up to $17 billion for violation of the Clean Water Act is still
pending and the company continues to pay out reparations to businesses in the Gulf
according to an early 2013 settlement. BP has already taken over $42 billion in charges
against its accounts and some suggest that the total bill for the spill could be as high as
$60 to $80 billion (Eaton, 2014).
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Although all the companies involved in the Deepwater Horizon spill have incurred
important financial costs, the bulk of the reputational damage fell on BP. Moreover the
company’s reputational shortfall continues to dog the company’s development efforts as
well as its attempts to present itself in a more favorable light. The Economist (February
2014) recently ran an article entitled, “The Shrunken Giant” that explains just how much
BP has suffered financially, but even more so in terms of reputation, due to the label it
earned in the Deepwater Horizon crisis for being reckless and having little concern for
the impact of its actions on the “small people” (per BP Chairman Carl-Henric Svanberg)
(Calnes & Cooper, 2010; “Shrunken Giant,” 2014). The research carried out for this
dissertation suggest that stakeholder actions against BP largely contributed to the damage
caused to BP’s reputation during those crucial first 90 days of the spill crisis. How that
came about is the subject of the subsequent parts of this dissertation. In the Analysis
section, the approach used to explore stakeholder actions subsequent to the Deepwater
Horizon spill is explained and in the Findings section, examples and conclusions about
the events and the methods used by stakeholders in developing their social movement
against BP are presented. In Appendix 4, the reader will find a timeline of major events
over the course of the first 30 days of the Deepwater Horizon spill.
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Chapter 5: Analysis
Analysis of the data gathered in this study overlapped with the data gathering,
interpretation, and coding process. As suggested by Bogdan and Knopp-Biklen (2002),
the process of searching and arranging facts and information involved a simultaneous
process of synthesizing the information, searching for patterns, and identifying what is
important. The steps in this iterative process are best described in the Methodology
section of this dissertation. Putting aside chronological considerations for the moment,
the focus here is on the analyses that were carried out and on the data involved.

5.1 Structuring the Analysis of the Data
Two main considerations arose with regards to structuring analysis of the data from the
Deepwater Horizon spill.
First, this is an inductive study, yet the exploration was framed using existing theory, in
this case the political process model, a well-developed, reliable and very flexible model
used in the social movement literature. How would the boundary where exploration
began and existing theory stopped be defined?
Second, given that there are two units of analysis – the holistic social movement against
BP, and the issues that fed into the movement against BP –what should be examined at
each of these two levels of analysis and how would the two levels be brought together to
tell a coherent story. Each question is addressed separately below:
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George and Bennett (2005) make it clear that there are many pitfalls for the researcher
who uses case studies to develop or test existing theory. They suggest that when using
extant theory, the boundary between existing theory and the opportunities, or the gap for
future exploration should be very clearly delineated if one is to avoid a situation in which
the researcher retests or simply reproduces the existing theory’s structure using new data,
thereby displaying a sort of confirmation bias.

The pitfalls described by George and Bennett (2005) were avoided in this study by
focusing attention on the way that the elements of the political process model come
together or ‘assemble’ to form a social movement in the context of firm-stakeholder
relations. In this study, the political process model suggests the form which a social
movement will take and it is predictive – it predicts that a social movement will result if
certain conditions are present and that the movement will impact the target firm, in this
case BP.

In terms of the elements to be considered, the model suggests that there are political
opportunities, framing mechanisms, and mobilizing structures; there could be, however,
factors missing. Moreover, not all of these factors may need to be present in order to
obtain the end result – a social movement against BP. Searching for missing elements and
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checking the need for elements-in-hand is part of the exploratory research objective of
this study. It is also necessary to gain a clear understanding of the use and functioning of
each of the factors present in the Deepwater Horizon spill or it will be difficult to
appreciate whether or not elements are missing or how it is that the resulting model is
theoretically reliable.

To summarize, this research with regards to how the social movement against BP came
about consists of exploring (or ‘fuddling around with’) the data gathered on the spill to
try to understand how the political opportunities, framing mechanisms, and organizing
structures contributed to the rise of the movement against BP and whether or not there are
factors which have been overlooked and were important to the outcome observed. This
study avoids many of the pitfalls of using case studies to develop theory because it
clearly defines a zone of opportunity for inductive, interpretive, and/or exploratory
research in the ‘assembly’ step of the political process model development. It also clearly
identifies areas in which the model should be referred to for structuring inquiry and
analysis. As will become evident further on in this section, this clear delineation allowed
me to focus in on the more fruitful avenues of investigation in the data and to identify
deviant cases for further examination and analysis.

A second main concern with regards to structuring analysis of the data involved the
handling of the two levels of analysis concerned by this study. Those two levels are the
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holistic case level (Deepwater Horizon spill) and the embedded case level (this issues that
arose and contributed to the Deepwater Horizon case outcomes). A frequent error in the
analysis of cases with embedded units is to confine the analysis to the level of the
embedded units without rolling up the conclusion of those analyses for consideration at
the level of the case as a whole (Bollen, Entwisle, & Alderson, 1993; Yin, 2009). This
study has avoided that error by adopting the approach shown in the following diagram.
Diagram # 5

As shown by the graph, initial analysis was carried out at the holistic case level. The
conclusions and observations at this level led to and were integrated into analyses carried
out at the level of the embedded cases. Conclusions from these new sets of observations
were then brought back up to the holistic case level and integrated into new analyses, to
eventually arrive at the findings explained in the ‘Findings’ section of this dissertation.
Following is a description of the analyses that were carried out in each of these three
parts.
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5.2 Initial analysis at the holistic case level
Three types of analyses were carried out in the initial stage of research at the holistic case
level. First, with as open a mind as possible, the data on the Deepwater Horizon spill was
arranged into a timeline of what seemed to me to be noteworthy or important events that
appeared to contribute in some way to the rise in a movement against BP. Looking at this
timeline, it was possible to search for patterns in the data including associations between
the stakeholder groups, between events/actions that appeared to connect in an
‘action/reaction’ sort of way, and for the presence of key factors that repeated and
appeared to have an important impact on the outcome. The timeline helped to organize
the data into narrative description connecting the coded patterns identified (Miles et al.,
2014). Although very early in the analysis, this step allowed for the identification of
certain key events were followed by significant alterations in stakeholder sentiment. For
example, the delay, and then the final refusal, by BP and the US Army corps of engineers
to move forward with the installation of a sand-berm sea wall to protect delicate marsh
areas was an event that frustrated many of the state and local officials in Louisiana and
clearly contributed to their assessment that not enough was being done to protect their
state from the impact of the spill (McKinley & Rudolf, 2010).

Second, confirmation of a social movement and some minimal evidence of the presence
of political opportunities, framing mechanisms, and mobilizing structures was looked for.
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In this analysis, what George and Bennett (2005) refer to as a congruence approach was
used in which, “…the investigator begins with a theory and then attempts to assess its
ability to explain or predict the outcome of a particular case.” (p. 181) Of course the goal
here is not to test the theory, but, as George and Bennett suggest, to refine it. This
approach is thought to work well when using a well-established theory, which is the case
here. As the political process model suggests a causal relationship between events and
outcome, stakeholder interactions were explored in an attempt to identify a pattern or
patterns in which there were both the elements suggested by the model and the causal
outcome predicted. The causal relationship to be found was the rise in a social movement
against BP and the subsequent condemnation of BP as being the ‘responsible party’ for
the spill and all of its unfortunate after effects. Such a relationship was fairly easy to find,
but in the search for causal patterns leading to BP’s ‘responsibility’, it also became
apparent that many of the same events and circumstances that implicated BP also
implicated the Obama administration and Transocean. Any of these three parties – BP,
the Obama administration, and Transocean – were in a position to be the object of a
protest movement for their responsibility in actions taken before and during the spill
crisis. So why was BP the target of that social movement and not the others?

This question led to the third analysis in this initial period – a search for dis-confirmatory
evidence of the elements of the political process model for BP, the Obama administration
and Transocean. This consisted of studying the data available on all these three parties
implicated by the Deepwater Horizon spill and looking for differences in the patterns
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connecting the events and the outcome for the parties (or the lack of an outcome in the
case of Transocean and the Obama administration). Were all of the elements of the
political process model present; were there any significant differences between the
relationships; were there any factors that might have been overlooked; might the
relationships between the factors and the outcome simply be spurious in the case of the
Obama administration and Transocean?

In the case of Transocean what was lacking was a significant mobilization effort by
stakeholders. At no point in the period following the spill was there any significant onthe-ground or even social media activity specifically directed against Transocean. They
were often mentioned, but rarely targeted. Their own employees, 79 of 126, were by far
the most numerous contingent on the Deepwater Horizon rig, yet were notably silent on
any faults committed by their managers or company. So while political opportunities
existed, and some framing efforts existed in the form of critiques of Transocean’s safety
record and its ‘off-shore’ status, these two did not translate into strong mobilization
against Transocean.

In the case of the Obama administration, all three conditions were present – there was
political opportunity due to documented mismanagement at the Mining & Minerals
department and the legacy of Katrina. There were also significant framing efforts made
by local and state politicians to transfer blame for a very slow clean-up to the federal
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agencies and/or BP, significant efforts by ecologists to frame the blame for the oil spill on
lax regulation of off-shore oil drilling and an oil/gas driven energy policy, and significant
efforts by local businesses and individuals to blame the government (generally speaking)
for their woes. Finally, there was significant mobilization in the form of protest on the
group in the Gulf and on the internet. These protests were not specifically directed at the
government, but they called on the government to act. One might conclude then that
responsibility or ‘blame’ for the spill and its mess might have been more evenly shared
between the government and BP. Yet this was not the case.

In searching for an explanation of the difference between the Obama admiration’s
handling of the spill, Transocean’s, and BP’s handling of the spill, one significant
differences in the pattern of actions/events was found - that being the number of
auxiliary issues that were connected to BP and the absence of those issues for the other
two. To illustrate, whereas discussions around, for example, BP’s safety record, its
misleading estimates of the amount of oil spilled, the manner in which it compensated
fishermen and business, its use of dispersants, etc., were numerous, there were markedly
fewer discussions around the Obama administration’s actions and very few around
Transocean’s actions. In short, BP seemed to have annoyed a lot of different groups in a
lot of different ways over those three months, whereas discussions of Transocean’s
behavior peaked only three times: first when the rig exploded; second, when its safety
record was perused; and third, when its incorporation in Switzerland was questioned for
tax reasons. Like BP, the Obama administration was the object of frequent speculation,
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discussion, and ‘framing mechanisms’, however, the administration appeared to be quite
reactive, even proactive, heading off potential criticism of its actions with measures such
as the assignment of additional resources to the spill clean-up or the launching of
investigative panels. Whereas the issues for BP would carry on for weeks, the
government’s issues were fewer in number and were often resolved within days.

To summarize, at the level of this initial analysis, the political process model appeared to
be a relevant analytical tool for assessing stakeholder-firm relations following the
Deepwater Horizon spill. All of the elements of the model were easily identified and the
predictive capabilities of the model were in evidence. With-in case analysis of two other
‘candidates’ as targets for a social movement – Transocean and the Obama administration
- showed that either elements were weak (mobilization in the case of Transocean) or that
a social movement was difficult to sustain (due to pre-emptive political initiatives by the
Obama administration). From a model-building perspective, one principle difference
between BP’s situation and that of the Obama administration or Transocean was the large
number, and regular appearance, of auxiliary, yet interconnected, issues that were
discussed among stakeholders. These issues and the discussions thereof eventually
worked against BP, and in favor of the development of a social movement against BP for
its role in the Deepwater Horizon spill. It was concluded that the study of these issues in
greater depth was warranted. In addition, the issues as embedded cases allowed for the
opportunity to make cross-case comparisons of the different elements of the political
process model which would contribute to the refinement of the model.
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5.3 Analysis at the embedded case level
Analysis at the level of the issues was to serve a different purpose than the analysis at the
level of the holistic case. The evidence used in the analysis of the holistic case suggested
that the political process model was a fruitful theoretical framework for the examination
of stakeholder-firm relations and that the elements described in the model were easily
identified. What had yet to be addressed are the definitions of the elements and the
further elaboration of the model for the stakeholder-firm context, taking into account the
changes in the model due to the effects of social media and internet connectivity. It was
also clear from the initial analysis of the case (above) that close attention should be paid
to stakeholders’ choice of targets for their protest efforts – as BP and the Obama
administration had been targeted simultaneously - and to the role of smaller
interconnected issues in the outcome of a larger social movement against a corporate
target.

To address these concerns, four analyses at the embedded case level were carried out:
First, the nature of issues was explored. What aspects of issues resemble elements of the
political process model? Might the political process model be sued as an analytical tool to
explore these issues? To answer these questions, the list of the 15-16 issues that had come
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up in discussions related to the spill was examined. They fell into roughly three
categories:
a) those that were already identifiable as separate social movements, or closely connected
to social movements, for example, ‘environmental impact’ and ‘off-shore drilling’, are
good examples of those that fell into this category;
b) those that were created as the result of outcries or strong reactions to specific decisions
or actions taken which were viewed as being reprehensible. Good examples of these
include the response to BP’s decision to use chemical dispersants, or the response to
Tony Hayward’s behavior including his remark about “wanting my life back” and,
c) those that represent an ‘area of concern’ based on mounting evidence that the outlook
in the area was not favorable. A good example here is the topic of ‘oil drilling safety’ for
which it became clear that not enough was being done to ensure the safety of the deep
water rigs. Another is the topic of the ‘response to the spill’ which was viewed as slow,
ineffective and inefficient. A third is the topic of the ‘local economy and well-being’
which was already suffering and which was very negatively impacted by the spill.

Looking at the definitions provided by social movement scholars on what makes a social
movement, only the ‘a’ group passes muster, however, from a stakeholder-firm analysis
perspective, all three types of stakeholder reactions are important. An analysis using the
political process model might provide insight into how issues contribute to the rise of a
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social movement against BP (Fox Piven, 2006; McAdam; McCarthy; Zald, 1996). This
led me to my second major analysis at the level of the embedded cases.

The second analysis carried out at the case level involved examining the elements of the
political process model – political opportunities, framing mechanisms, and mobilizing
structure - as they appear in each of the embedded cases. Were they all present in all of
the cases identified? How best could these elements be described and how do they
contribute to the model? These analyses led to the principle findings of this study. Each
of the issues was studied separately, concentrating on those seven that had the greatest
impact on the rise of a social movement against BP. In doing so a thorough understanding
of each of the elements was gained and it was possible to clarify some of the most
important characteristics. These results can be found in the ‘Finding’ section of this
dissertation.

The third analysis done at the level of the embedded cases was to look at how social
media and internet connectivity was being used by stakeholders in each of the issues.
Social media’s use was studied in two ways. First, social media tools under employ were
studied along with the manner in which they impacted elements of the political process
model – political opportunities, framing, for mobilization, etc. Secondly, this study
examined how social media was being used in comparison and/or alongside traditional
communication and mobilization tools. For example, in mobilization efforts, was on-the-
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ground protest occurring in combination with social media protest or was only one or the
other in use. The situations in which social media was used was also explored to see
whether the results were more or less impactful than for the situations in which preinternet tools were used. Given the nature of this study any controlled comparison of
relative effectiveness was out of the question, but with cross-case comparisons, some
sense of the way in which social media and the internet were being used and the
situations in which it appeared to have worked well were identified. The results of these
analyses are also in the ‘Findings’ section of this dissertation.

The fourth analysis that was carried out at the level of the embedded cases was to explore
cross-case variations and/or deviations between issues. The data was checked for
consistency and for reliability in the definitions developed for each element across all of
the six issues. Only one of the six showed signs of deviating from the model
characteristics outlined. This was the issue, ‘Local Economy & Well-Being’. The deviant
aspect of this issue is as follows: although this issue was perceived to be one of the
strongest and most cohesive mini-movements of those studied, there was very little actual
mobilization in this movement. Even the activity on social media was subdued and
represented essentially an expression of loss. One could argue that it should be integrated
as a framing mechanism into one of the other mini-movements, yet the themes and the
stakeholders concerned are significantly different from those of the other minimovements. In term of outcomes, the strong change in sentiment in the Gulf vis-à-vis BP
appeared to be a direct result of the sympathy generated by this movement for individuals
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living in the Gulf and suffering the aftermath of the BP spill. This anomaly should be left
as an opportunity for further research.

To summarize, in the second phase of analysis, exploration was dropped to the level of
the embedded cases. At this level it was possible to observe how social media and
internet connectivity was being used by stakeholders and consider how the model altered
as a result. The embedded cases used were the six issues identified as being the most
important to the development of a social movement against BP. Each of these issues was
explored using the political process model. These issues also allowed me to better define
the elements of a new ‘stakeholder political process model’ taking into account the
impact of social media and internet connectivity and clarifying the relationships between
parts of the model.

5.4 Final Analysis at the holistic case level
This last phase in the analysis is best described in tandem with its findings, to be found in
the ‘Findings’ section of this dissertation. However, it is worthwhile here to explain the
considerations that drove this last set of analyses and which allowed me to arrive at the
final conclusions of this study.
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First, having developed significantly the new ‘stakeholder political process model’ based
on the analysis of the embedded cases (the issues) and having now integrated the effects
of social media and internet connectivity into the model, it was necessary to reconsider
the holistic case using this new model. Did this new political process model for
stakeholders allow me to improve understanding of how a social movement against BP
arose and resulted in BP being blamed for the Deepwater Horizon spill? Was this new
model an adequate reflection of a stakeholder social movement in the internet age or were
there still pieces missing in the model or adjustments to be made?

Secondly, although the political process model was used to explore each of the issues for
the purposes of the embedded cases analysis, it was necessary to reconsider their role at
the level of the holistic case. How did they fit into the Deepwater Horizon case
understanding and how should they be accounted for in the new ‘stakeholder political
process model’?

Third, it was necessary to compare and contrast the new ‘stakeholder political process
model’ with the ‘social movement political process model’ on which it was based. In
particular, the respective applicability of each model and the limitations of the new
‘stakeholder political process model’ had to be considered. Which of the differences were
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explained by the introduction of social media and internet connectivity and which might
be explained by other factors?

The findings for each of the above considerations is presented in the next section of this
dissertation, following.
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Chapter 6: Findings
The findings from this study are presented below. They begin with an explanation of the
new ‘stakeholder process model’ for use in the analysis of stakeholder-firm relations in
the internet age. In subsequent sections, the findings with regards to each of the elements
in the model are presented together with an examination of one or more of the issues that
serves to illustrate the findings. In the last sections of the chapter the relationship between
the issues and feedback loops are presented and explained.

6.1 Refinements to the political process model: the new ‘stakeholder process model’
This study set out to explore the way in which social media and internet connectivity has
altered firm-stakeholder relations as described by the political process model, a social
movement literature theory. It finds that, indeed, the internet age has impacted the firmstakeholder relations principally by strengthening the influence of secondary
stakeholders. The model can still be used effectively to analyze firm-stakeholder relations
with some very important modifications. The original model and the revised version –
labeled the stakeholder process model – are both represented in the diagrams that follow.
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Diagram # 6: King’s Original Political Process Model from Social Movement
Theory

Diagram #7: Revised ‘Stakeholder Process Model’ for Firm-Stakeholder Relations

The original model identified three key elements contributing to the rise and success of a
protest movement against a firm: political opportunities, framing, and mobilizing
structures. The findings of this research suggest a more complex model. First, political
opportunities consist of two very distinct elements: pre-existing conditions and disruptive
events. Second, framing mechanisms serve the purpose of pulling together disparate
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viewpoints and may target multiple parties. Third, mobilizing structures represent a much
broader range of actions than in the past and most of these occur on-line or in conjunction
with on-line activity. Fourth, successful stakeholder action against the firm is preceded by
indirect and direct outcomes which later combine to lead to successful stakeholder action.
Finally, there are feedback loops between outcomes and political opportunities.

Many of these changes to the model have been prompted or facilitated by secondary
stakeholders’ access to social media and internet connectivity. Below I explain each of
the aspects of the revised model using the findings of this study as supporting material. In
particular, analysis of the six embedded cases, the issues, provided valuable material for
the elaboration of the findings below. The issues chosen were initially those that appeared
to make the greatest contribution to the development of a stakeholder social movement
against BP and include: ‘drilling safety’, ‘oil drilling’, ‘dispute on oil spill quantity’,
‘Tony Hayward, CEO’, ‘spill response’, and ‘local economy and well-being’. I use one of
the issues as an example below to explain each of the revisions to the original political
process model; they are therefore presented simultaneously.
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6.2 The issue of ‘drilling safety’ and a better understanding of political opportunity
The political process model in the social movement literature has been dogged by a lack
of clarity as to the exact nature of political opportunities (Bevington & Dixon, 2005;
Goodwin et al., 1999). ‘Political opportunity’ in the case of the French revolution might
involve elements as diverse as the prevailing economic conditions at the time and/or the
public’s opinion of the royal family. In their critique of the political process model,
Goodwin and Jasper (2012) claim that what constitutes a political opportunity for many
researchers of a social movement is determined based on the situation and post-hoc,
taking away much of the predictive value of the model. The contextualization of this
model to firm-stakeholder relations and the acceleration of the diffusion of information
possible with the internet appears to have allowed for a more precise definition of
political opportunities. To explain, I describe here the findings concerning the issue
‘drilling safety’.

In the course of the first 90 days of the Deepwater Horizon spill, one of the first issues to
be raised and discussed in connection with the spill was that of ‘drilling safety’. The Wall
Street Journal published an extensive piece just one day after the spill pointing to the
increase in dangers involved in off-shore drilling and the poor safety record that BP had
gained for itself over the past 10 years (Chazan, 2010). Two major accidents had
occurred at BP facilities: one at a Texas oil refinery in 2005 in which 15 people had died,
and the second, a major spill in Alaska in 2006 on the Prudhoe Bay area pipeline.
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Several articles in subsequent weeks also made reference to lax regulation and evidence
that the US Mining and Minerals Service was more concerned with promoting
development than with regulating and overseeing drilling practices. The MMS was also
viewed as a “revolving door” for oil industry executives (Jonasson, 2010a; Urbina,
2010a; Wighton, 2010). Thus, the safety in off-shore drilling was an issue that had been
discussed for some time; the Deepwater Horizon spill was the latest event to contribute to
this discussion.

Considering ‘drilling safety’ as a stakeholder movement in its own right and using the
political process model as a framework led to the following representation of the
situation. I found two types of pre-existing conditions – those connected with the rather
slow consciousness-raising development of opinions and views on the topic of drilling
safety, and those events that were sudden and unexpected. The latter had the potential to
alter existing views on the topic suddenly, either by confirming or dis-confirming
prevailing ideas. In a previous era it would have been difficult to know whether sudden
events could be separated from the slower consciousness-raising evolution of opinions;
both impacted public opinion, yet were opinions evolving naturally or were the events
provoking an alteration in viewpoints. Today, the distinction can be made clearer.
Information on events small and large are communicated extremely rapidly via the
internet to broad audiences; the reactive nature of those audiences on social media allow
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us to have a better sense of whether or not an event has had an impact and what that
impact has been. The delay between an event and a change in opinion also appears to
have shrunk leaving little time for slow consciousness-raising. As such, it is now possible
to differentiate at a given point in time between two types of political opportunities: the
first of these is ‘pre-existing conditions’ and the second of these ‘disruptive events’. The
definitions of each are:
•

Pre-existing conditions: State of affairs prior to the present time including
stakeholders’ positions, and relevant economic, social, and political conditions.

•

Disruptive events: A disruptive event that creates the issue or significantly alters
the state of affairs relative to this issue. Also subsequent events that sustain the
development of a stakeholder movement over time and that contribute to the
evolution of opinions on the issue.

Below is a visual representation of the stakeholder political process model for the issue
‘drilling safety’.
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Figure #1 The Stakeholder Political Process Model for ‘Drilling Safety’

Please note that the column with ‘pre-existing conditions’ includes the historical
reference to the spill off the coast of California in 1969 and the Exxon Valdez spill – both
events which marked the public consciousness. It also includes reference to the recent
low accident rate in the industry which over the years had begun to move public opinion
in favor of relaxing restrictions on off-shore drilling, and the reference to the Bush
administration’s policy of minimal oversight of the oil industry (AP, 2010a; Sheppard,
2010a; Vanderklippe, 2010). Public opinion evolves even in the absence of events, as this
example shows. All of these circumstances and historical events made up part of the
public’ understanding of the issue of ‘drilling safety’ and were referred to several times in
the 90 days following the Deepwater Horizon spill.
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There were two disruptive events during the 90 days studied. The first was the Deepwater
Horizon spill itself which was compared both to the Exxon Valdez spill off the coast of
Alaska and to the spill off the coast of Santa Barbara in 1969 that gave rise to the
movement against off-shore drilling. The second was the revelation that the MMS had
been lax in their oversight of the Deepwater Horizon rig and, in particular, had allowed
BP to delay the mandated test of the blow-out preventer just prior to the accident (Urbina,
2010b). These two events led to an adjustment in stakeholder actions and in public
opinion that was reflected in blogs on the internet. The first meant that concerns about
drilling safety were now once again front and center. Ecology groups revived their
traditional stance against off-shore drilling and framed the Deepwater Horizon spill as the
result of lax government oversight and an incompetent operator – BP. Also, fellow oil
companies pointed the finger at BP’s poor safety record during the congressional hearing
and insist that they would have done things differently. The second event – evidence that
came forth concerning the role of the MMS in the spill – led to new calls against the
agency’s practices and to the re-organization of the department by the Obama
administration. The administration split the service into three separate entities and the
reporting structure was changed to ensure that there were appropriate checks and
balances in the system. Finally, BP was obliged to agree that additional regulation was an
inevitable outcome, something that it had strenuously opposed prior to the Deepwater
Horizon event. Thus, both of these disruptive events significantly altered the course of
the public discussion around oil drilling safety and led to changes for BP, other oil
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companies, government agencies, and all other parties concerned with this issue. Such a
rapid course of events might have been less likely in a pre-internet era.

In all of the five other ‘issues’ studied, there was a similar pattern with regards to
political opportunities being made up of two separate types of elements: pre-existing
conditions and disruptive events. With regards to the issues labeled ‘oil drilling’, ‘spill
response’ and ‘local economy & well-being’, there were significant historical references
that contributed to these topics being raised during the Deepwater Horizon spill event.
For the other two – ‘Tony Hayward – CEO’ and ‘dispute on spill amount’, there were
fewer historical references; the issues were more context-specific in nature. All, however,
had both pre-existing conditions and disruptive events associated with them. The use of
social media and blogs, particularly by secondary stakeholders and the public, led to a
rapid alteration in public opinion and, often if not always, prompt responses by the
targeted entity. The Obama administration was particularly quick to respond during this
period. Below is a table with each of the issues and their respective pre-existing
conditions and disruptive elements:
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Figure #2 Pre-existing Conditions and Disruptive Events for All Six Issues

Splitting political opportunities into the two separate categories of pre-existing conditions
and disruptive events allows the following:
•

Gain a clearer sense of the historical background to an issue. Pre-existing events
represent an assessment of the state of affairs at the time just prior to an event or
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the time when the analysis begins. A clear distinction is draw between those
events that took place in the recent or distant past and those occurring in the
present.
•

Appreciate how certain events can alter the course of events. Changes of course in
the development of a stakeholder social movement can be more easily associated
with an event or occurrence or a change in affairs. Each disruptive event is
recorded along with the subsequent changes in public opinion and stakeholder
behavior that occur.

•

Appreciate the importance of ‘little drops that eventually make the barrel
overflow’. This research suggests that a series of small disruptive events building
one upon the other contribute to the rise of a stakeholder social movement. By
clearly identifying each of those events, it is easier to evaluate their impact on the
movement as a whole.

I now turn to the topic of framing mechanisms.

6.3 The issue of ‘local economy and well-being’ and a better understanding of
framing mechanisms
According to King, framing mechanisms serve the purpose of imbibing protesting
stakeholders with a sense of significance, a common sense of fate, and enable them to
communicate their requests to influential allies and to the corporation (King, 2008 a). In
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this research, I observed less of an effort on behalf of stakeholders to communicate their
claims and more of an effort to come together around a common language or voice about
the major issues they were willing to defend. Most of this activity occurred via exchanges
on blogs and social media. Zietsma and Winn (2008) have suggested that stakeholders
invest heavily in framing to build alliances and support across groups with diverse
claims. This I found to be true in this case as well with bloggers maintaining a strong
following of users who reinforce their opinions and would ‘carry’ the commentaries of
bloggers and other opinion leaders such as Anderson Cooper across blogs and websites.

From a stakeholder research perspective, what is particularly interesting in the Deepwater
Horizon case is the initial lack of a target for many of the framing activities. Protesting
stakeholders initially appeared to be focused on raising their issues, but not on making
demands or directing their dissatisfaction towards a particular party. This was especially
true with regards to the reaction of Gulf residents to the Deepwater Horizon spill. This
group of stakeholders was very active about voicing their concerns for the ecology of the
Gulf, their livelihood, the impact of oil on their businesses, etc, but they did not go out of
their way to accuse BP for their misfortunes – at least not in the early days. In fact, when
they did express dissatisfaction, it was directed nearly as much at government officials as
it was at BP.
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Below is a table of the analysis of the issue ‘local economy and well-being’, once again
viewed as a social movement using the political process model. This movement
coalesced over time, initially being made up of a collection of concerns expressed
individually by various groups – fishermen, boat owners, hotel and restaurant owners,
local officials, local ecology groups, etc. Most of these were secondary stakeholders and
each group expressed very separate concerns with regards to the impact of the spill on the
Gulf region. In terms of a ‘social movement’, it was not at all clear how these disparate
groups would come together to form the backbone of a stakeholder movement against BP
– which is what eventually occurred. An alternative outcome could have been that each
group associated with other similar groups from across the country – for example, the
local ecology groups could have tightened their ties to national ecology groups. Yet, the
ties between the different Gulf businesses and residents strengthened as time went on and
were particularly strong in the Louisiana area. I did not find evidence of a movement of
similar strength and cohesion in the other Gulf states, although my study did not
concentrate on those other areas either.
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Figure #3 The Stakeholder Political Process Model for ‘Local Economy & Well-Being’

In allowing these disparate groups to come together, framing appeared to be very
important. One might think that the most logical and effective framing strategy for such
an ecological event would have featured oil covered birds, such as the one I have pasted
into the text below. The extent of the ecological damage caused by the Deepwater
Horizon is truly impressive, surpassing the Exxon Valdez spill in the scope of its reach,
yet Gulf residents in particular appeared somewhat immune to the plight of birds,
dolphins, and turtles (“More Than Just An Oil Spill,” 2010; Robertson, McKinley,
Dewan, & Cave, 2010). In their YouTube videos and when interviewed, Gulf residents
most frequently spoke about the loss of their ‘way of life’ in a broader sense and the
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threat that the spill represented to their ability to survive independently, living off, and in
harmony with, the land/sea (Harmon, 2010). The framing that brought these groups
together was therefore very particular.
Figure #4 Oiled Gulf Bird

Source: theocculttruth.com

It initially was expressed as a collective expression of regret – this is a terrible thing to
have happened to our dear Gulf region (“Oil spill could eclipse Exxon disaster,” 2010).
Rapidly, however, a connection was made between the events following Katrina and the
events of the Deepwater Horizon spill. The connection was at the level of ‘why us’? We
don’t deserve this! The public as a whole in the US has shown considerable sympathy
towards the Gulf coast for the difficulties it suffered post-Katrina - one could label it as a
sense of ‘debt-owed’ to the Gulf. So this second phase was manifested by a large number
of human interest stories and interviews of people in Louisiana and the Gulf asking how
they were coping with this new crisis. Television and journals were particularly strong in
providing a regular supply of these stories, but they were also taken up in the blog
discussions . In a considerable number of commentaries, the Gulf residents themselves
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referred back to their experiences with Katrina, “"It's just like what we saw with
Hurricane Katrina," said Tesvich, 53. "At first, it was just another storm, just like this was
just another oil spill. But by the time they realize how bad it really is, it's too late”
(Winter & Jervis, 2010). In the third phase in the development of this movement, Gulf
residents begin focusing on what they have lost to the spill. The framing then altered
again, now making a connection between the losses experienced and BP as the agent who
brought about those losses. A New York Times articles quotes fisherman Donny Campo,
"They put us out of work, and now we're cleaning up their mess," he said (“More Than
Just An Oil Spill,” 2010).

By the beginning of June, the framing for this movement was fully developed around the
issue of losses in the Gulf and most of the residents’ fury was being directed at BP. BP’s
subsequent mishandling of the payment of compensation to Gulf residents and Tony
Hayward’s insensitive comments such as, “…I would like my life back” only added fuel
to the fire of Gulf resident’s anger against BP (Durando, 2010). They looked to both the
government and BP to provide relief, but the damage to BP was already done and
attention now was fully focused on BP as the perpetrator of their troubles. Sentiments
created by this largely ‘framing-focused’ movement fed into stakeholders’ response to
the clean-up efforts in the Gulf (the ‘spill clean-up’ issue) and to perceptions about who
was ultimately responsible for the Deepwater Horizon spill.
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In terms of what we learn about the framing mechanisms, it can be concluded from this
example, that stakeholders do not always identify the target of their protest in the initial
phases of the movement. It may take them some time to coalesce around a set of
messages and concerns that will draw the broadest following and that they are willing to
move forward. Until they are fully in agreement, messaging around the issue, rather than
around the target, will be more important to the movement. In addition, framing was
achieved through interaction between the various social media, internet and mainstream
communication outlets. Stories provided by television and newspaper journalists were
picked up by secondary stakeholders and the public and re-communicated via blogs to
support the framing of their issues. In this particular case, framing was particularly
effective around the miseries imposed on the Gulf due to the ‘Katrina’ recollection.

In the next example, that of the ‘spill response’, it will be seen that stakeholders will
target multiple stakeholders if it serves their purposes of advancing their cause.

6.4 The issue of the ‘spill response’ and multi-target framing
From the discussion above, it appears that the message is more important to stakeholders
than the target of that message. Analysis of another example, the issue of ‘spill response’,
suggests that secondary stakeholders will target multiple other stakeholders (primary and
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secondary) or other possible responsible parties, presumably in the hopes that at least one
will be vulnerable to protest and eventually address their concerns.

The inadequacy of the response to the Deepwater Horizon spill was one of the most
broadly expressed sentiments of stakeholders that observed in this research. First, there
were the facts – it took 87 days to cap the well; then there was the perception gained of
an important lack of effective management and coordination by BP, the government, and
all other parties involved. That the spill response became a major issue connected with
the Deepwater Horizon incident is not very surprising under the circumstances. It is,
however, useful to use the political process model to appreciate the various elements that
contributed to this issue gaining momentum and eventually being the subject of meetings
and protests in the Gulf and on the internet.
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Figure #5 The Stakeholder Political Process Model for ‘Spill Response’

The pre-existing conditions contributing to dissatisfaction with the spill response begin
with the legacy of the Exxon Valdez off the coast of Alaska. The Exxon Valdez clean-up
was extremely difficult due to the cold temperatures and the lack of preparation on the
part of the firm. ExxonMobil was widely accused of being ill-prepared and reluctant to
assume responsibility for the event. Legislations was passed in 1990 – the Oil Pollution
Act – which was intended to ensure that history would not be repeated. The legislation
specified that the oil company who owed the well or the resource would be responsible
for the clean-up. Plans for a clean-up had to be submitted to the MMS as a precaution.
This set the stage for the decision by Obama to designate BP as the entity responsible for
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the Deepwater Horizon spill clean-up. BP was initially favorably disposed as it was
anxious to secure its reputation as a ‘green’ oil company. Gulf residents were also
initially well-disposed to BP’s handling of the spill - the Gulf region looked favorably on
‘big oil’ and less so on ‘Washington’ as it had had an unfortunate experience during
Katrina with the federal government’s response under George W. Bush.

But what started out as an advantageous setting for BP quickly turned difficult for both
BP and everyone involved, including the US government. By April 29th, the spill which
had appeared to be manageable in the first week was now growing rapidly, already
covering a space the size of Rhode Island. Questions were asked as to why so little was
done the first week to stem the spill and why no one was aware of how large the leak
actually was. By May 1 Obama is chastised BP for its lack of response while accusations
from all parties are being directed at both the government and BP for their lack of
preparedness. Obama visits the Gulf several times in an attempt to stem criticisms of the
government’s response while BP increases the resources being directed at the clean-up,
including calling on its industry partners Shell, Exxon Mobil and others to lend
assistance. Despite expense outlays of over $6 million per day and substantial efforts on
the part of BP to address concerns about its response to the spill, ultimately BP’s spill
response is judged to be lamentable –Billy Nungesser, Plaquemines Parish President,
was quoted as saying that BP’s response plans were, “…drawn up on the back of a bar
napkin” (Santa Cruz, 2010).
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Secondary stakeholders’ framing efforts contributed to this outcome, but they were
directed at both the Obama administration and at BP. Referring back to the table with the
details of the ‘spill response’ (Figure………..above), in red the reader will find the
instances in which both BP and the Government were targeted by stakeholder framing
efforts. Both the Obama administration and BP were criticized for not making better use
of local talent. Both BP and the Obama administration were criticized for the
arrangement whereby BP was in charge of the clean-up; and both BP and the Obama
administration were criticized for not altering the leadership situation when it was clear
that BP was over its heads from a managerial perspective. Ultimately BP became the
target of the larger share of stakeholder frustration when it became clear that the plan
submitted to the MMS was full of errors and outdated.

The lessons from this example for our understanding of framing are that secondary
stakeholder framing may not be initially directed at an identified target. Initially,
developing cohesion between various stakeholder groups around a set of common
messages and concerns may be more important than identifying the target for those
messages. Second, even when the messages and concerns are clear and stakeholders are
aligned, framing mechanisms may involve not one, but multiple targets. In the case of the
‘spill response’, both the Obama administration and BP were the targets of stakeholder
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fury over the lack of an adequate response to the BP spill. These results therefore suggest
that we adopt the modified definition of framing mechanisms that follows:
Framing mechanisms: The strategic use of shared meanings & definitions to
create messages that evoke an emotional response and encourage affiliation with
the view(s) expressed. These messages can be directed at a single target
organization or at multiple targets.
To execute framing, secondary stakeholders used almost exclusively social media. The
media contributed and supported framing activities by providing material that could be
used by secondary stakeholders to support their arguments on various blogs and websites.
The mainstream press also contributed by reporting on secondary stakeholders activities
and, because of their own following of the social media discussions, by reflecting many
of the stakeholders’ arguments in their own stories. For example, in early June reports
began surfacing on the blogs and on YouTube about BP restricting the press’s access to
the beaches and the wild animal clean-up stations. Anderson Cooper began reporting on
the same topic at about the same and ran several footages about both BP’s and the
government’s restriction of press access. It’s difficult to identify which came first –
mainstream media or individual citizen contributions – but it can be said that once
started, the two contributed to a sustained dialogue on the topic.

Next I will address mobilizing structures using the example of the ‘spill response’
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6.5 The issues of the ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’, ‘Dispute over Spill Quantity’ and
mobilizing structures
King describe mobilizing structures as vehicles that pool individual inputs and suggests
that without mobilizing structures, protests will fails to materialize even if grievances
exist (King, 2008a). He goes on to point out that two types of mobilizing structures have
been identified by social movement scholars: formal organizations and informal networks
of friends and peers. This research finds that a third type of mobilizing structure is
available to protestors through anonymous, virtual discussion on social media and the
internet. They represent an important variation on the other two as they require no
physical contact, very little few resources for participation, and, because they are
anonymous, they lower the psychological risk barrier for participation. The other
interesting aspect is that organization and protest occur simultaneously. An individual
joins a virtual protest by participating in that protest through their posting or contribution
to a discussion board. Mobilizing structures are therefore increasingly virtual and
mobilization is either virtual and/or a combination of virtual and ‘on-the-ground’.

To illustrate the findings of this study with regards to mobilizing structures, I use the
examples of ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ and ‘Dispute over Spill Quantity’. I begin with Tony.
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Tony Hayward was BP’s energetic CEO. He had a good reputation within the oil industry
and financial communities and had taken over from Lord John Browne several years
earlier. He had adopted an agenda in which BP was to turn around its poor safety record,
adopt a ‘green’ image, and push forward with aggressive development efforts to identify
new sources for oil and gas. Just one week before the spill, BP and three other oil
companies had concluded talks with the Obama administration and a bipartisan group of
Senators on a deal that would have ensured the company’s support for the energy and
climate bill in exchange for access to new sites for off-shore oil drilling, an area in which
BP was concentrating its energies and was recognized to be a technological leader. With
such a large and attractive deal in the air, it is no wonder that Tony Hayward was anxious
to reassure the US government and public that the Deepwater Horizon was a spill that BP
could handle quickly and efficiently. Perhaps Tony was just over-anxious, or perhaps he
just lacked diplomacy and was overly frank, as suggested by Ed Crooks of the Financial
Times when he described Tony as, “unguarded, informal, and passionate” (Crooks,
2010). But very rapidly Tony Hayward’s comments drew the attention of secondary
stakeholders and the public becoming a subject of commentary and criticism. Perceived
as insensitive and out-of-touch, the New York Times described Tony as “gaffe-prone”
(Mouawad & Krauss, 2010). Hayward ultimately represented a huge liability for the
company, but this was only the outcome of a huge on-line campaign against Tony that
leveraged his less-than-diplomatic comments, his life-style, his British origins, and his
less-than-credible assurances that BP would ‘make things right’ for the Gulf. YouTube
videos, cartoons, Titter feeds all generously featured Tony Hayward as a subject of
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ridicule. An excellent example is the SouthPark cartoon where Tony says “I’m Sorry”
many times while in each frame, he is featured in increasingly privileged surrounding
pursuing leisure activities such as skiing, horse-backing riding, sailing, etc. The message
is that Hayward lives in a world of riches and status and can’t possible relate to the Gulf
families and residents who have lost their loved-ones, their livelihoods, and their
beautiful coastline.

The campaign against Tony Hayward was carried out exclusively over the internet and
through the media. Considered within the framework of the political process model, the
‘Tony issue’ is presented in the following chart. It was an important contributing factor to
the development and continuation of the larger movement against BP, but also had a
direct result – the replacement of Tony Hayward with Bob Dudley as lead man in the
Gulf in late June. Ultimately Tony Hayward was asked to leave the company. Viewed
from the perspective of mobilizing structures, the movement against Hayward used only
the internet and media outlets as mobilizing structures. Individual participants and
humorists individually made contributions to the movement through their internet
participation. Their cartoons and jokes and chatter were picked up by mainstream media
who provided the means for criticism of Tony Hayward to reach broader audiences, who
then later joined in and feed into the on-line chatter.
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Figure #6 The Stakeholder Political Process Model for ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’

A second example of the internet and social media as being used as a mobilizing structure
is that of the ‘Dispute over Spill Quantity’ issue. This issue rose up in the second week of
the spill when it became clear that the information being provided by the authorities
about the amount of oil gushing from the undersea well was inconsistent with the facts
that indicated a slick the size of Rhode Island. BP and the Coast Guard publically
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disagreed on the amount of oil on April 29th just over a week after the rig explosion (AP,
2010b). The same day, the Los Angeles Times published an article pointing out that a
group called SkyTruth was using satellite and aerial surveillance technology to estimate
the spillage at around 20,000 barrels a day, compared to the 5,000 barrel a day estimate
provided by NOAA and the even smaller 1,000 barrel a day estimate provided by BP
(Fausset, 2010). The debate over the spill amount continued over the next two and a half
months with no agreement on the actual amounts and ever increasing estimates by all
parties. By June 15, official government estimates put the amount of oil at 35,000-60,000
barrels of oil per day while recognizing that the amount could be as high as 80,000
(Achenbach & Fahrenthold, 2010). The confusion over the amount of oil spilled became
an ‘issue’ primarily because BP was very reluctant to provide any but the most
conservative estimates and the government authorities initially appeared ill-equipped and
under manned for taking on the task of measuring the oil spill. They had initially relied
on BP’s estimates and only began conducting independent assessments after April 29th.
The scientific community attempted to fill in the gap left by BP and the authorities by
using innovative techniques to measure the oil. Several researchers and scientists
contributed their experience and shared their information on-line as well as with the press
(Jonasson, 2010b). The dispute over the oil spill amount is presented below as ‘issue’
using the political process model framework.
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Figure #7 The Stakeholder Political Process Model for ‘Dispute over Quantity Spilled’

What is of particular interest in this example for the purposes of better understanding
mobilizing frameworks is the following: first, the internet provided scientists who are
secondary stakeholders in this situation, access to information and tools that allowed
them to study the spill – NASA satellite photos were publically available on-line as was
data about the nature and size of the spill, and later, live feeds from the bottom of the
ocean provided additional data for analysis. Second, social media and internet sites
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provided a way for scientists to communicate the results of their findings to the public at
large. In short, social media and the internet didn’t just serve as a mobilizing structure to
carry out the protest (as was the case with the ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ issue), it also
provided the means for there to be a protest in the first place. Without access to
information about the spill and the means to communicate with colleagues and the press,
the scientists who took the lead in disputing BP’s estimates would never have been able
to play this role. The information would have remained in the government and BP’s
possession. In terms of mobilizing structures, the internet and social media served two
purposes: that of providing the resources to mobilize and that of providing the means
though which mobilization occurs.

I now turn to a third example of the use of mobilizing structures using the issue discussed
above, ‘Spill Response’. In this third case, virtual mobilization was combined with local
stakeholder action to have significant impact. To remind the reader, the ‘Spill Response’
issue involves the development of a stakeholder movement protesting the lack of an
adequate response to the spill crisis. The management of the spill response and the lack of
resource commitment were concerns expressed by individuals participating in this
widespread protest movement. In terms of mobilization, the protest was carried out both
on-line and on-the-ground. Mobilizing structures were several – they were informal
relationships or connections made through regular contact in meetings, bars, restaurants
and locations in the Gulf. They were also the formal groups and organizations that were
mobilized to take action on the spill – local ecology groups, business groups, unions, etc..
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They were also ad-hoc community and community leader-organized meetings and
collective actions, such as those led by the Parish presidents in Louisiana. Finally, they
were the on-line communities, blogs, and discussion boards in which information about
what was happening on the Gulf was shared with those not on the Gulf including national
organizations, the press, politicians, and the public.

Considering these in an attempt to better understand mobilizing structures, it appears that
the traditional notion of a mobilizing structure can be found in organizations such as the
Gulf Restoration Network, a pre-Deepwater Horizon spill ecology organization dedicated
to restoring and maintaining the wildlife and its habitat in the Gulf. The Gulf Restoration
Network was very active both in participating in the Gulf clean-up and in criticizing the
management of the clean-up. Arron Viles, campaign director, was interviewed many
times by the press. The members of his organization held rallies and clean-up events. It
has even been suggested that the anonymous author of the spoof BP Twitter account was
a member of the Gulf Restoration Network. Organizations such as this one played an
active role in mobilizing Gulf residents to protest against the slow and ineffective cleanup efforts in the Gulf.

Another traditional mobilizing structure is represented by the actions of local parish
politicians such as Billy Nungesser, Kevin Davis, Michel Claudet, and others. At the state
level, Governor Bobby Jindal played an important role in stimulating debate about what
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needed to be done and in organizing local officials to cooperate. The result was a regular
series of meetings and initiatives that drew the attention of mainstream media and the
public to the plight of these communities and to the inadequacy of the response provided
by BP and administration officials.

Less traditional mobilizing structures are represented by the use of the internet and social
media. As with the ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ issue, the internet served as a tool that allowed
movement organization and protest simultaneously. Internet sites are mobilizing
structures in that they provide the opportunity of ‘self-organization’ to secondary
stakeholders concerned by an issue – in this case the Gulf plight. By joining a chat group
or protest site, these individuals simultaneously organize with others and protest by
posting comments and/or making contributions. On-line discussion and chat during the
Deepwater Horizon spill was extensive and both BP and the government were targeted.
… Group or community websites were also used to assist in mobilizing individuals to
participate in the clean-up and/or in meetings and protests.

To summarize, traditional and non-traditional mobilizing structures were used in tandem
to assist secondary stakeholders to protest against BP, the Obama administration, and
other government authorities for an inadequate spill response. Other examples in this
study, for example the ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ and the ‘Dispute over Quantity Spilled’
indicate that it may be sufficient to use only the internet and social media to create and
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sustain a social movement. The internet and social media serve simultaneously as a
mobilizing structure – by bringing together like-minded individuals – and as protest
mobilization – by giving individuals the opportunity to criticize and speak out against
their target. With the ‘Dispute over Quantity Spilled’, we also saw that the internet and
social media can serve as a means by which a social movement can get started by
providing access to information and people that would otherwise be difficult to reach.

I now turn to the topic of ‘Outcomes’ and Successful Stakeholder action.

6.6 The issue of ‘Oil Drilling’ and Successful Stakeholder Action
King’s (2008a) political process model framework posits that once the requisite
conditions for stakeholder mobilization have been met, stakeholder mobilization will
result in a response by the target firm. King’s argument is consistent with prevailing
stakeholder theory which links salient stakeholder protest with firm responses in the form
of a change in company’s practices or policies. Based on this research, I found this
action-reaction explanation to be too simplistic. In all of the issues studied there were
both direct and indirect outcomes from stakeholder mobilization. Also, not all direct
outcomes could be described as a change in company policy or practices. Yet the
outcomes – direct or indirect were not unsatisfactory from the secondary stakeholders’
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perspective. To better understand this phenomenon, I suggest we look closely at the issue
of ‘Oil Drilling’.

It is not unusual in the course of human events to discover that an occurrence in one
domain has an unanticipated impact on another. This happens to be the case with the
issue of ‘Oil Drilling’ which is properly understood as the discussion and events
surrounding the failed attempt to create a bipartisan collation to support and pass a
climate and energy bill in the face of resistance from a longstanding social movement
against off-shore oil drilling. In the first half of 2010, the Obama administration, together
with Senators John Kerry, Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham were to put forth a bill
on April 26th that would simultaneously open up new areas for off-shore oil drilling and
put in place cap and trade regime to limit global warming. The bill represented
compromises by moderate ecology groups and by the energy industry. A similar bill had
passed the House of Representatives the previous year. BP was said to be one of three oil
companies that had committed to support the bill and had looked forward to the
possibility of accessing the additional off-shore oil reserves that the Obama
administration planned to make available to the oil industry for drilling (Cowen, 2010;
Sheppard, 2010b).

The Deepwater Horizon spill represented a significant ‘disruptive event’ that contributed
to a breakdown in the Senate coalition and was ultimately a major factor in the bill’s
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defeat in the Senate (“US Gulf Rig Accident Could Stall Offshore Drilling Proposal,”
2010). The sequences of events contributing to the breakdown in the coalition were as
follows: Once the circumstances around the Deepwater Horizon spill became known,
ecology groups rapidly withdrew their offer of compromise; they re-stated their
traditional positions, siding with the anti-off-shore drilling faction, pointing out that the
accident made it clear that the oil industry couldn’t be trusted and that these were the
kinds of accidents that were bound to happen if we permitted and resumption/expansion
of oil-shore drilling. As a result of the alteration in the position of the ecology groups,
democratic politicians in the Senate began to push to remove clauses in the bill that
expanded off-shore drilling. Others called for an investigation. Republican Senators and
Lindsay Graham, a co-sponsor of the bill, removed their support as the bill was unlikely
to include the off-shore drilling provisions. While the actual details of the changes in
position vis-à-vis the bill may be more complex, suffice to say that within two weeks of
the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill, the positions of key constituents had altered
considerably and the bill was thought to have little or no chance of success (Dickinsen,
2010).

To put these events in the context of our analysis of the Deepwater Horizon spill using
the political process model, one should consider that the debate over the energy and
climate bill of 2010 took place on the backdrop of an on-going anti-off-shore drilling
movement (Clayton, 2010). The anti-off-shore drilling movement had been successful in
maintaining a moratorium on off-shore drilling in California for 27 years and in limiting
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expansion of drilling along the Atlantic Coast. Recently, a strong push had been made to
open up new areas to drilling to accommodate national energy requirements. It was
thought that after a significant period in which there had been few major off-shore events,
off-shore drilling had become safer. This trend towards greater accommodation of offshore drilling was what prompted the compromise deal included in the bill and led to the
events just prior to the Deepwater Horizon spill. The Deepwater Horizon spill
represented a disruptive event, not only for the Climate and Energy bill, but for the antioff-shore drilling movement. It gave new energy to their claims that off-shore oil drilling
was not to be entertained as an option. The direct outcome for the movement was the
successful defeat of Obama’s plan to open up reserves to new drilling, the defeat of the
climate and energy bill, and the reenergizing of anti-off-shore drilling movement.

While the Deepwater Horizon spill significantly impacted the oil drilling movement and
the climate and energy bill, the reverse was also true. The indirect outcome of discussions
on the climate and energy bill and on off-shore oil drilling impacted the course of events
with regards to the movement against BP. It did so in two ways: first, it altered the
political calculation for Obama with regards to BP. While the bill was still in play, BP
was an ally in Obama and the administration’s efforts to push through the climate and
energy bill. Once prospects for the bill receded and the usefulness of having BP as an ally
was gone, Obama had less reason to support BP in its efforts to deal with the Gulf crisis.
The change in Obama’s stance can be seen taking place in the week of April 26th, just
after it was announced that Senator Lindsay Graham was pulling his support for the
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climate and energy bill. Of course the timing also coincides with the discovery that the
amount of oil gushing in the ocean was much greater than thought so it’s difficult to draw
direct inferences based on Obama’s behavior. None-the-less, the importance of the
change in Obama’s political calculus shouldn’t be ignored. The second impact of the oil
drilling discussions occurring in Washington was the decision to put in place of a sixmonth moratorium on deep water drilling in the Gulf until an investigation into the deep
water horizon had been completed. This was not a popular move on the Gulf; however it
was very popular with the ecology groups and the anti-off-shore drilling coalition. The
arguments put forth by these groups in the days following the BP spill were effective in
convincing a number of Senators and administrators to support a moratorium.
With all of the elements now explained, I present below the complete table for the issue
‘oil drilling’ within the framework of the political process model.
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Figure #8 The Stakeholder Political Process Model for ‘Oil Drilling’

As the table above shows, ‘outcomes’ have been separated into two parts – direct and
indirect outcomes. Considering direct vs. indirect outcomes, an important observation is
that outcomes need to be considered in view of the entity that has been the target of
stakeholder action. Direct outcomes impact the target of the social movement; indirect
outcomes do not. The definitions for each of these are:
•

Direct outcomes: An action taken, an event, or an alteration in position or
perception that has a direct impact on the company or organization targeted by the
social movement. These could be a response by the firm to stakeholders’ specific
requests or claims, if the issue concerns a request. It could also be direct action
taken by others as a result of stakeholder mobilization on the issue.
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•

Indirect outcomes: An action, event or significant alteration in perception, stated
positions, or practices with regards to the issue in question. An indirect outcome
does not necessarily impact the targeted firm or organization; it may impact other
people or events which have an influence on the firm or on subsequent events of
concern to the firm.

BP was not the targeted firm for all of the issues we have looked at in this dissertation.
As explained in the section on framing, in some cases, multiple entities were targeted by
stakeholder mobilization. In the example above, BP was a stakeholder, but not a target of
the social movement against deep water drilling. The Obama administration and the US
congressmen were the immediate targets of the anti-off-shore drilling movement leaders
as they attempted to thwart passage of the climate and energy bill. The direct outcomes of
this issue, thus concern the government. The bill was defeated (direct outcome) and the
anti-off-shore drilling movement in the halls of government was revived (direct
outcome). The indirect outcomes listed above concern BP. Obama withdraws support
from BP as it struggles to handle the Gulf crisis and a moratorium is placed on deep
water off-shore drilling, an area in which BP has significant resources committed. This
example suggests that both indirect and direct outcomes can have significant impacts on a
firm. Moreover, it suggests that the most important outcomes from stakeholder
movements are not always those that result in a decision or action by the targeted firm.
Change can come from elsewhere, such as when the Obama administration puts in place
a moratorium on oil drilling which ultimately impacts BP’s operations in the Gulf. Below
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is a table with the outcomes from the other issues broken into the two groups - direct and
indirect. The target of each issue is listed for reference.
Figure #9 Direct and Indirect Outcomes for all Six Issues

To conclude, the outcomes of stakeholder movements do not always result in an action or
change in policy being taken by the target firm. In some cases, stakeholder movements
can result in an alteration in the view of others on the target firm or it can result in
changes that ultimately impact the company, but though the actions of other parties.
When considering social movements and attempting to differentiate direct from indirect
outcomes, the target of the social movement should also be taken into account. As in the
situation described above with the climate and energy bill and the anti-off-shore oil
drilling movement, the target was not BP but the US government, yet the outcomes of
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that event had significant impacts on BP. The role of social media and the internet should
not be ignored here either; both direct and indirect outcomes include alterations in public
opinion with regards to the issue, the target firm, or the stakeholder concerned. By
splitting outcomes into direct and indirect outcomes, it becomes easier to appreciate the
complexity of the relationships in which the firm is involved and to tease out a little more
clearly the pieces that ultimately result in changes in policies and practices in the firm.

6.7 The stakeholder movement against BP and the stakeholder process model with
feedback loops
At this point in the presentation of the findings, it is perhaps useful to remind ourselves of
the purpose of this research – that being the exploration of the role that social media and
internet connectivity play in the stakeholder movement against BP subsequent to the
Deepwater Horizon spill, using the political process model as a framework. Examination
at the level of the embedded cases - ‘issues’, above, has led to a building out of the
political process model to include additional factors and more detailed explanations of
each part of the model. Below is a table integrating all of the elements of the revised
model – a stakeholder process model for the internet age.
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Figure #10 The Stakeholder Political Process Model Incorporating New Elements &
Definitions

I now propose to use this revised model to explore the Deepwater Horizon incident at the
level of the holistic case. Some explanation of the model is necessary first. Reading from
the left, the model starts with pre-existing conditions. As discussed earlier, pre-existing
conditions are aspects of the state of affairs existing prior to the rise of the stakeholder
movement that have particular pertinence to the movement. It is assumed that once the
movement has started these remain stagnant for the immediate period in which the
movement takes hold and develops. Although not explicitly shown in this representation,
feedback loops are conceptually included in the model because outcomes feed back into
the model altering pre-existing conditions over time and, thus, stakeholders’ assessment
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of the situation. This model does not explicitly include changes to pre-existing conditions
in order to differentiate more clearly between the long term trends and conditions that
prevailed prior to the rise of the movement and the disruptive events that represent short
term events and changes in circumstances that impact the course of the movement. It was
noted that social media and internet connectivity was critical to the differentiation
between a pre-existing conditions and a disruption event as it allowed for a rapid
assessment of a disruptive event on changes in public opinion. Yet if a movement extends
over several years, it would make sense to integrate changes to pre-existing conditions as
from disruptive events.

Disruptive events regularly feed the movement and are listed in chronological order.
Such events can be of a varying nature – speeches, physical happenings, decisions,
changes in policy, discoveries of new information, shocking behavior, etc. They differ
from other activities and happening because they have pertinence for the stakeholders and
are likely to enhance their ability to achieve their goals. Reactions to disruptive events
can be tracked via social media, providing an estimate of their impact on public opinion.
Often disruptive events are the subsequent target of framing activities and/or later
mobilization.

Framing is shown in the model as it evolves over the life over the movement with the
initial framing represented on top and the final framing on the bottom. What is presented
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here is the essence of the many messages communicated by activist stakeholders with the
intent of rallying support for the cause. Changes in the framing demonstrate an evolution
in stakeholders’ position vis-à-vis their target. It may also represent an alteration in the
chosen target, say from being the government to BP. Framing is almost exclusively
achieved through the internet, social media, and mainstream press through a process
whereby they each supply the other with material to report on or to use to support their
respective arguments.

Direct and indirect outcomes can occur at any point in the stakeholder movement and are
shown from top to bottom in chronological order. This research has suggested that many
outcomes are not changes in the target firm’s policy or practices, but rather changes made
by other parties that have an indirect impact on the target firm. Direct outcomes are
changes either by the firm or an alteration of opinion directed at the target firm. Indirect
outcomes are those that are not directed at the target firm, but which have a significant
impact on the target firm. Successful stakeholder action results from both direct and
indirect outcomes and can be considered any alteration that moves stakeholders closer to
achieving their objectives. Secondary stakeholders are satisfied with both direct and
indirect outcomes that go in the direction they have charted and may leverage indirect
outcomes to use against the firm.
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Below is Deepwater Horizon incident viewed as stakeholder movement against BP. That
can best be understood as the events contributing to the movement against BP. Outcomes
and events associated with each of the ‘issues’ examined earlier in this section
contributed to the development of the stakeholder movement against BP outlined below.
Figure # 11The Stakeholder Political Process Model for ‘Deepwater Horizon
Responsibility’
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There were several important pre-existing conditions that contributed to the development
of a stakeholder movement against BP following the Deepwater Horizon spill. The first
of those was the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. This act was passed in the wake of the Exxon
Valdez disaster and mandated that in the case of an accident or ecological event, the
entity who owned the oil would be responsible for paying for damages and removal costs
associated with the event. It also required that states, government agencies and individual
oil companies develop preventive plans and a detailed containment and clean-up plans.
The importance of this legislation for the Deepwater Horizon case is that it placed the
financial burden for the clean-up efforts on BP. It also set the stage for a tug of war
between the state and federal authorities on the one hand and BP on the other as concerns
responsibility for managing the clean-up. According to the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, the National and Regional Response Teams are
to coordinate and direct efforts to respond in the case of an important oil spill. Yet
according to the plan that BP submitted to and approved by the US Mining and Minerals
Service, BP was prepared to deploy a massive clean-up effort in the case of a spill.

A second important pre-existing condition was the poor safety record that BP had gained
over the previous 10 years. Discussed above in the section on ‘Drilling Safety’, I explain
how BP’s safety record was a result of two major accidents – the 2005 Texas oil refinery
accident and the 2006 leak in the Prudhoe Bay pipeline in Alaska. Despite BP’s claims
that they had resolved these issues, the Deepwater Horizon spill came too quickly after
the other two major accidents for BP’s claims to hold a great deal of weight.

135

The third important pre-existing condition was that this event came on the heels of
Katrina. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 had devastated the Gulf, in particular Louisiana,
leaving in its wake major ecological, economic, and property damage. The region was
only just beginning to recover. One of the features of the Katrina event was the lack of
preparedness of the state and federal authorities to provide disaster relief to tis citizens.
President G. W. Bush’s administration was widely criticized as having failed the
residents of the Gulf Coast. Local politicians such as Governor Bobby Jindal have been
noted for their outspoken skepticism with regards to aid coming from Washington.

On this backdrop, the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill came as a vivid reminder of
the past inadequacies of the federal government, the past mistakes made by BP, and the
responsibility that both parties have for ‘making things right’ for the people of the Gulf. It
is perhaps to their credit that the Gulf citizens responded stoically to the early news of the
spill. Yet it was, perhaps, disquieting to learn a week later that the leak was not under
control and was spreading. Even more so to learn that there were disagreements between
government authorities and BP on the amount of oil spilled, as was the case by April 29th.
Up to this point, it had appeared that the government and BP were cooperating, that they
were on the ‘same team’; yet here was evidence that the two entities on which the Gulf
population was relying most to deal with the spill were quibbling in their corner. It is at
this point that President Obama steps in and announces that BP is responsible for the
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clean-up. "While BP is ultimately responsible for funding the cost of response and cleanup operations, my administration will continue to use every single available resource at
our disposal, including potentially the Department of Defense, to address the incident,"
President Barack Obama said yesterday. The announcement was a game-changer in terms
of framing BP for responsibility for the spill; it came across in the headlines and Tweets
as, “BP is responsible” (CEO Wire, n.d.; Lewis, 2012).

And yet it was not the only piece of information that made its way into the public
consciousness that contributed to the impression of BP being responsible for the spill.
Despite protestations from BP that the rig was owned by Transocean, the fact that the
well was owned by BP and that Transocean was under contract from BP seemed to have
more impact. It was ‘BP’s well’ and thus ‘BP’s spill’. In the search for understanding as
to how this catastrophe could have come about, curious stakeholders and the press
learned that the Mining and Minerals Service may once again have been derelict in their
duties. Already under scrutiny for highly compromising behavior in Colorado, it
appeared now that the MMS was in the pocket of BP management and could be guilty of
lax oversight in the Deepwater Horizon case (Urbina, 2010a). In an effort to deflect
criticism against the government and also with the aim of resolving what was
increasingly becoming a liability, the Obama administration immediately stepped in and
announced the re-organization of the MMS. This tacit admission of guilt by the US
government left BP, not in a better, but in a worse position, as it made it appear that
indeed BP had been violating mandated operating procedures and had gotten away with
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it. The loss of legitimacy of the MMS left BP with no ‘covering blanket’ to support their
claims that all necessary and adequate procedures had been followed with regards to the
rig.

The chatter in social media and the tone of the comments on the Deepwater Horizon
situation turned continuously more critical of BP. A title of a blog comment on April 29th
on ProPublica was, “Gulf Oil Spill Puts Spotlight on Regulator With Mixed Record”. On
May 1st on Daily Kos, one blogger’s title was, “BP is a syphilitic infection” and on May
25th by ‘troutfishing’ on Daily Kos, another was entitled: “BP's accidental terrorism
brings silent spring to America” . An important contribution to the impression of BP’s
duplicity was its own behavior with regards to the spill quantity estimates. As discussed
in the section on ‘Dispute on Quantity Spilled, BP was continually communicating only
the most conservative estimates even when it became very clear through the contributions
of scientists across the US that those estimates were totally unrealistic. While objectively
speaking, one could be sympathetic to the plight of BP who were well aware that their
liability under the Clean Water act would depend upon the calculation of the amount of
oil spilled; it was not in the company’s interest to provide data that would simply serve to
increase the cost to the company of an already very expensive disaster. That being said,
their handling of the ‘quantity dispute’ simply contributed to the impression of the
company’s lack of transparency and unwillingness to cooperate.
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By the time that protests were beginning on the Gulf against BP, the company had been
framed as being ‘liars, cheats, and money grabbing oil tycoons who cared very little for
the people of the Gulf’. The anti-off-shore drilling movement’s efforts also began to have
an effect focusing attention on the US’s unhealthy dependence on oil and the inherent
dangers of off-shore drilling. Below I have pasted in two photos of the BP protests that
took place around the world found on the internet.
Figure #12 BP Protestors

Source: Idahobusinessreview.com & zimbio.com

Certainly some of the fears about BP’s lack of concern for the impacts of their activity on
the environment and the people in the Gulf were confirmed by the words and actions of
Tony Hayward, BP’s CEO. Although certainly he had attempted to transmit a very downto-earth and sympathetic image to people on the Gulf, the gap between his reality and that
of residents living on the Gulf was perhaps too wide to allow that approach to work. His
comments came across as exaggerated and his gaffs were widely quoted. As explained
above in the section on ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’, there was even a mini-movement against
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Tony Hayward, the person, with jokes and videos filling the web pages of social media.
Hayward himself talks about being vilified upon stepping down from BP. "This is a very
sad day for me personally," Mr [Tony Hayward] said. "Whether it is fair or unfair is not
the point. I became the public face [of the disaster] and was demonized and vilified. BP
cannot move on in the US with me as its leader . . . Life isn't fair" (“Hayward pay-off
fury after BP posts GBP 11bn loss,” 2010).

I have described above how stakeholders used disruptive events, framing, and mobilizing
structures to damage the image of BP and reinforce its responsibility for the spill. In
terms of direct outcomes from primarily secondary stakeholder actions, first, BP suffered
at one point a more than 50% decline in its stock price from the period just prior to the
spill. Second, the spill was labeled the ‘BP spill’ early on by stakeholders, a name that
has stuck to this day. A search in Google for ‘BP spill’ will bring up over 28 million
entries starting with those on the Deepwater Horizon spill. In addition to the reputation
damage which is still evident today, BP is has suffered considerable financial damage
(“Shrunken Giant,” 2014). Over $42 million has been set aside to cover the costs of the
spill. As there are still major court hearings pending, the cost is expected to exceed this
amount with the total bill reaching nearly $60 million. Around $38 million in assets has
already been sold. BP is also still barred by the US environmental protection agency from
bidding on new oil drilling and related contracts.
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In terms of indirect outcomes, the BP stakeholder movement led to a temporary
moratorium on deep water drilling. Very unpopular with Gulf residents, but strongly
supported by the ecologists and anti-off-shore oil drilling advocates, the ban was lifted
earlier than the six months allowed as soon as the US Department of Interior had
completed its assessment and announced new regulation of oil drilling activities. The new
regulation, another indirect outcome of the Deepwater Horizon incident and stakeholder
protest, included new standards for well design, blowout preventers, safety certification,
emergency response and worker training (Baker & Broder, 2010). Two other indirect
outcomes include the defeat of the Climate and Energy bill in the Senate, discussed in the
section above on ‘Oil Drilling’ and the re-organization of the Mining and Minerals
Service.

Both the direct and indirect outcomes must have given some satisfaction and assurance to
secondary stakeholders in the Gulf and elsewhere that measures had been taken to
prevent a ‘BP-type’ occurrence in the future. Although BP has borne much of the brunt of
the blame and reputation damage in this affair primarily through its stakeholders’ framing
and mobilizing efforts, it is not clear that the full weight of guilt lies with BP. Both
Transocean and Halliburton have been found guilty of wrongdoing in their respective
court hearings and the US government was clearly at fault for lax oversight due to
mismanagement at the Mining and Minerals Service. This story is therefore a cautionary
tale for other corporate managers about the dangers associated with secondary
stakeholder movements, such as the one that was launched against BP. Whatever may be
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the circumstances, should the right elements (pre-existing conditions, disruptive events,
framing mechanisms, and mobilization structures) be present, there is the possibility of
the development of a stakeholder movement with all of its unfortunate consequences.

6.8 The Stakeholder Process Model – the Holistic Movement
Stepping back now from the ‘tale’ of the Deepwater Horizon spill, let’s now turn to the
findings of this study with regards to holistic case, taking into account what has been
learned at the level of the embedded cases.

Based on the findings of this study, the movement against BP could best be characterized
as a collection of issues and stakeholders that came together at this point in time to
contribute to the protest against the actions of BP in regards to the Deepwater Horizon
spill. Each issue appears to contribute something different to the larger movement. Some
issues were more important for the framing of the larger movement, some for driving and
leading to mobilization, others for their pre-existing conditions or disruptive events. For
example, the ‘Local Economy and Well-Being’ issue was very important in creating
sympathy for inhabitants of the Gulf. The impact of the oil spill was framed not simply as
an environmental disaster but as an attack on the livelihoods and lifestyles of people on
the Gulf. This careful framing brought together diverse groups who may not have
otherwise been willing to protest against an oil company who also provides a career and
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revenues to many in the Gulf. The issue ‘Spill Response’ that pointed up the
inefficiencies of the government’s and BP’s response to the spill was extremely effective
in terms of mobilizing structures. It brought together those that were helping in the cleanup with those who were living on the Gulf and were concerned for its wildlife and
welfare. It also provided a regular store of examples of how BP was not stepping up to
the task of cleaning up the Gulf. The ‘Drilling Safety’ issue with its focus on BP’s poor
safety record was crucial as a pre-existing condition that set the stage for BP being
framed as a poor operator while the ‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ issue provided excellent
fodder for messages framing BP as a profits-hungry firm with little consideration for the
damage its leaves in its wake.

The timing of issues and the connections between issues does not appear to occur in a
haphazard fashion, although the pattern does display some degree of circularity with
feedback loops. While pre-existing conditions always precede the beginning of a
movement, disruptive events, framing efforts and mobilizing activities can occur
throughout the timeframe of the movement and be repeated multiple times. In particular,
the relationship between disruptive events and framing efforts is highly repetitive and
circular. A disruptive event will generate a reaction within the concerned stakeholder
population to be followed by efforts to frame the event in the context of larger movement.
Mobilization can occur in reaction to the new framing and, if it occurs on-line, it follows
closely the disruptive event. On-the-ground mobilization implies logistical organization
and may occur some days, weeks, or even perhaps months after an event.
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The course of the development of a stakeholder movement can be impacted by the order
in which events occur. For example, if the dispute over the quantify of oil spilled had
occurred a month or more later, Senator Markey may not have been successful in making
the case to Congress for the release of BP’s underwater videos. And, it was the
combination of the scientific analysis of aerial photos together with the videos of the
underwater well that so discredited BP’s technical reputation in the eyes of the public.
The regular reframing of messaging following disruptive events can serve to broaden the
appeal of the movement and draw in new active participants. With each new disruptive
event concerning Gulf residents, the messages on social media and in the press were reframed. Initially concerning only the families for fishermen, the commercial community
was later implicated, and still later, Gulf residents and vacationers were affected. As new
issues and new stakeholders become involved, the framing expanded and found solid
footing in messaging that echoed the Gulf’s Katrina experience and emphasized how
unfair it was that Gulf residents’ lifestyle once again become threatened.

Below is a graph illustrating the timing aspects of the stakeholder process model. These
initial impressions will need to be confirmed in further studies of the model.
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Figure #13

To summarize, a stakeholder movement does not appear to be a cohesive entity but is
made up of several smaller issues which come together to make a whole. The
stakeholders involved, particularly in the case of secondary stakeholder movements, are
likely to be diverse and the targets not necessarily uniform across the various stakeholder
groups. A stakeholder movement may also draw strength from a larger social movement;
in this case the movement against BP drew strength from the anti-off-shore drilling
movement, for example. It is the coalescing of the different movements and issues
together that allows the movement as a whole to take form and eventually identify a
unique target(s) for their actions.
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As the moment begins to take form, timing becomes important with regular feedback
loops between disruptive events and the framing of those events in the larger movement.
Mobilizing can occur on-line or on-the-ground and therefore can be closely linked with
framing efforts if they are on-line, or more removed in time, if they are on the ground. In
the case of the BP spill, there were several disruptive events and several framing efforts
as well as a number of mobilization activities.

Below is a graph that depicts the interlocking nature of the issues connected with the
Deepwater Horizon spill. It suggests that outcomes from several different stakeholder
discussions taking place on social media and in the press eventually combined and
interacted contributing to movement against BP and the overall pejorative impression that
was retained by the public. The size of the arrows in the diagram below indicates the
level of influence each of the issue outcomes had on either on other issues or on the
movement. For example, the outcome of the dispute over the quantity of oil spilled had a
direct influence on the impression gained about BP’s trustworthiness, but it also
influenced how people viewed BP’s spill response efforts. Because of the inaccuracy in
BP’s estimates of the amount of oil spilled, the public lost trust in BP’s claims as to the
amount of oil there was in marches and on beaches, as to the amount of oil that had been
cleaned up, or as to the efficacy of the company’s clean-up efforts in general. One
particularly interesting observation that can be made, illustrated below, is that while Tony
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Hayward’s undiplomatic behavior had devastating effects, it did not appear to directly
contribute to the public’s impression of BP’s responsibility for the spill. It did, however,
substantially impact the public’s impression of BP’s handling of the clean-up efforts and
of its level of concern for Gulf residents. In the end, Tony Hayward was not viewed as an
incompetent or dishonest CEO, but rather as a remote CEO who had little or no
sensitivity for the impact of his firm’s actions on the outside world.
Figure # 14 Public Perceptions on Issues Combine/Interact, Contributing to a Social
Movement against BP.
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6.9 Summary of the Findings, the Impact of Social Media and Internet Connectivity
on the Political Process Model

Social media and internet connectivity had an important impact on the unfolding of the
events following the Deepwater Horizon explosion and spill. These tools were widely
used by the media, the public and stakeholders for information gathering, information
sharing, and in framing and mobilizing activities. While these tools were available and
used by all stakeholders, those that benefitted the most were secondary stakeholders, in
particular scientists, the Gulf residents and communities, and the concerned public.

Results of this study include a revised ppm for use in the internet age – a stakeholder
process model. The model reflects the process through which stakeholders gain influence
over their corporate target and are able to influence events. Unlike many other
frameworks developed to explain stakeholder-firm relations, the stakeholder process
model refined here takes into account the increased influence that secondary stakeholders
are able to wield as a result of their use of social media and internet connectivity. The
model also accommodates primary stakeholders integrating the nature of their preexisting relationships with the firm and their own efforts to influence the firm. It
therefore takes into account both the ‘power, legitimacy and urgency’ connected with
primary stakeholders’ demands on the firm and the rapidly evolving influence that
secondary stakeholders are able to accumulate as the consequence of disruptive events,
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framing, and social mobilization (Agle et al., 1999; Mitchell et al., 1997). In short it is a
more dynamic representation of firm-stakeholder relations suitable to the internet age.

What follows is summary of how social media and internet connectivity contributed to
secondary stakeholders’ efforts in the Deepwater Horizon crisis and to the development
of a social movement that ultimately had a strong influence on the course of events.
Social media and internet connectivity was impactful, 1) by allowing for a clear
definition of political opportunities and a differentiation between pre-existing conditions
and disruptive events; 2) by being the principle mechanism through which secondary
stakeholders were successful in framing their issues; 3) by simultaneously providing a
vehicle through which secondary stakeholders could organize mobilization and mobilize;
and 4) by increasing information symmetry so that secondary stakeholder with diverse
interests might inform one another of their efforts and then combine their efforts for
greater impact.
The information is broken down by element in the stakeholder process model. A table
summarizing the effects follows the explanation.

1) Political opportunities: Pre-existing conditions and disruptive events
The political process model was criticized for its inability to clearly define what would
constitute a political opportunity. The findings of this research suggest that there are two
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types of political opportunities: pre-existing conditions that contribute to consciousnessraising in public opinion with regards to a particular issue, and disruptive events, that
represent opinion altering occurrences. The latter can be differentiated from the former
because a clear change in public opinion can be traced to the event. This research
suggests that the alteration in public opinion can be identified through social media.
Reactions to events and/or decisions are reflected in blog posts and social media
comments, thereby assisting in differentiating pre-existing conditions from disruptive
events.

2) Framing:

Social media and the internet were used by secondary stakeholders and the public to
frame BP - providing their observations and sentiments on the events related to the
Deepwater Horizon spill. Extensive blogging, tweeting and commenting on social media
and websites contributed heavily to secondary stakeholders’ efforts to frame BP as a
sloppy and duplicitous operator that was only interested in profits. Successful framing
efforts appear to have been primarily a result of internet and social media activity. Those
efforts were supported and extended by the mainstream media which provided additional
outlets for the views of secondary stakeholders and material which could be used to
support the efforts of bloggers and social media commentators.

150
Framing efforts were not so much uni-targeted at BP as they were multi-targeted at
several entities that could be held responsible for the spill and for the unsatisfactory
clean-up efforts. Social media facilitated both the multi-targeting, but also left open the
possibility that the public and other secondary stakeholders could contribute to the
evolution of framing efforts through their individual participation on websites and social
media pages. As it happens, framing efforts increasingly were targeted at BP as the
outcomes from ‘mini-issues’ contributed to the discourse around the Deepwater Horizon
spill.

3) Mobilization:

Social media and the internet were also used heavily in mobilization around the spill. In
contrast to tradition mobilizing structures for social movements in which a) affiliation
with the movement and b) mobilization or protest are separate activities, with social
media, those two activities occur simultaneously. A would-be protestor who begins to
comment on a discussion board protesting BP, has at once become a member of the
movement against BP and participated for the first time in a protest. Mobilization
around the BP spill on social media and the internet was intense. As early as May 1,
reporters were commented on how extensive the activity was on social media concerning
BP. It also wasn’t very flattering. Doug Lacombe of the Star-Phoenix wrote, “BP may
have an easier time capping the gushing well than the toxic word-of-mouth that is
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spewing forth on social media” (Lacombe, 2010). If social media and the internet were
any indication of the size of the movement against BP, then it was very big indeed.

In terms of how these tools were used, social media and the internet were used differently
for each of the issues I studied. In some cases, an internet campaign was combined with
an on-the-ground campaign (involving meetings and protests and the like). That was the
case with the issue of the BP ‘Spill Response’ efforts. On-the-ground activities were
picked up and communicated on-line giving further credence to the protests and dialogue
posted on social media. In other cases, the movement was strictly internet based. The
‘Tony Hayward, CEO’ issue, for example, was an almost exclusively on-line affair
featuring videos, cartoons, and quips about Tony. Social media and the internet were also
effective as an information gathering and network building tool. For example, the
scientists that stepped forward to challenge BP’s estimate of the spill amount were using
the internet to access satellite photos, video feeds from the bottom of the ocean, and the
networking capabilities of the internet to access other colleagues with the needed tools
and skills to complete their analyses.

4) Indirect/direct outcomes, feedback loops, and interlocking issues
While the impact of social media and internet connectivity on the political process model
is less evident than with the other elements of the process, what can be said is the
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importance of its role in overcoming information asymmetry. Consistent with economic
theories on the importance of having access to information for investing, purchasing, and
other decision-making purposes, secondary stakeholders need access to information on
issues concerning the firm in order to make informed decisions about the groups’
influence strategies. The results of this study suggest that social media and internet
connectivity facilitated the transfer of information concerning one issue/event to the
discussion of another and thereby increasing the likelihood that one secondary
stakeholder group would be aware of and sympathetic to another’s issues. Take, for
example, the events related to the use of chemical dispersants in the Gulf. Fishermen who
were hired to assist in cleaning up in the Gulf began having respiratory problems which
they attributed to the dispersants. Their concerns might have remained isolated to the
fishing community; however, the issue became a topic of discussion on social media
thereby drawing attention to the use of dispersants and the nature of the dispersants.
Ecology groups already were expressing concerns about the use of this particular brand
of dispersants. The additional information from the fishing community reinforced their
concerns and ultimately led the EPA to ask BP to stop using the dispersants. Timing is
also important; while the information from the fishermen would probably have reached
the EPA at some point anyway, it may not have reached it in time and in enough quantity
to sufficiently to reinforce the environmentalists’’ demands and to allow for prompt and
appropriate action.
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Below is a table summarizing the impacts of social media and the internet on the
elements of the stakeholder process model:
Table #5
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Chapter 7: Limitations of this Study and Discussion

The limitations of this study concern primarily the degree to which its findings can be
generalized to other contexts and situations. This point is addressed below. A discussion
of the implications of the findings for stakeholder theory research and for managerial
application follows in sections 7.2-7.4.

7.1 Generalizability of the Findings
One challenge for researchers using the single case method is to show external validity
with regard to the explanation or relationships found in the study (Yin, 2009). This study
is focused on exploring the political process model in the context of firm-stakeholder
relations. In particular, its contribution concerns the initial steps in the building of a midrange theory of firm-stakeholder relations in the information age – the stakeholder
process model. Efforts were made in the data collection phase to ensure that a wide
variety of populations and data sources were included in the study, something that will
contribute to the transferability of the findings. In addition, the richness of the study’s
data has facilitated a better understanding of how the stakeholder process model operates
and has contributed to the model’s development, yet this study is neither a controlled
experiment nor a test of the model’s predictive capabilities. The principle contribution of
this study to the development of this theory concerns the clarification of the definitions,
the identification of important elements, and a better understanding of the relationship
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between those elements. The study has also integrated the aspects of social media and
internet connectivity in order for the model to more accurately reflect firm-stakeholder
relations in the information age. While the findings suggest a causal relationship between
certain events connected with the Deepwater Horizon spill and the rise of a social
movement against BP, it has not been the purposes of this study to test that relationship.
That can be the purpose of other studies using the political process model.

The model developed as a result of the findings in this study is applicable to the study of
firm-stakeholder relations. This study’s findings can be generalized insofar as they
represent stakeholder-firm relations following a major ecological or safety incident or
another major incident in which the legitimacy of the company’s internal practices are
questioned. Additional research will be required to determine whether the stakeholder
process model introduced in this study can be developed for use in other circumstance.
For example, this study’s findings may be relevant, but incomplete, if used to examine
other types of firm relationships or when there is no major incident or event to serve as a
trigger for the re-configuration of stakeholder positions and relationships. An event where
there is less media coverage or social media activity may also alter the transferability of
the model. In addition, this study looked at a foreign company operating in a US context.
The findings may be different should a US firm be studied or should the event occur
outside the US. The industry context in which this occurred is also of importance. The oil
and gas industry has had several incidents involving ecological damage and the
credibility of the industry as a whole can be suspect. A comparable incident within
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another industry may not be the object of a social movement. In summary, several factors
have yet to be tested before it can be said that the stakeholder process model has strong
generalizability across many sectors, conditions, and situations.

With regards to this study’s findings on the use of the internet and social media, they
concur with several others showing that these tools appear to be altering power
relationships between the firm and its consumer stakeholders and have the potential for
increasing the effectiveness of political activist organizations that target firms (Baron,
2001; Pitt, Berthon, Watson, & Ewing, 2001; Rezabakhsh et al., 2006; Walgrave et al.,
2010). The limitations of this study with regards to the internet and social media is that it
did not look at the use and comparative effectiveness of other non-internet based tools,
nor does this study concern itself with the use of social media and internet related tools
outside the confines of the stakeholder process model. The technology in this area is
evolving very rapidly, as is the manner in which the technology is being used. It is not
clear that if a similar spill occurred today, the events would evolve in a similar manner.
Further study would therefore be useful in this area. One possible avenue for further
research could be to study the comparative effectiveness of non-internet tools with
internet and social media tools in a social movement, as it appeared that not all of the online or on-the-ground mobilization efforts were equally impactful.
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7.2 Implications - Primary vs. Secondary Stakeholders, Two Approaches for Influence
Extent research on stakeholder-firm relations suggests that primary stakeholders will
have greater influence than secondary stakeholder over the firm due to the resource
dependent nature of their relationship with the firm (Agle et al., 1999; Frooman &
Murrell, 2005; Mitchell et al., 1997). It additionally suggests that influence over a firm is
based almost exclusively on resource-based connections or relationships. This research
suggests that social media and internet connectivity may be altering the nature of firmstakeholder relationships by making it easier for secondary stakeholders to have access to
relevant information, to frame the discussion, and to mobilize against the firm – and
thereby being able to increase their influence on the firm.

In terms of gaining access to relevant information, secondary stakeholders and the public
were able to gain access to valuable information through the internet that allowed them to
engage in the public discussion about the BP spill in a timely and highly effective
manner. The most notable example of this was the access scientists gained to satellite
images, underwater oil flows from the well and other data which they then analyzed and
shared amongst the community in order to comment upon, and in this case, refute BP’s
and NOAA’s own estimates. The importance of their contribution is most significant
because it arrived in a timely manner. Had their concerns been raised several weeks later,
then their information would have been primarily useful in eventual court discussions.
What transpired was that the scientists’ sharing of information, 1) led to a change in
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NOAA’s own policy for the way it was collecting information on the amount of oil
spilled (they stopped using BP’s estimates and developed their own), 2) initiated a
discussion around BP’s motivation for obscuring information on the amount of oil
spilled, and 3) engaged other scientists and layperson to contribute to vibrant discussions
on social media and the internet on all matters of scientific data concerning various
aspects of the BP spill. To conclude, these secondary stakeholders actively contributed to
the on-going debate about how to deal with the spill and its consequences. They were
able to do so because they had access to information that hitherto would be reserved to
the authorities or the company involved. Public sharing of information increases
information symmetry between parties and contributes to equalizing the relative power
position between stakeholders and the firm or between primary and secondary
stakeholders groups.

Social media and internet connectivity also contributed to secondary stakeholders’ ability
to frame their issues, and to identify areas in which the interests of several different
stakeholders could find common ground. The best illustration of this was the way in
which Gulf residents, fisherman, and businessmen were able to accommodate their
different interests, combining to put forth a cohesion message about their position vis-avis BP and their demands of the firm. These efforts were facilitated through social media
conversations and the reinforcement of framing by the mainstream press. These internet
based techniques for the finding of common ground between groups does not require the
mediation of the groups’ leaders, but occurs through fluid on-line dialogue.
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Finally, social media and internet connectivity largely contributed to secondary
stakeholder mobilization. It represents both the mechanism through which mobilization is
organized and the mechanism through which it occurs. Secondary stakeholders can
mobilize on-line by contributing to a blog, or posting a picture or a video on YouTube.
The possibilities are extensive and while they may not require quite the level of
commitments that a march on Washington DC (for example) might require of its
participants, on-line mobilization is open to a wider audience and can bring into the
movement a broader representation of the general public. In this study, internet
mobilization was used extensively and was highly effective in both attracting
participation and getting its message across.

To summarize, the three manners in which social media and internet connectivity was
used by secondary stakeholders in the Deepwater Horizon spill aftermath suggests that
these tools have strengthen and broadened the reach of secondary stakeholders relative to
primary stakeholders and the firm. Primary stakeholders rely primarily upon one-to-one
contacts and privileged communication and information channels to influence the firm.
Secondary stakeholders previously had limited access to these channels and to the
information that might pass through them. With the internet and social media, secondary
stakeholders have gained access to alternative channels for information and
communication that are increasing these stakeholders ability to act in a timely manner
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and to influence opinion on important issues. This represents a significant change from
the status-quo state of relations between secondary stakeholders, primary stakeholders,
and the firm, by increasing the relative influence of secondary stakeholders.

The implication of this access to influence by secondary stakeholders is that it potentially
alters the dynamic of firm-stakeholder relations. While primary stakeholders’ relations
with the firm are based on stakeholders’ control of vital resources, it now appears that
secondary stakeholders’ relations, are based on secondary stakeholders’ ability to
influence public opinion and other stakeholders’ views of the firm through its
manipulation of firm reputation and social legitimacy. Several researchers have looked at
the growing importance of reputation and legitimacy for corporation’s successful
operations (BG King & Whetten, 2008; Maak, 2007; J. Vergne, 2012; J.-P. Vergne,
2010). The conclusions are that these factors are not solely important as a firm resource,
but that corporate reputation and legitimacy relates to the identity and social acceptance
of the firm in its institutional environment. Bitektine, for example, has proposed a process
model of how individuals make a social judgment of a corporation that involves moral,
regulatory, managerial, technical, and media-based legitimacy among other factors
(Bitektine, 2011). Thus, it would be erroneous to characterize secondary stakeholders’
influence on their corporate targets reputation as uniquely an increase in their resourcebased power over the firm. Reputation and legitimacy appear to have a much broader
scope of importance and the nature of secondary stakeholders’ influence appear to relate
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more closely to institutional issues of peer-group acceptance, status, and imitative
behavior.

To summarize, the findings of this research suggest that secondary stakeholders have
developed the capacity to influence firms in new ways. Some of this ability has been
made possible through access to social media and internet connectivity. At first glance, it
could be said that secondary stakeholders have simply become more powerful, power
being one element in the resource dependence-based toolkit used by primary
stakeholders. A closer look suggests that secondary stakeholders have gained access to a
different type of influence – that of institutional-based acceptance and legitimacy for the
firm. Through their ability to influence public opinion and other stakeholders’ views of
acceptable behavior and practices, secondary stakeholders are able to influence firms in a
very different manner. Further research will be needed to clearly differentiate reputation
and legitimacy-based influence from resource dependence-based influence on the firm.

7.3 Implications for Managers
If stakeholder theory is to depart from a uniquely resource dependence-based approach in
which firm-stakeholder relations are determined by the power, legitimacy and urgency of
stakeholders based on the firm’s dependency on stakeholder resources, to encompass a
reputation and legitimacy based approach including secondary stakeholders, then we
need also to reconsider stakeholder management practices. Extant practice for
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stakeholder relations involves a one-size-fits-all approach. Firms are to reach out to
stakeholders, attempt to assess their needs and demands, and respond according to their
ability to do so and the firms’ strategic interests. Firms, such as BP, faced with a
stakeholder protest movement in development may not identify it as such; the
characteristics of good stakeholders relations in the event of a social movement appear to
be very different that those prevailing when such a moment does not exist. Several
factors are concerned – in a social movement, secondary stakeholders are dominating the
dialogue with the firm. In a business-as-usual context, primary stakeholders are
dominating the dialogue with the firm. In a social movement, the legitimacy of the firm is
being questionned; in a business-as-usual context, the legitimacy of the firm is intact.
Finally, in a social movement, the issues involve calls for justice, equality, fairness,
respects – values that are important to the stakeholders; in a business-as-usual context,
much of stakeholder-firm interactions involve discussions around how to share the
economic pie created by the firm’s business ventures and stakeholders’ support of those
ventures.

If indeed stakeholder relations does involve secondary stakeholder-based influence, as
found by this research, then it follows to reason that the management of those situations
must involve careful management of secondary stakeholder groups. During the
Deepwater Horizon spill, BP followed with relative precision a textbook approach to
traditional stakeholder management – and failed miserably. BP expended much time and
energy engaging with its primary stakeholders – the investment community, the
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government and regulatory authorities, its partners, suppliers, state officials, and industry
specialists. It even engaged with some ecology groups in the clean-up. However, the
groups it ignored and/or treated poorly were the Gulf coast residents, fishermen, boat
owners, businessmen, residents, oil workers, and the general disenfranchised public.
These were precisely the stakeholder groups who rose up and fueled the social movement
against BP.

What BP managers could have done better to manage its stakeholders includes the
following. First, they should have recognized that the Deepwater Horizon spill threatened
not only their own firm, but also those firms and organizations to which they were
connected including the Obama administration, NOAA, the Mining and Minerals
Service, the Coast Guard, its industry partners, its investors who supported BP’s high risk
strategy, and its partners who provided the financing such as Anadarko and Mitsui.
Devoting time and effort to appeasing this group of stakeholders was time poorly spent.
Both the Obama administration and other industry players including Shell, Chevron and
ExxonMobil were very quick to point out BP’s failings; the first did so in press briefing
just two weeks after the rig explosion and the other did so in congressional hearing when
asked whether their manner of handling the rig would have differed.

Second, BP managers should have recognized that they would be the target of social
media and internet guerilla tactics by secondary stakeholders. Social movements are
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driven by secondary stakeholders and these groups of stakeholders require access to
communication outlets in order to attract disenfranchised individuals and fuel the
movement. By ignoring social media and internet channels, BP made a serious mistake
and left open the possibility for secondary stakeholder to coalese on a framing for their
grivances. Secondary stakeholders were also able to engage the interest of the
mainstream media in their plight and to engage in on-line mobilization.

Third, BP managers focused on attempts to appease Gulf residents’ dissatisfaction with
monetary compensation. They also responded to Gulf residents’ criticisms of their
handling of the clean-up by donately money to funds for the clean-up. None of this
appeared to have a positive impact. What BP neglected to consider was the nature of
these secondary stakeholders’ complaints; in a social movement, stakeholders are
concerned with fundamental values. They question the legitimacy of the firm and expect
the firm to be willing to re-negotiate its ‘social contract’ before they allow it to re-gain
the legitimacy that it has lost. BP’s efforts to compensate these secondary stakeholders
only served to reinforce these groups’ impression of BP’s illegitimacy.

To conclude, one of the important implications of this research is that stakeholder
management may require a very different approach in the circumstances of a secondary
stakeholder social movement than in ordinary circumstances with primary stakeholders.
BP followed standard guidleines for managing stakeholder relations and their approach
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failed miserably. Further research will be required to determine exactly what managerial
techniques might be better suited to managing stakeholders in a stakeholder protest
environment. In the next section, additional research opportunities are listed and
explained.
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Chapter 8: Further Research Opportunities
In 8.1 below, unanswered questions and the challenges connected with future research
and study to develop the stakeholder process model are outlined. In 8.2 below, an agenda
for further research with a potential timeline is presented.

8.1 Unanswered questions
There are several unanswered questions from this research. The first relates to the
study’s limitations and the need to confirm these initial findings. As indicated in the
methodology section, one major concern encountered in the execution of this research
was the need to increase the reliability of the interpretation of the data. The interpretation
of the data is vital as the structure of the stakeholder process model depends upon the
interpretation of the events and their classification into various elements of the model. In
this study, once the data was collected, it was coded according to the issues that were
identified in each of the communications (published articles, blogs, YouTube video, etc.).
Due to nature of the data and the nature of the coding required, the use of a textual
analytical software program proved to be impractical. The logical alternative was the use
of multiple coders. Unfortunately, they were not available. The next steps in this
research therefore involve the introduction of one or more additional coders for all or
parts of the data. One approach to doing this might be to provide a second coder with all
of the data for a defined time range and ask that the coder identify the issues they find in
the data. A second and complementary approach might be to ask another coder with the
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information pertaining to a single issue and to identify the elements of the model in the
data. Both of these approaches should be used to refine and confirm the findings in this
study and represent the next step in the research.

Another unanswered question concerns the degree to which this study’s findings can be
generalized to other contexts. While a single case study provides substantial richness to
the exploration of a given topic, it leaves open the possibility that the findings apply only
to the case studied. The Deepwater Horizon case represents a crisis environment, with the
size of the ecological disaster increasing on a daily basis. Not all stakeholder protest
movements are triggered by a defining event that draws major media attention. An
additional concern is that this movement concerned the oil and gas industry and occurred
in the US. Would the process have been the same if the movement concerned the plastics
industry in Japan, for example? To address these concerns and in order to validate and
extend the findings of this study, several additional field-based case studies will be
needed. The logical next step in the research agenda would be to look at not one, but
several cases to explore how the stakeholder process model applies to stakeholder-firm
relations in a variety of contexts. Such a study should involve firms from several
industries and countries, stakeholder protests dealing with a variety of topics (not just
ecology), and those that are both crisis situations and slower-moving protest movements.
Cross-case comparisons in such a study would allow for a verification of this study’s
findings with regards to the elements in the model and how they interact to create a
stakeholder movement. In particular, some of the points that should be addressed include:
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A) A clarification on the definition of the moment when stakeholder demands
become a ‘stakeholder protest movement’. Can we clearly identify a bifurcation
and if yes, what signs are associated with that transition?
B) Greater clarity on the nature of pre-existing conditions across several cases. Is it
possible to identify and classify types of conditions?
C) A clarification of the role of disruptive events in the stakeholder movement. Are
they in fact triggers allowing the movement to take form and develop?
D) A better understanding of the role of framing mechanisms and an appreciation for
how framing mechanisms work in the absence of extensive press coverage of an
event. What is the role of social media in the framing process?
E) Likewise, a better understanding of how mobilization occurs, how it occurs in the
absence of extensive press coverage, and of the relationship between on-line and
on-the-ground mobilization.
F) Finally, a better appreciation of outcomes and the role of direct vs. indirect
outcomes in a social movement.

The results of this research have led to an initial understanding of the stakeholder process
model, yet more work is needed before the model can be considered generalizable across
all types of firm-stakeholder relationships.
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Beyond questions concerning the generalizability of the model, there also remains
considerable work to develop the model into a mid-level explaining/predicting theory for
firm-stakeholder relations. One issue to be handled carefully is the structure of the model
which is presently a mixture of ‘process’ and ‘variance’ aspects (Gregor, 2006). The
model has process aspects in that the development of a stakeholder movement against a
firm occurs over time and in phases. There are also variance aspects to the model in that
there are distinct elements that have been identified that are presumed to be necessary for
the predicted result (although these still need to be tested). With both process and
variance elements present, there may be ‘sequence’ implications to be considered –
certain elements may need to occur in a particular sequence in order to have the predicted
result. Gregor has suggested that this is not necessarily an impediment to the
development of a theory, but she also recognizes that not all researchers are comfortable
with the mixing of these two types of theory structure (Gregor, 2006). Testing the
variance aspects of the model suggests that the next steps might involve statistical or
factor analysis. The process structure of the model suggests that further qualitative
research may be needed with the aim of clarifying the possible sequences in the predicted
relationship.

Another research challenge involved in developing the theory is related to the dual role
that certain entities or events can play in the model. For example, we know from the
social movement literature that a social movement organization is considered to be a
mobilizing structure, yet recent research and the results from this study also suggest that
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these organizations can be pre-existing conditions as well (McCammon & Campbell,
2001; Schneiberg, King, & Smith, 2008; Schneiberg, 2013). An second example is social
media. In this study, we saw social media playing a role as a framing mechanism and as a
mobilizing structure, sometime simultaneously. Teasing out which role a particular
organization or event is playing in a social movement may be a challenge. The focus of
analysis should therefore move from general classification to careful interpretation of the
contribution that particular elements play in the model while recognizing that such
elements may take very different forms and make multiple contributions. Ideally, very
precise definitions in terms of contributions to outcomes will be needed for each element
of the model. This suggests that any further research should involve an important
qualitative aspect that explores more thoroughly the contribution of: pre-existing
conditions, disruptive events, framing mechanisms, and mobilizing structures in the
model and its outcomes.

A third research challenge relates to outcomes. In the stakeholder process model,
outcomes are both direct and indirect. Sequentially, no consistency was observed in this
study. Sometime indirect outcomes came before direct outcomes; in other cases, it was
the reverse. For the stakeholder process model to become a well-supported theory, there
needs to be clarity on the nature of the ‘dependent variable’ and on the relationship
between independent and dependent variables. The model suggests some relationship of
causality, so if we take the firm view and label direct outcomes as a dependent variable,
then any role that the indirect outcomes plays in direct outcomes will need to be clarified.
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The use of quantitative methods to establish correlation between the variables, for
example, will not be enough to support the theory’s development and may even lead to
misleading conclusions, therefore qualitative research is suggested. Process-tracing, a
technique developed by George and Bennett (2005) may be an appropriate tool for this
purpose. Process-tracing allows for the careful and precise elaboration and testing of
causal theories using qualitative methods. It is useful in cases where there may be reverse
causality or incidental association and allows for several alternative hypotheses to be
tested simultaneously (Crasnow, 2012; George & Bennett, 2005).

In summary, the nature of the questions that yet need to be addressed and the need for
further validation of the coding used in this study suggest that additional qualitative
research is called for as a next step to developing the stakeholder process model as midrange theory for stakeholder-firm relations. In the next section, I present a research
agenda aimed at addressing some of the questions raised here.

8.2 Future Research Agenda
The additional research outlined above represents a significant, but potentially rewarding,
research agenda. The results of this research on stakeholder protest movements may have
an impact of how firms manage stakeholder-firm relations under these conditions and
represents an important departure from the relatively homogenous approach to
stakeholder relationship management presently suggested in the literature. The research
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agenda suggested as a next step to developing the stakeholder process model into a midrange explaining/predicting theory is summarized in the table below.
Table #6 Research Agenda
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Appendices
Appendix 1:
Table of Typical Differences between Primary & Secondary Stakeholders

Primary Stakeholders
Financial or material Gain

Domain
Aims in Engaging with the Firm
(Clarkson 1995; Goodpaster 1991; DeHond & De
Bakker 2007; Winn 2001)

Direct; exchange of resources: contract or
agreement based

Nature of relationship between
Parties
(Pedersen 2006; Zietsma & Winn 2004; Yaziji 2004;
Gebhardt 2011)

More likely to be direct and cooperative – e.g.
discussion; latent threat of withholding of
resources

Strategic; related to the parties’ competitive
advantage and//or the condition of
association/exchange

Most likely to be seen as legitimate claimants
on the firm; explicit power based on the
resource dependence of the firm

Dependence upon the resource exchange
relationship with the firm

Influence Approach
(Frooman 1999; Frooman& Murrell 2005; Sharma
Henriques 2005; King & Soule 2007)

Nature of Issues Most Often
Raised by Stakeholder

Secondary Stakeholders
Institutional or field-level change; righting of
perceived wrong-doings by the firm

Indirect – through the media, or at ‘arms length’
and managed the firm’s PR or corporate
relations department
More likely to be indirect and coercive e.g.
public protest; attempt to influence public
opinion and/or primary stakeholders’ perception
of their strategic interests in order to influence
the firm
Ethical/moral issues related to the firm’s
responsibility in society

(Winn 2001; Arruda Fontenelle2010; Gebhardt
2011; Hart Sharma 2004)

Bargaining Strengths
(Mitchell, Agle & Wood 1997; Eesley & Lenox
2006; Perrault 2012; Frooman 1999)

Bargaining Weaknesses
(Mitchell, Agle & Wood 1997; Eesley & Lenox
2006; Perrault 2012; Frooman 1999; Sharma &
Henriques 2005)

Potential for influencing the media, public
opinion, and primary’s stakeholders and thereby
impacting the legitimacy, reputation, and
competitive advantage of the firm

Relative lack of legitimacy with the firm and in
society; possible lack of power or resources to
carry out influence strategies
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Appendix 2
A Suggestive List of Coercive and Compromise Strategies
Influence Strategy
Compromise

Positive Letter-writing campaigns
Celebrity approval
“Green” alliances
Socially responsible investing
Endorsements
Free advertising
Community investing
Cooperation/help in projects
Codes of Conduct (inclusion)
NGO partnerships
Easing of restrictions/oversight

Coercive

Boycotts
Negative Letter-writing campaigns
Lobbying
Protests/ Demonstrations
Slander
Litigation
Celebrity condemnation
Video, film distribution
Inflammatory posters, books, pamphlets,…
Blockage of firm facilities
Damage of firm property
Work stoppage
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Work slowdowns
Sit-ins or vigils
Music, painting, poems or other art forms
Stakeholder resolutions
Divestitures of stock
Regulation
Codes of Conduct (exclusion)
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Appendix 3
Overview of Four Predictive Models on Stakeholder Influence Strategies

Frooman (1999):

Frooman, Murrell (2005):

Research scope: Applies to stakeholders

Research scope: Applies to stakeholders
Taxology:

Taxology:
1. Direct vs Indirect:

1. Direct vs Indirect:
Direct - same as Frooman (1999)

Direct – stakeholder manipulates
the flow of resources to the firm
Indirect – stakeholder works
through an ally, by having the ally
manipulate the flow of resources
to the firm

Indirect - same as Frooman (1999)
Predictive logic: same as Frooman (1999)

2. Coercion vs Cooperation:
Predictive logic: Access to/influence with
the firm management. Low access/influence
predicts indirect strategy.

Coercion – negative strategies
involving either a threat to reduce
a benefit or increase a cost. Note:
withholding strategies are a type
of coercion.

2. Usage vs Withholding:
Withholding – stakeholder
discontinues providing a resource
to a firm
Usage – the stakeholder continues
to supply the resource but with
strings attached
Predictive logic: Level of stakeholder
dependence on firm. High dependence will
predict that the firm will use usage strategy
in order not to threaten its own interests.

Compromise – positive in nature
and involve an offer to increase a
benefit or reduce a cost. Note:
usage strategies are a type of
compromise.
Predictive logic: Level of stakeholder
dependence on firm. High dependence will
predict that the firm will use compromise
strategy in order not to threaten its own
interests….see Frooman (1999)
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Zietsma, Winn (2008) :

Den Hond, De Bakker (2007):

Applies to secondary stakeholders

Applies to secondary stakeholders, notably activists

Taxology:
1. Damage vs. Gain:
1. Issue Raising Strategies:
Direct action
Framing
Indirect action
Allying
Issue linking
Predictive logic: Used when competing for
issue salience
2. Positioning Strategies:
Movement, coalition formation
Framing
Issue linking
Indirect action
Direct action for issue-raising
Predictive logic: Used when competing for
power and legitimacy
3. Issue Resolution Strategies:
Negotiating
Offering
Compromising
Complying
Joint learning
Predictive logic: Used when working with
firm for Solutions
Also: tie-severing – used in transitions
between stages

Damage – damaging property or
increasing the cost of the
unwanted activity
Gain – rewarding of offering to
reward the firm for wanted
behavior.
Predictive logic: Based on phase of deinstitutionalization/ re-institutionalization –
damage for de-institutionalization,
particularly by radical groups
2. Material vs. Symbolic:
Material – focuses on subversion,
appropriation or destruction of
organizational technology and
resources.
Symbolic – attempts to subvert
dominant meanings, ideologies,
and discourses (e.g. firm
reputation).
Predictive logic: Based on phase of deinstitutionalization/ re-institutionalization –
symbolic will be used first by both reformists
and radicals

3. Participatory vs. Non-participatory:
Participatory: actions that rely on
large numbers of
participants…marches, boycotts,
etc
Non-participatory: actions that do
not require large numbers of
participants.
Predictive logic: Based on phase of deinstitutionalization/ re-institutionalization –
non-participatory initially by both groups.
Later reformists will use participatory more
than radicals.

178
Appendix 4 –
A Chronological Listing of Key Events in the Three Months following the
Deepwater Horizon Explosion

Tuesday April 20, 2010

Rig Explodes - Environment News Service wire

around 9PM
Wednesday April 21

BP oil drilling safety record raised by WSJ

Wednesday April 21

Families of rug-necked oil rig workers pray for their
survival – Christian Science Monitor

Thursday April 22

Rig Sinks – Gannett News wire

Thursday April 22

Bipartisan climate/energy bill to be supported by BP,
Conoco Philips & Shell; Impact of spill on questioned –
CNN; MotherJones

Friday April 23

Tony Hayward has BP reputation challenge - the Times
(UK); Tony flies to Louisiana to oversee the response -WSJ

Friday April 23

BP activated “extensive” spill response - Environment
News Service wire
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Friday April 23

Lawmakers suggest the industry suffers from “myth of
safety” – Christian Science Monitor

Friday April 23

Environmental situation looks optimistic; no major leaks –
The Courier, Houma, LA (AP)

Friday April 23

Tony Hayward, CEO of BP, reassures the public, “There
should be no doubt of our resolve to limit the escape of oil
and protect the marine and coastal environments from its
effects." - The Daily Telegraph

Saturday April 24

Leak discovered; 1000 barrels/day – Ocala Star Banner,

Ocala Florida
Saturday April 24

Spotlight is put on Tony Hayward and the BP spill response
– Daily Telegraph

Saturday April 24

11 of 126 rig workers presumed dead; Coast Guard search
ends – NYTimes

Monday April 26

Slick is the size of Rhode Island (1800 sq. miles) - AP

Monday April 26

Bobby Jindal asks for help from the Coast Guard to deploy
booms in fragile wildlife preserves –The Ledger, Lakeland,
FL
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Monday April 26

Discussion in the Senate on the compromise climate and
energy bill are overshadowed by calls for an investigation
of the Deepwater Horizon incident – Oil Daily

Tuesday April 27

Cost on incident to BP estimated at $1.6 billion - Daily

Telegraph UK
Tuesday April 27

Debate over the BP spill and Obama’s plans to extend offshore oil drilling spread to the House as the Energy &
Commerce Commission announce plans for an
investigation – WSJ

Tuesday April 27

Locals in hotel, tourist, boat & fishing industries watch
anxiously to see if spill can be contained – Bennington
Banner

Wednesday April 28

NOAA revises estimates on oil leaking to 5000 barrels/day
– Gainesville Sun, Florida (reported on 04/29/2010)

Wednesday April 28

Climate &Energy bill stalled in Senate – Gannett News
Service

Wednesday April 28

Royal Dutch Shell steps in to help clean-up efforts –
FT.com

Wednesday April 28

A dispute over the amount of oil leaking begins as BP’s
estimate stays at 1000 barrels per Associated Press
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Thursday April 29

President Obama says BP is responsible for cost of spill
cleanup – Christian Science Monitor (reported on
04/30/2010)

Thursday April 29

Locals wonder why it took BP so long to react to the spill
and so long to reach out to locals, “It’s just like Katrina” –
Gannett News Service

Thursday April 29

‘Vessels of Opportunity’ program is launched by BP – The
Courier, Houma, LA

Thursday April 29

BP praised for its efforts by Rea Admiral Landry –
Environmental News Services

Thursday April 29

Florida State University’s Ian MacDonald confirms a report
by SkyTruth that oil is leaking at the rate of 25,000 barrels
a day – LA Times

Friday April 30

Oil washes ashore in Louisiana; Louisiana, Alabama,
Mississippi, and Florida have all declared states of
emergencies – CEO Wire

Friday April 30

In an open letter, four New Jersey law makers join Senator
Bill Nelson in urging the President to reverse plans to drill
in coastal waters – Christian Science Monitor
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Friday April 30

Pentagon orders plans to begin distributing chemical
dispersants; BP still in charge – CEO Wire

Friday April 30

Coast Guard’s Landrieu acknowledges that local officials
need more specific information – The Courier, Houma, LA

Friday April 30

Questions are raised about Obama Administration’s slow
response to spill - Finance Wire

Friday April 30

Echoing the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana
residents meet in a local gym to be trained in hazardous
waste management – The Christian Science Monitor

Saturday May 1

President Obama puts a temporary halt on all new
exploratory off-shore drilling on the US continental shelf
pending an investigation – Christian Science Monitor

Saturday May 1

Obama chastises BP by for its response; questions are
raised as to BP’s ability to handle the spill response – NY
Times; The Courier, Houma, LA

Saturday May 1

Governor Bobby Jindal together with Parish leaders
announce spill response measures and plans for protecting
coastlines and wetlands – The Courier, Houma, LA
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Saturday May 1

The Financial Times does a story on Tony Hayward finding
him to be, “unguarded, informal, passionate, … and
ruthless” FT.com

Saturday May 1

Spill given ‘BP’ label on social media – Star Pheonix,
Saskatchewan CA

Sunday May 2

Obama visits the Gulf Coast for the first time; inability to
contain spill explained by failure in the blow-out preventer
– NY Times

Monday May 3

Hayward defends BP’s role and points finger at Transocean
– “This wasn’t our accident. …It was their people. Their
systems. Their processes.” – Daily Kos

Monday May 3

More than 70 environment groups urge Obama to take offshore oil drilling out of the climate & energy bill – Mother
Jones

Tuesday May 4

Local groups work with national ecology and wildlife
groups to recruit volunteers for clean-up; wait on BP for
green light – Times Picayune

Wednesday May 5

BP announces $25 million block grants to each of four Gulf
states impacted by the spill – Rigzone
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Thursday May 6

Locals contribute time and materials to create ‘natural’
booms – NY Times

Friday May 7

BP and Transocean are named by Coast Guard as
‘responsible parties’ meaning that they are responsible for
the clean-up – NY Times

Saturday May 8

Mining and Minerals Service comes under attach for lax
oversight – NY Times

Sunday May 9

First Containment Dome fails to stop gushing oil – NY
Times

Monday May 10

Reports surface about BP asking employees and boat
owners in Vessels of Opportunity to sign waivers of
liability/responsibility – NY Times

Monday May 10

BP to pay “legitimate claims”. When asked about
illegitimate claims, Tony is quoted by the Times of London
as saying, "This is America -- come on. We're going to
have lots of illegitimate claims." – NY Times

Monday May 10

Transocean’s safety record is scrutinized and found
wanting – WSJ
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Tuesday May 11

Senate Committee hearing begin: Transocean and
Halliburton accounts questions BP cement plug procedures;
3 parties blame each other – WSJ

Wednesday May 12

The Obama announces a decision to break up the Mineral
& Mining Management department – NY Times

Wednesday May 12

A CBS poll finds sharp drop in public support for increased
off-shore oil drilling – Daily Kos

Wednesday May 12

Modified climate & energy bill unveiled; expanded
offshore drilling provisions have been left off; republican
support eroded – NY Times

Thursday May 13

The Gulf is a big ocean. On asked about the spill, Tony
explains, “The Gulf of Mexico is a very big ocean. The
amount of volume of oil and dispersant we are putting into
it is tiny in relation to the total water volume." – The
Guardian (UK)

Thursday May 13

Newest estimates by Purdue University’s Steve Wereley
estimate spill at 10x official estimate: 50-60,000
barrels/day - NPR
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Friday May 14

Internal investigations highlight MMS’s conflicts of
interest, rubber stamping of approvals, and overruling of
scientific staff recommendations – NY Times

Saturday May 15

More safety culture issues raised about BP – Washington
Post

Sunday May 16

BP begins paying for personal injury and economic losses
out of its 13 claims offices across the Gulf Coast – Times
Picayune

Tuesday May 18

Senator Markey succeeds in requests to BP to make
available live feeds of the oil spill from the floor of the
Gulf – NY Times

Wednesday May 19

NOAA expands fishing ban to 19% of the Gulf –NY Times

Thursday May 20

Scientific community criticizes NOAA and Obama officials
for not thoroughly investigating impacts of spill including
spill size, spread, oil plumes, and other data – NY Times

Thursday May 20

Louisiana’s Bobby Jindal berates US officials & BP for not
moving forward on protective berms. Oil now seeping into
delicate marshes – NY Times

Thursday May 20

Reports surface of fisherman becoming sick from working
on BP spill clean-up – Daily Kos; CNN
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Friday May 21

Desperation as oil covers 50 miles of Louisiana coastline;
“It seems like BP doesn’t care” says police chief – NY
Times

Saturday May 22

Louisiana state officials try to convince BP and the US
government to build sand berms and plug holes to save
marshes – NY Times

Sunday May 23

Obama establishes bi-partisan commission to investigate
drilling practices – NY Times

Monday May 24

Locals Officials in Jefferson Parish threaten to
commandeer idle boats to fight effects of the spill – NY
Times

Tuesday May 25

BP is asked by EPA to stop using the highly toxic
dispersant Corexit…and ignores request –NY Times

Thursday May 27

US Interior Department extends moratorium on new
offshore drilling in Gulf & Virginia & halts oil exploration
drilling in the Arctic - CNN

Thursday May 27

Plaquemines Parish’s Republican mayor, Billy Nungesser,
says of meeting with Obama, “He was solid on it; didn’t
back down on the issues…” – Daily Kos
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Friday May 28

BP attempts using ‘top kill’ and “junk shot’ to stop oil leak
– NY Times

Friday May 28

Dispersants are suspected as possible source for sick
fishermen and dead dolphins – NY Times

Friday May 28

Oil spill leak rate officially increased to 12-19,000 barrels a
day – NY Times

Sunday May 30

BP’s Tony Hayward denies existence of plumes –
Huffington Post

Sunday May 30

Internal BP documents show longstanding safety concerns
with Deepwater Horizon rig and “special permissions”
from MMS – NY Times

Sunday May 30

Lack of clarity on compensation payment calculation
leaves fishermen worried – NY Times

Sunday May 30

BP announces that ‘top kill’ and ‘junk shot’ have failed –
NY Times

Tuesday June 1

BP Tony Hayward apologies for spill and would, “ …like
my life back.” – USA Today

Tuesday June 1

BP announces a new attempt to stop leaking oil with dome
– NY Times
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Tuesday June 1

US Attorney General announces opening of civil and
criminal investigations into BO oil spill – Washington Post

Thursday June 3

Earthjustice files suit in federal court against the Mining
and Minerals Management Service’s approval of BP’s
clean-up plan – Targeted News Service

Thursday June 3

BP launches ad with Tony, “We will get this done; we will
make this right.” – ThinkProgress.org

Saturday June 5

A cap is successfully installed over BP well – NY Times

Sunday June 6

More criticisms by local officials surface over BP’s
handling of the spill response – NY Times

Sunday June 6

Public officials say of BP, “When I ask a Question, I don’t
get an answer” – NY Times

Monday June 7

Locals are dissatisfied with BP payments, assuming they
got them – NY Times

Monday June 7

Capacity of tanker ships storing well oil are ‘maxed out’.
More will be brought in – NY Times

Tuesday June 8

Going against ‘Unified Command’ in an Alabama coastal
community– NY Times
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Wednesday June 9

Plumes of oil below the surface are thought to be large and
growing – NY Times

Thursday June 10

Multiple reports coming to light about BP restricting press
access to spill sites – Daily Kos, CNN

Friday June 11

Official government estimate of oil leak officially increased
to 25-30,000 barrels a day – NY Times

Saturday June 12

Locals protest Administration’s moratorium on deep water
drilling – Times Picayune

Monday June 14

Obama outlines plans to create BP funded ‘Escrow
Account’ to compensate business & individuals impacted
by the spill – NY Times

Tuesday June 15

Official government estimate of oil flow rises to 35-60,000
barrels per day – Washington Post

Wednesday June 16

Oil executives testify in the Senate hearings. Exxon Mobil,
Shell, Conoco Philips, and Chevron insist they would have
done things differently – NY Times

Thursday June 17

Spill aftermath takes toll on Gulf workers’ psyches – NY
Times

Thursday June 17

Obama administration and BP lawyers announce agreement
to create $20billion fund to pay damage claims – NY Times
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Thursday June 17

Overall cost of spill to BP is now estimated to be
$62.9billion by securities analysts – NY Times

Thursday June 17

Tony Hayward testifies to Congress, “I was not involved in
the decision-making.” – Huffington Post

Thursday June 17

Republican Joe Barton apologizes to BP and faces huge
backlash on social media – Daily Kos

Friday June 18

State officials claim that their clean-up efforts have been
continually stymied by BP and federal officials, “…you
have a big mess with no command and control” – Times
Picayune

Saturday June 19

BP reports that it captured a record 25, 290 barrels of oil in
its containment efforts on Thursday – NY Times

Saturday June 19

BP announces that it will replace Tony Hayward as point
person on the BP spill response with Robert Dudley, an
American – NY Times

Saturday June 19

BP accused of dragging its feet on paying claims – NY
Times

Saturday June 19

Tony Hayward attends private yacht race in UK – Daily
Kos
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Monday June 21

Two reliefs wells being drilled to resolve oil spill predicted
to reach bottom of Gulf by late July/early August – NY
Times

Monday June 21

Anderson Cooper reports on BP internal documents
showing early estimates of oil flows as high as 100,000
barrels a day – CNN

Tuesday June 22

Poll shows that local Gulf residents disapprove of BP’s
handling of the spill. They trust the government over BP 2to-1 – NY Times

Wednesday June 23

A federal judge in New Orleans blocked a six-month
moratorium on deep-water oil drilling from going into
effect – NY Times

Thursday June 24

Containment cap on BP well has to be removed – NY
Times

Thursday June 24

Local ban on drilling will affect over 10,000 Gulf workers
– CNN Money

Saturday June 26

All clean-up handled by paid BP workers, leaving
untrained volunteers with little to do – Times Picayune

Wednesday June 30

BP share price fall, 50% since April, may slowing – NY
Times
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Friday July 2

BP and Coast Guard reach settlement with environmental
groups to cut back on sea turtle burnings – Bloomberg

Sunday July 4

Louisiana federal judge works on streamlining lawsuits
arising from ineffective BP claims process – NY Times

Monday July 5

BP demands $400 million from Deepwater Horizon well
partners to pay spill costs – The Guardian

Wednesday July 7

US Army Corps of Engineers denies permit for local plan
to preserve tidal estuaries – NY Times

Thursday July 8

BP holds up checks for fishermen due to process change
and more stringent requirements – Ed Schultz show
MSMBC; CNN Money.com

Friday July 9

A Federal appeals court has turned down the Obama
administration's effort to enforce a six-month moratorium
on deep water drilling – NY Times

Saturday July 10

BP will fit new cap on well, hoping to eliminate leakage
and funnel 35-60,000 barrels a day into surface ships – NY
Times

Sunday July 11

Plaqueman’s Parish Nungesser, labeled ‘frontman’ for the
Gulf, describes BP’s clean-up plan as “drawn up on the
back of a bar napkin” – Los Angeles Times
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Tuesday July 13

US Interior Department revises rules on drilling
moratorium to facilitate its enforcement – NY Times

Wednesday July 14

“I live week to week”, says on local resident – NY Times

Thursday July 15

BP’s new cap is in place and tests are under way to see if it
will hold – NY Times

Friday July 16

Well leak is officially stopped and oil spill is under control
– NY Times

Saturday July 17

Skepticism and a shrug; locals react to news of leak
stoppage – NY Times

Friday July 23

Climate & Energy bill is effectively ‘dead’ in the Senate –
Foreign Policy

Thursday August 5

Deepwater Horizon well officially ‘killed’ – Washington
Post

Sunday September 19

Deepwater Horizon well officially declared ‘dead’ by Coast
Guard Admiral Thad Allen – Boston Globe (AP)
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